From military operations halfway around the world to the communications of virtually every single American, satellites touch every facet of life in the United States.
Yet despite their indispensable role both commercially and militarily, satellites can be rendered functionless with “relative ease.”
“Less than 10 percent of our military satellite communications capacity is protected against jamming,” Todd Harrison, director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Aerospace Security Project, told the Washington Examiner.
Jamming, a process in which satellites are disabled by blasting a signal toward them, can disrupt radio or TV broadcasts, or go further to subvert military operations. And it’s relatively easy to do.
“You just need the RF [radio frequency] components to transmit a high-power signal in the right frequency band,” Harrison said. “Jammers are readily available, you can buy GPS jammers online. It’s illegal, but you can do it. And we know some of our adversaries have fielded pretty large powerful jamming systems as part of their force structure.”
While the first actors to come to mind in any electronic war with the United States are Russia and China, doing so doesn’t require a state-backed level of sophistication. Insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan have used radios to send bogus signals to U.S. satellites.
“You could disrupt video feed from one of our drones so we can’t see what it’s seeing anymore or you could disrupt the command and control link to the drone so we can’t command it anymore,” Harrison said. “In Iraq and Afghanistan we’ve uncovered laptops where the insurgents had copies of video feed from some of our drones where it intercepted the communication link. That’s because it was unencrypted at the time.”
Untethered
The U.S. has broad recommendations for cybersecurity through the Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology, but abiding by the guidelines is voluntary.
The NIST framework was “developed through an open and transparent process that brought together stakeholders from industry, academia, and government,” an agency spokesperson said.
Mike Gold, vice president of operations for satellite manufacturer Space Systems Loral, said U.S. satellites could benefit from greater cybersecurity and improved encryption with more partnerships between the public and private sector.
“In terms of encryption, one of the issues — and really opportunities — is to ensure that encryption standards on commercial satellites are on par with what is necessary to be able to accommodate any future threats, and that’s an excellent opportunity for partnerships between DoD and the private sector to work together,” Gold said.
Some changes to improve satellite security can be made on the ground, such as updating software or communications equipment, but others require changing the satellites themselves, which are miles above the Earth. One option is to use a fleet of less-expensive satellites that can be switched out early in order to stay up-to-date cybersecurity technology.
“We build a large number of smaller, less expensive satellites that do not necessarily last as long and we launch them on a more frequent basis,” Harrison of the Aerospace Security Project said.
Gold believes updating satellite components will increasingly take place in space.
“You’re no longer just going to have satellites in orbit, you’re going to have robotic servicing vehicles that will be able to again repair, refuel, replace components and inspect satellites on orbit,” Gold said. “Many of the activities that we once conducted on the ground will now be done in orbit.”
‘Future warfare doctrine’
As the U.S. manages more aerospace technology, electronic threats and objects in orbit, some in Congress have called for a new way for the technology to be handled.
Calls to create a separate Space Corps within the military under the Air Force made it into the language of the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, similar to how the Marine Corps is housed under the umbrella of the Navy. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis opposes a Space Corps, as does Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson, who called it unneeded bureaucracy.
“I’ve been shocked by the response from the Air Force leadership. Did they miss where the Chinese and the Russians have already reorganized space operations?” said Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Ala., who proposed creating the Space Corps. “If she can’t implement this proposal without creating six new deputy chiefs of staff, that’s on her. Maybe we need a Space Corps secretary instead of an Air Force secretary leading space.”
The Trump administration recognizes the growing threat to the U.S. satellite infrastructure and where possible attacks could originate.
During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in May, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats said Russia’s and China’s military strategies will increasingly focus on targeting U.S. satellites.
“Russia and China perceive a need to offset any U.S. military advantage derived from military, civil, or commercial space systems,” Coats said. “[They] are increasingly considering attacks against satellite systems as part of their future warfare doctrine.”
