The secretary of state is usually thought of as the principal cabinet position, and indeed he or she is first among cabinet officers and fourth in line overall to succeed the president. But when Rex Tillerson shows up at Foggy Bottom, he will discover a department that faces many challenges, not all of which arise from international actors. There are deeper structural challenges confronting the State Department that have evolved over time and fundamentally altered the role the agency plays in U.S. foreign policy. A realignment is both necessary and possible.
One might be tempted to think that since the United States has been actively engaged around the globe since the end of World War II, this should be a golden age for the department. But Congress and the executive branch have created a number of strong rival institutions that did not exist for most of our nation’s history. It has been fairly said that Dean Acheson was the last secretary of state to whom the president looked exclusively for guidance on foreign policy issues.
The first rival of the State Department is the National Security Council (NSC) and particularly the national security adviser. The national security adviser usually sees the president first in the morning and last in the evening, a proximity and access that offer considerable power. Presidents have used the NSC in various ways, some leaning more and some less heavily on it—but even the least-used NSC is always an important source of policy ideas and not just the coordinating body it was designed to be. In the case of President Obama, who kept foreign policy-making tightly controlled by the White House, the NSC staff ballooned to nearly 400 professional employees. It is no surprise that Hillary Clinton seemed unable to point to any significant accomplishments during her tenure as secretary of state.
A second and even stronger competitor is the Department of Defense. This is true for reasons having to do with policy, programs, and personnel. The undersecretary of defense for policy sits atop a policy-planning staff of roughly 4,000. One might compare it with the much-vaunted State Department policy planning staff (about which legends go back to George Kennan) that employs a staff of 20-30. Meanwhile, the Defense Department maintains programs—many referred to as “train and equip”—in countries throughout the world. The dollar value of these programs exceeds the dollar value of State Department programs in many countries. Often these programs have the added advantage of being run by regional combatant commanders, who have close ties not only to their reciprocal militaries but to the governments of recipient nations. Finally, as to personnel, there is simply no comparison between State and Defense. Which department can dig new wells if they are required? Which can deliver massive amounts of food or other emergency relief supplies? Which can provide security for its people who go out into the countryside in dangerous settings? Which can build new facilities or repair old ones?
A third major competitor of the State Department is the intelligence community. Historically, the State Department exercised America’s foreign reporting function. American diplomats never had a corner on information coming out of foreign countries, but they were certainly first among equals in being able to report to Washington what was occurring abroad. This has all changed. Since the end of World War II the United States has maintained a vast intelligence empire that has expanded with every new technological development. Beyond the reporting and analysis of human agents, we have satellite intelligence, signals intelligence, and a total of 17 separate intelligence agencies. A sure sign of the erosion of State’s reporting function is the very limited role of the State Department’s own intelligence arm, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The work of this small group is entirely derivative, dependent on other intelligence collection agencies for its information, justifying its continued role by appeal to its superior—but scarcely demonstrated—interpretive skills.
Consider also how the historical negotiating function of the State Department has been eroded by the creation of the Special Trade Representative. Prior to 1962, the State Department was the lead agency on trade negotiations. No longer. State is now but one of numerous departments and agencies that make up the interagency trade negotiating team, represented by a bureau of economic affairs and a tiny staff reporting to the undersecretary for economic affairs. Similarly, many other cabinet departments have assumed a major role in international economic policy. The Treasury Department, for example, maintains a large international division that not only manages international monetary policy issues and regulatory standard-setting, but is also tasked with enforcement of international economic sanctions.
In addition to bureaucratic competition, the evolution of technology—in particular communications technology—has also eroded the traditional role of the State Department. The State Department is by no means the only or even the most important channel in which information from abroad is passed along to Washington decision-makers. Today Americans are everywhere—businesses, students, tourists, not-for-profit organizations, church groups, and others all reside and work abroad. Foreign newspapers, periodicals, phone conversations, Skype and email exchanges—all offer avenues by which an abundance of information is generated about foreign governments, trends, and possibilities. Ambassadors no longer occupy a unique and privileged position abroad but, rather, look increasingly like anachronisms.
Technology has changed outbound communications as well. No longer are ambassadors needed to craft messages from the U.S. government, much less to use their judgment and creativity to shape American policy positions. Detailed input to American embassies comes regularly from Washington. Ambassadors are regularly supplied with “talking points” and tasked to deliver these to recipient governments. Emails and cables go regularly to our embassies abroad instructing them on the finest and most nuanced points of the messages to be delivered. Moreover, foreign governments frequently learn about American government decisions, well in advance of when American ambassadors might share news with them.
Given these challenges, how can the State Department play a leadership role? How should the new secretary think about his role? Obviously, a special relationship with the president is beneficial in navigating the interagency process and its all but certain conflicts. Apart from this, one must accept the fact that the State Department is not operating in territory that it has all to itself. It will inevitably have to work within the interagency process and find a way to make the most of it. This can be done successfully only through the tried and true process of having more and better ideas than its competitors. This in turn will mean breaking certain longstanding and self-imposed cultural limits, in particular moving beyond the functions of negotiating and reporting in which the department has traditionally engaged.
A good place to begin would be for the new secretary and his team to think through a set of broad goals that will guide them over the next four years. It is all too easy to fall into the trap of becoming totally reactive, allowing the urgent to drive out what is important, and becoming mired in day-to-day crisis management. The new secretary and his team should ask: What would success look like at the end of four years? What are we trying to achieve? Here are a few ideas:
(1) A Russia with which the United States cooperates in areas of common interest, but which understands American resolve in areas of difference.
(2) A China that has ended its threatening behavior in Asia and plays a constructive role in the world economy and political order.
(3) A North Korea without Kim Jong-un and without nuclear weapons, or a Korean peninsula without North Korea altogether.
(4) An Iran whose geopolitical pretensions have been reduced to a more normal level.
(5) A Cuba without Raúl Castro, which has opened up its economic and political system.
6) A Venezuela without Nicolás Maduro, which restores Venezuela’s traditional freedoms.
(7) A Saudi Arabia that no longer finances radical Islamism.
(8) A strong NATO alliance in which all partners meet minimally agreed levels of participation.
(9) A Palestinian population that understands that it too must play a constructive role if there is to be peace, much less a two-state solution.
(10) A reformed foreign assistance program that focuses on what actually works and leverages trade and investment for economic development.
These are outcomes that could provide a template for creative policy-making. The department could think through and craft policies—diplomatic and economic, political and military—that are in the service of these goals. This would require new and far bolder thinking than the department has displayed in many years. These would include setting out clear policy markers (for example, no Iranian close approaches to U.S. ships in international waters), upending and creating new regional alliances, conditioning foreign assistance and contributions to international organizations on pro-American policies and votes, expanding covert programs, and a host of other policies. Even career officials, who will not at first welcome changes to time-honored ways of doing business, might in the end find much here to support, not least restoring State to a lead role in foreign policy-making.
Inevitably the State Department will spend much time responding to crises and to events that we cannot yet envision. But if that is all it does, it will have ceded its agenda to others. Far better to lead.
Jeff Bergner served as staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as assistant secretary of state for legislative affairs. He currently teaches at the University of Virginia’s Batten School of Public Policy.
