Choosing to Lose in Iraq

Published January 7, 2014 7:11pm ET



The news that al Qaeda has reportedly gained (at least) temporary control of Fallujah and Ramadi is devastating to veterans of the Iraq war. It is, of course, the same Fallujah that Marines and soldiers fought multiple bloody battles to capture in 2004; and it’s the same Ramadi that was the centerpiece of the 2007-2008 surge strategy in Anbar Province. In total, one-third of U.S. deaths during the war occurred in Anbar Province—mostly fighting to control Fallujah and Ramadi.

It was there that some of the best and brightest Americans spilled blood to prevent an al Qaeda—and Islamists of all stripes—safe-haven inside the new Iraq.  Our warriors cleared hostile neighborhoods, patrolled dangerous streets, met with tribal leaders, trained local police, and fought shoulder-to-shoulder with the Iraqi army. And after the Anbar awakening and counterinsurgency/surge strategy of 2007-2008, our brave Americans left behind an Anbar province—and Iraq writ-large—with the prospect for an advantageous political outcome. Which was ultimately the point of winning those battles and killing those insurgents.

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