As tensions in Asia, particularly in and around the South and East China Seas, have steadily risen in the past eight years, Taiwan has emerged as an island of unexpected tranquility. The thaw in cross-Strait relations brought about by the era of the Nationalist (KMT) presidency of Taiwan’s Ma Ying-jeou, however, could soon be coming to an end. The likely election of opposition leader Dr. Tsai Ing-wen as president of Taiwan on January 16th may signal that rockier relations with Beijing lie just over the horizon.
While the dire warnings of “scorched earth diplomacy” with Beijing in the event of an opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) victory seem exaggerated, Beijing’s fixation on a reaffirmation of the “1992 consensus” could present a problem. Dr. Tsai Ing-wen has certainly indicated a more studious approach to cross-Strait issues than the last DPP President Chen Shui-bian. The Los Angeles Times reported on January 11th that her detail to policy analysis and reputation as a perfectionist have earned her the nickname “Correction Tsai.”
Yet Tsai has firmly avoided, even during her Washington visit last year, a public restatement of the 1992 consensus language. The 1992 consensus is a political term, which refers to a 1992 meeting in Hong Kong between representatives of Taipei’s Straits Exchange Foundation and Beijing’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait. The consensus, which a number of observers assert was reached at that meeting, is that “both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that there is only one China. However, the two sides of the Strait have different opinions as to the meaning of ‘one China.'” Such doctrinaire formulae, including the three U.S.-China joint communiques and President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan, form the bedrock of cross-Strait diplomacy. The question is whether China’s new strongman Xi Jinping will choose to make an issue over Dr. Tsai’s omission of “1992 consensus” in her public utterances.
A major theme of China’s Xi Jinping has been “the China Dream” to restore Beijing’s greatness after past humiliations by outside powers. The 1997 reversion of Hong Kong, taken by Great Britain, and later Macau (1999), taken by the Portuguese, to Chinese sovereignty were seen as a restoration of China’s honor. The question remains: is the return of Taiwan to the bosom of the motherland, seen as being taken in 1895 by Imperial Japan, equally essential to Xi’s “China Dream?”
Xi’s highly assertive foreign policy, most recently on display with China’s construction of aircraft runways on coral reefs in the disputed South China Sea, is a notable departure from Hu Jintao’s emphasis on “China’s peaceful rise.” It also contrasts with the policy articulated by the late Deng Xiaoping, who said that China should “bide its time and hide its capabilities.” Fortunately, there is a published blueprint spelling out what Xi Jinping means when he evokes “the China Dream,” and it is not very comforting for either Taipei or Washington. Retired PLA colonel Liu Mingfu’s book “The China Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post-American Era” was first published in Chinese in 2010. In it, Liu anticipates China replacing the United States as the global number one power in 2049, the hundredth anniversary of communism’s victory in mainland China.
Liu endorses in his book the current Chinese military build-up, which has rightly drawn global attention. Liu wrote, for example, that, “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation must go hand in hand with a rich and powerful army. In order to achieve this goal, China must dare to strengthen its military force, not just its economy…Chinese military forces need to ensure that Taiwan cannot divide from China; the United States and other countries cannot interfere in a Taiwan Strait military conflict; and the United States cannot attempt to stop the rise and development of China.”
What does this mean specifically for Taiwan, especially with the likely dawn of a new DPP government in Taipei which may prove more assertive regarding Taiwan’s identity and sovereignty and less accommodating to Beijing? Certain respected China watchers have indicated that there could be some rough sailing ahead. The Taipei Times quoted China expert Bonnie Glaser as cautioning that there “could be a strong reaction from Beijing” if Tsai Ing-wen is elected. Speaking recently at a conference in Washington, Glaser reportedly noted that Chinese leader Xi Jinping has clearly demonstrated that he was willing “to tolerate a high level of friction with a large number of neighbors and that he had a potential appetite for risk.” She further warned that Xi might pressure Tsai “to accept some definition of the ‘one-China’ principle” and that there could be “economic pressure or military action or intimidation.”
Beijing is also reportedly concerned about the upcoming American presidential election, including the possibility that an incoming Republican administration might put forward a more robust arms package for Taiwan than the Obama Administration has been willing to do. And recent developments in Hong Kong, including further restrictions on press freedoms, the disappearance of booksellers who may have been spirited away to the Chinese mainland by secret police, and the lack of any progress on election reform, all clearly indicate to Taiwan the potential peril of any future talks with Beijing on closer political integration.
Xi’s “China Dream,” of course, and his willingness to be more confrontational toward Taiwan, is premised on Beijing’s continual rapid economic development to pay for military modernization. The recent gyrations in the Chinese stock market, however, have renewed doubts over whether China’s economy can achieve a soft landing as it deals with rising wages, debt servicing for state-owned enterprises, a real estate bubble, endemic corruption, and an aging population. Renewed concerns over an unpredictable North Korean ally, due to Pyongyang’s recent nuclear test conducted in defiance of Beijing, also may limit Beijing’s diplomatic maneuvering in the short term. Still, the China Dream could prove, in the long-run, to be a nightmare for not only Taiwan, but for America’s other allies in the region as well.
Dennis P. Halpin, a former adviser on Asian issues to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, is a visiting scholar at the U.S-Korea Institute (SAIS) and an adviser to the Poblete Analysis Group.
