Sadr and the Surge

By way of Blackfive, a medic in the 1st Cavalry Division gives his thoughts on Sadr and the surge:

The insurgents who battle the Coalition Forces are from outside the country. And the biggest problem down here isn’t the insurgents. Its the politicians. The local politicians. Even though the country is controlled by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, downtown Baghdad is controlled by radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The Shiites follow al-Sadr and thus the Prime Minister does what al-Sadr says. Think of it as if a warlord controlled New York and blackmailed the President into diplomatic immunity

When 1st Cav (mainly 2/5 Cav) came here in 2004, they took downtown Baghdad (known as Sadr City ) by force. It cost many lives, but after a year, we held an iron grip on the largest insurgent breeding ground in Iraq . The insurgents were afraid of the Horse People, and rightfully so. But when 1st Cav left, al-Sadr influenced the Prime Minister to kick out the Coalition forces from that area of Baghdad . He said the Iraqi military forces could hold the city. But all that happened was al-Sadr regained control of his cty, and it is now a heavily guarded fortress. A place where insurgents and terrorists can train and stockpile arms. And we cannot go back in becuase the Prime Minister won’t let us. Our hands are tied. . . .

What appears to have happened within our diplomatic community, is that Prime Minister finally realizes that his days are numbered. If al-Sadr remains, [the prime minister] will be kicked to the curb. So hopefully he is about to allow us to reenter Sadr City , root out and destroy the enemy. A dramatic troop increase will allow us to do this. And the Horse People are back and ready to finish what they started over 2 years ago.

On Sunday, the Boston Globe reported that U.S. military commanders had been given new authority to pursue Sadr and other militia leaders:

US military officials say the Bush administration has given them new authority to target leaders of political and religious militias in Iraq who are implicated in sectarian violence, including the powerful Shi’ite Muslim cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

Such a showdown, key to Bush’s plan to increase the number of US troops in Baghdad, could spark a deadly confrontation with Shi’ite militias, which enjoy widespread popularity in Shi’ite neighborhoods. It could also erode support for the fragile government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who has agreed to the plan.

Senior US and Iraqi officials said last week that Maliki has pledged to confront the militias with the help of additional US troops. But many analysts doubt that Maliki has the will or the firepower to take on Sadr, whose Mahdi Army militia is blamed for much of the tit-for-tat violence in the capital.
In recent months, Maliki and other top Iraqi officials routinely vetoed US raids on Sadr’s operations, fearing the reaction of his legion of followers. Maliki’s government kept a list of militia leaders who were off-limits to US troops, a senior Pentagon official told reporters in a background briefing in Washington, but now Maliki has agreed that the list would no longer be used.

If the specialist is right, going after Sadr may be Maliki’s only option.

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