All of the hubbub over the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s July 12 ruling that left China’s “nine-dash line” in tatters and raised questions anew about Beijing’s ability to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international arena overlooked one vital factor: There’s a new sheriff in town in Manila. Hard-line nationalist Benigno Aquino, who was president when the Philippines brought its suit to the Hague in 2013, was replaced on June 30 by a new president with a decidedly softer approach towards his country’s big neighbor to the north.
Aquino had consistently insisted on referring to the body of water in dispute as “the West Philippine Sea,” much to the chagrin of Beijing, which prefers calling it the “South China Sea.” Aquino directed a Berlin-like airlift of supplies to a beleaguered garrison of Philippine marines on the isolated Second Thomas Shoal in 2014 when Chinese coast guard vessels blocked their resupply. The two countries even engaged in a brief “banana war” in 2012, as the Chinese never hesitate to use trade as a cudgel. (Beijing slapped import restrictions on banana imports, which was significant, given that the Chinese market accounts for thirty percent of Philippine banana exports.) Aquino was at his most dramatic during public remarks in Tokyo in 2015, when he compared Chinese aggressive behavior in the South China Sea to pre-war Nazi bullying of Czechoslovakia over the Sudetenland. The mandarins in Beijing and admirals of the South Sea Fleet undoubtedly breathed a collective sigh of relief when Aquino recently stepped down.
The new president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, has adopted a much more conciliatory line toward Beijing. After briefly joking during the presidential election campaign that he would “ride a jet ski while bringing the Philippine flag” to the Spratlys to assert Philippine sovereignty, Duterte quickly changed his tune. Even before the Hague ruling, he publicly indicated that he was open to “bilateral talks with China” over the territorial disputes, something his predecessor studiously avoided because of a widespread regional perception that Beijing would prefer to pick off weaker territorial claimants one by one in isolation. (On election day, however, Duterte seemed to again reverse himself by discussing “multilateral negotiations” on the South China Sea.)
Duterte also met with the Chinese ambassador before meeting the American ambassador, which some saw as a protocol snub of an old ally. He has also noted in earlier public statements that his “grandfather was Chinese.” And in his June 30 inaugural address, Duterte failed to make any specific mention of the South China Sea at all, even though it is arguably the number one national security issue facing the Philippines today. He limited his comments on foreign affairs to the following: “On the international front and community of nations, let me reiterate that the Republic of the Philippines will honor treaties and international obligations.” This must be music to the ears of the Beijing leadership as they look upon Duterte as a man with whom they can do business.
Duterte, meanwhile, has also previously publicly stated that he feels “lukewarm toward the United States.” The at-times trash-talking politician even advised the American and Australian ambassadors to “shut their mouths” after they expressed criticism of his crude election campaign joke about the jailhouse rape of a missionary. In a fit of pique, he even publicly dared the two countries to “cut diplomatic ties” with Manila. President-elect Duterte then stated that he had only one question for American Ambassador Goldberg when he came to make a courtesy call: “are you with us?”
Duterte’s public questioning of the U.S. security commitment to the Philippines has raised some concern over whether his administration will follow through on all of the enhanced security arrangements with the United States agreed to by his predecessor Aquino. (The Philippines, a former U.S. territory, has always displayed a rather ambivalent attitude towards Washington, as demonstrated by the Senate vote in the early 1990s to reject a treaty on U.S. base renewal.)
The United States has other interests linked with both freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and the Obama Administration “re-balance” to Asia which go beyond treaty commitments to its Philippine ally. However, Washington’s at first hesitant decision to undertake somewhat risky freedom-of-navigation operations near Chinese fortified coral reefs in South China Sea waters appeared to be at least partially predicated on the need to stand with a treaty ally.
The ball, therefore, seems to be squarely in Manila’s court in formulation of policy in a post-Hague environment. And reports of flag-waving, joyous crowds in Manila after the ruling was announced would seem to indicate that there will be popular pressure on the new Philippine president to uphold national sovereignty—despite whatever his personal inclinations may be. A foreign ministry statement issued in Manila “welcoming the issuance today, 12 July 2016, of the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal” indicates that that, indeed, will likely be the case. But Duterte could keep us all guessing.
Dennis P. Halpin, a former adviser on Asian issues to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, is a visiting scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute (SAIS) and an adviser to the Poblete Analysis Group.
