The start of President Trump’s visit to India this week was all pomp and circumstance, but soon he and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi got down to business. The primary consideration was what Trump described as “an incredible trade agreement to reduce barriers of investment between the United States and India” while speaking at a rally in Ahmedabad on Monday. Yet also on the agenda were arms deals valued above $3 billion.
Positive engagement with the world’s most populous democracy is welcome, but Trump is unwise to view India as a potential client state that can be bent to Washington’s will. Given rising concerns over Modi’s increasingly authoritarian domestic policies and his handling of the disputed territory of Kashmir, our approach to India should prioritize productive trade and diplomacy, not weapons deals. Unfortunately, the Trump administration is trying to coerce India into acting on U.S. whims.
“We make the greatest weapons ever made. Airplanes. Missiles. Rockets. Ships. We make the best, and we’re dealing now with India. But this includes advanced air defense systems and armed and unarmed aerial vehicles,” Trump said Monday. This comes two years after his administration elevated India, in recent years rivaled only by Saudi Arabia for the title of world’s largest weapons importer, to Strategic Trade Authorization-1 status, which gives New Delhi the same access to U.S. defense exports as that enjoyed by our NATO allies.
The designation and a concurrent sanctions waiver to allow India to buy weapons from Russia along with, now, this arms sale, are all widely understood as an effort to bolster U.S.-India relations and cultivate India as a pro-U.S. regional rival to China. The Trump administration appears to see enhanced “defense cooperation” between the United States and India, as the president put it at the rally Monday, as a way to strengthen the U.S. position vis-a-vis China in Asia. India, in this perspective, would act as Washington’s junior partner in the great power competition, pushing back on Beijing’s regional dominance on our behalf.
This narrative is only half right: Yes, India will seek to balance China, but not always for America’s benefit.
No matter how much Trump cozies up to Modi, New Delhi will act in its own perceived interests in relations with Washington and Beijing alike. Sometimes that will work out to the U.S. preference, and sometimes it won’t. Regardless, U.S. arms and trade arrangements, absent extreme and dangerous measures such as a total suspension of trade, are unlikely to significantly change New Delhi’s choices here, because its policies toward the largest nation in its neighborhood affect India’s core national interests in a way those factors do not.
Beyond this issue of maintaining realistic expectations, the Modi government’s policies should give Washington pause in moving forward with military deals.
As the Reason Foundation’s Shikha Dalmia has documented, Modi has moved India in an authoritarian direction in its treatment of minority groups, including Muslims and Christians, who are subject to increasing violence. (Trump reportedly plans to discuss religious freedom during his visit, but it is not clear what, if any, effect this will have. The arms deal, already accomplished, offers no leverage.)
In Kashmir, with its competing claims of control by India, Pakistan, and China, Modi has taken newly oppressive measures, including a complete shutdown of internet access that would have continued indefinitely, had not India’s Supreme Court required a partial restoration.
Better than this military-first version of U.S.-India relations is one that pursues mutually beneficial trade and diplomacy. India will continue to serve as a regional balance to China with or without U.S. encouragement — but unlike arms deals and efforts to recruit India to do Washington’s bidding in great power rivalry, economic and diplomatic engagement doesn’t risk unintended consequences that could be detrimental to U.S. security.
A relationship built around prosperity and peace is by far the more prudent approach.
Bonnie Kristian is a fellow at Defense Priorities and contributing editor at the Week.
