To defeat the U.S. military in the South China Sea, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army will need to hit a U.S. aircraft carrier or impose overwhelming losses on Navy warships operating within the first island chain. China’s new J-20B stealth fighter jet will not be instrumental in the accomplishment of either objective.
For context, here’s a map of the first island chain.
I note the J-20B issue in light of Beijing’s deliberate leaking that it has begun mass-producing its new long-range J-20 stealth fighter jets. A senior Chinese army official told the South China Morning Post on Monday that problems with the airframe have been fixed and that it is ready for heavy production. The jet’s primary improvement is apparently related to thrust vectoring, which would allow it to operate with greater maneuverability.
But although the likelihood of a U.S.-China conflict is growing quickly, the J-20B is no game changer.
For a start, its air-to-air combat capabilities are exaggerated. While the J-20B is a leap in China’s strike fighter competency, which is enabled by its industrial espionage against Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman, it does not supersede U.S. air-to-air capabilities. And while it is designed to be a long-range fighter, the key challenge for Chinese war planners is how to employ the J-20B at a distance. The jet might support short-range engagements close to the Chinese army’s island strongholds, supported by the Chinese army’s impressive short-to-medium-range air defense and electronic warfare systems. But the J-20B’s stealth profile, which is not as good as China claims, precludes its employment of medium- to long-range anti-ship missiles. Equipped with those missiles, it would face rapid detection by the U.S. Navy’s AN-SPY sensor suite.
Regardless, the edges of the first island chain entering into the Philippine Sea would be a death zone for the J-20B.
This is where U.S. carrier strike groups would be operating as the supporting force for the main offensive effort to degrade the Chinese army within the first island chain (the inside-chain offensive force would likely center around long-range air superiority, bomber and missile forces, Marine missile teams, destroyers, and, particularly, submarines). But outside the first island chain, the moment the J-20B used its active electronically scanned array system, it would face a swarm of RIM-174 ERAMs and various air-to-air missiles. It would also be intercepted and killed by the F-18 Super Hornets embarked on U.S. carriers. While the Super Hornet is not a stealth jet, its avionics, crews, sensor systems, and air-to-air missiles are superior to those of the J-20B. China claims its J-15 long-range air-to-air missiles could undermine these competencies, but for various reasons, I doubt that.
Even then, the J-20B would be far from invulnerable within the first island chain. Operating within Chinese air defense screens, it would still face U.S. F-35 and F-22 squadrons that it could not see until it was too late. The importance here of sensor detection and counterdetection is critical. While the Chinese military is rapidly developing its naval and at-range missile forces, it cannot match U.S. capabilities in finding and fixing the enemy’s location. This poses new challenges for China in relation to newly developed U.S. sensor disruption/”ghosting” capabilities to misdirect its forces.
Still, it would be a grievous mistake to be overconfident in relation to a prospective U.S.-China conflict.
China’s anti-ship ballistic missile force is increasingly advanced and far more of a threat to the U.S. Navy’s aircraft carriers than the admirals admit. This force centers around DF-21D and DF-26 long-range ballistic missiles, which give China a prospective kill range of up to 2,500 nautical miles. And while U.S. carrier strike groups could likely destroy a few incoming ballistic missiles (though not with certainty), defeating saturation strikes by 30 missiles is a different matter, especially since those saturation strikes would be joined by aggressive Chinese space-based attacks on U.S. satellites (which help protect the carriers in a number of ways).
We must recognize that the loss of one U.S. carrier or even the crippling of one carrier would shake the public’s psyche in unpredictable ways. For many, aircraft carriers are the purest physical manifestation of military supremacy. Something immense in size, confidence, and power. Footage of a burning carrier would shake that understanding greatly. And I can near guarantee you that the day after the carrier was hit, just long enough for the footage to hit the news, China would offer a ceasefire, a ceasefire that appeared but was not semi-favorable to U.S. interests. The limited tactical loss of a carrier might, then, have outsize strategic China war-winning effect.
Where does this leave us?
Put simply, with the growing prospect of a U.S.-China war in the South China Sea and an order of battle that is more complex than some assume.
