The Russian government has publicly welcomed the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan as a defeat for the United States.
But behind the scenes, it is planning to prevent the spread of Talibanism to Central Asia and to Russia itself. And one major way to deflect that threat is to aim it against Western interests in the wider Middle East and globally.
State media and Russian officials have reveled in the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Kremlin suggests that the rapid collapse of the Afghan government demonstrates that the U.S. is a declining global power that cannot be trusted to defend its allies and partners and that NATO is a spent force. Both Russia and China may test other U.S. commitments in Europe and Asia at a time of acute global uncertainty. Moscow’s propaganda campaign will also be accompanied by moves to steer the Taliban into new anti-Western offensives by subverting other Muslim-majority states, spreading an authoritarian religious ideology, and undermining President Joe Biden’s agenda of promoting democracy and women’s emancipation.
The more immediate threat to the West and to moderate Islam is a revival of global terrorism. Afghanistan can again be effectively used as a base to recruit, train, and deploy jihadis against Western facilities, allies, and civilians throughout the Muslim world. New attacks on the U.S. homeland also cannot be discounted, and the younger Taliban generation may prove more sophisticated in disinformation campaigns and more capable in cyberwar and in deploying bioweapons.
The Biden administration may endeavor to develop ties with the Taliban regime to limit its assaults on the West. There is some hope in Washington that the new Taliban leaders will be willing to engage in diplomacy in return for a measure of international legitimacy. An alternative option would be to exploit Afghanistan’s ethnic, tribal, and regional divisions to weaken the emirate by supporting anti-Taliban forces, particularly those gathered by Ahmad Massoud, the son of the legendary anti-Soviet mujahedeen commander.
Massoud has pledged to resist the Taliban from his stronghold in the Panjshir Valley and to recruit experienced combatants. It remains to be seen whether the lobby against “forever wars” in Washington will also preclude assistance to insurgents battling repressive regimes.
Moscow has not evacuated its embassy in Kabul after cultivating cordial ties with Taliban leaders and receiving pledges that they will not aim their Islamic revolution against the secular Central Asian states. But the Kremlin’s trust in the Taliban may be misplaced. The Kremlin’s primary goals in Central Asia are to maintain the region in its sphere of influence, keep the West at a distance, and prevent the infiltration of radical Islamist groups into Russia. It will undoubtedly expand its military presence in the region, including border guards and special forces. However, this could mean a drawdown of troops in other regions where Russia is already engaged in wars or outright occupation, including Ukraine and Georgia.
Despite the reinforced military presence, the authorities in Kabul can now facilitate the infiltration of various ultra-Islamist groups into neighboring Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan and promote radicalization among disaffected locals. A sizable number of jihadis will also be returning from the war fronts in Afghanistan, and the robust heroin trade will help fund insurgency and terrorism.
In Russia, fears are rising about a new upsurge in jihadi militancy and anti-state terrorism. The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan will inspire Islamist rebel groups in the North Caucasus and other Muslim-majority regions, with many experienced fighters returning home from Afghanistan. A new round of terrorist attacks in Russian cities can be expected. The head of the Chechen republic Ramzan Kadyrov has warned of the imminent danger after the fall of Kabul. He is evidently fearful that his loyalty to Russian President Vladimir Putin may be undermined by a new generation of anti-Moscow Islamists.
A sizable jihadi movement can reemerge in the North Caucasus and other Muslim areas, aimed at the creation of an Islamic caliphate similar to Afghanistan. The ensuing challenges to Russia’s state integrity can also unleash a plethora of ethnic, national, and regional demands throughout the fragile Russian federation. Paradoxically, while Moscow may see the Taliban victory as a defeat for the West, the U.S. retreat from Afghanistan may have more destabilizing consequences inside Russia.
Janusz Bugajski is a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington, D.C. His recent book, Eurasian Disunion: Russia’s Vulnerable Flanks, is co-authored with Margarita Assenova. His upcoming book is titled Failed State: Planning for Russia’s Rupture.
