President Donald Trump said last week that after defeating Iran, he would declare the Strait of Hormuz a territory of the United States.
I understand the instinct behind the statement. Iran has turned one of the world’s most important waterways into a weapon. It has threatened ships, disrupted energy supplies, and used the strait to extract political and economic concessions.
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But the U.S. cannot secure Hormuz by renaming it or claiming ownership of it.
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Declarations do not control waterways. Ships, intelligence, logistics, military readiness, and credible consequences do.
Trump says Iran is suffering a crushing defeat. Yet Tehran is not acting like a government preparing to surrender. Iranian officials said on Aug. 11 that Hormuz would remain closed until Washington ended the war, lifted sanctions and its blockade, released frozen Iranian assets, and compensated Iran for damages.
Those demands reveal Tehran’s real strategy. Iran does not need to defeat the United States in a conventional war. It only needs to keep the conflict going long enough to raise energy prices, exhaust American patience, divide Washington from its allies, and frighten shipping companies away from the Persian Gulf.
In other words, Iran is betting that time is on its side.
The economic stakes are enormous. Before the war, nearly 20 million barrels of oil passed through the Strait of Hormuz each day. That represented roughly one-quarter of the global seaborne oil trade. During the second quarter of 2026, shipments fell to an average of 4.9 million barrels per day, down from 21.6 million in the final quarter of 2025, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.
The problem goes beyond oil and gasoline prices. More than 110 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas passed through Hormuz in 2025. That included approximately 93% of Qatar’s LNG exports and 96% of those from the United Arab Emirates, according to the International Energy Agency.
There is no meaningful alternative route for those gas shipments.
Oil producers have slightly more flexibility, but not nearly enough. Saudi Arabia and the UAE operate the only pipelines capable of moving substantial quantities of oil around Hormuz. Their estimated available capacity between 3.5 million and 5.5 million barrels per day could replace only a fraction of the oil that normally passes through the strait.
Iran understands this vulnerability. Its leaders know they cannot match America aircraft for aircraft or ship for ship. They do not have to. Missiles, drones, mines, fast-attack boats, and proxy forces can make commercial passage dangerous without defeating the U.S. Navy.
Every damaged tanker raises insurance costs. Every delayed shipment unsettles energy markets. Every failed round of negotiations allows Iran to repair military capabilities and test whether Washington’s partners are willing to endure a longer confrontation.
That is why calling Hormuz American territory would be a mistake. It would transform a broadly supported campaign for freedom of navigation into an unnecessary debate over American annexation. It could also frighten Gulf partners whose cooperation is essential and give Tehran an easy propaganda victory.
The U.S. does not need to own Hormuz — it needs to ensure that Iran cannot control it.
Trump should begin by stating a clear and achievable objective: Every lawful commercial vessel must be able to pass through the strait without Iranian permission, tolls, or political conditions.
Next, the administration should build a serious multinational maritime coalition. European and Asian economies depend heavily on Gulf energy, yet they have repeatedly treated the defense of Hormuz as an American obligation. China, India, Japan, South Korea, and European governments should contribute ships, surveillance capabilities, funding, or logistical support.
The diplomatic groundwork already exists. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2817, adopted in March with 13 votes in favor and none opposed, condemned Iran’s attacks against neighboring countries and its threats to international navigation through Hormuz.
Washington should turn that international consensus into coordinated action.
The administration must also establish clear consequences for attacks on commercial shipping. Iranian missile batteries, drone facilities, naval bases, surveillance systems, and command centers used to threaten vessels should not be protected from retaliation. Deterrence cannot work if Tehran believes it can attack a ship, pause for negotiations, and then repeat the cycle.
At the same time, the U.S. should work with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, and Turkey to expand pipelines and land-based export corridors that connect Gulf energy supplies to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. These projects will not replace Hormuz tomorrow, but every barrel that can bypass the strait reduces Iran’s ability to hold the global economy hostage in the future.
Finally, Trump should treat negotiations as a tool, not as evidence of progress by themselves. Diplomacy is useful when it produces verifiable results. It becomes dangerous when Iran uses talks to seek sanctions relief, rebuild its forces, divide its opponents, and prepare for another round of escalation.
Iran has suffered serious military and economic damage. But destroying military assets is not the same as achieving strategic victory. Tehran remains dangerous as long as it can decide which ships pass through the world’s most important energy corridor.
Trump is right about the central issue: Iran cannot be permitted to dominate the Strait of Hormuz.
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But America does not need to plant a flag in the water. It needs to make clear that no regime can close an international waterway, extort the global economy, or attack commercial ships without facing consequences it cannot afford.
That is what victory in Hormuz would look like.
Heyrsh Abdulrahman is a Washington-based senior intelligence analyst and former Kurdistan Regional Government official. He writes on U.S. foreign policy, Middle East security, Iraqi politics, and regional affairs. His analysis and commentary have appeared in major U.S., Middle Eastern, and international news outlets.
