The Australian Department of Defence recently released its first defense White Paper in almost a decade. The much anticipated Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 addresses Australia’s strategic priorities, taking the bold step of proposing a defense framework for addressing the rapid military expansion of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Australia’s prime minister Kevin Rudd appears to be convinced that, despite close economic ties, greater investment in the Australian Defense Force (ADF) is necessary.
Weary of the potential decline of U.S. primacy in the region, the new White Paper is a muscular declaration from Canberra that Australia plans to hedge against an uncertain future by maintaining its middle power status. Moreover, the strategic document may prove to have broader regional significance for other states that have witnessed China’s military buildup with unease, but have remained unwilling to invest further in their militaries.
Although Australian Defense Minister Joel Fitzgibbon insists the White Paper is “not about China necessarily,” Force 2030 acknowledges China will be a “leading stakeholder” in international affairs and potentially the strongest military power in Asia “by a considerable margin.” The document’s Sino-centric approach is readily apparent as it places a considerable emphasis on the balance of power between states. Concluding that it would be “premature to judge that war among states, including the major powers, has been eliminated as a feature of the international system,” the White Paper also contends that “Islamist terrorism will continue to have inherent limitations as a strategic threat.”
This is a stark deviation from the direction U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has proposed for the U.S. military in recent months. Gates has argued that the United States can afford to scale back procurement of its air and naval assets in preparation for a future of “hybrid” threats where the irregular military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan emulate the “trend(s) of future conflict.” This view was also reportedly the position taken by the Australian intelligence community, which did not share the findings of the White Paper or its primary author, Deputy Secretary of Defence Mike Pezzullo.
In keeping with Gates’ own focus, the document proposes an ADF with sufficient capabilities to contribute to stability operations in places like Afghanistan or East Timor. But it also offers an ambitious plan to grow Australia’s air and sea power so that it can play a greater role in maritime control and denial operations in the Pacific. At the heart of this effort are 12 new next-generation submarines that will replace the current fleet of 6 Collins-class subs and grow the fleet by 6 more, 3 Air Warfare Destroyers, 8 next-generation frigates designed for anti-submarine missions, 8 new maritime surveillance aircraft, 24 naval combat helicopters, and 100 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters.
More significantly, the White Paper represents the first major strategic planning document from one of America’s core allies in the region–not including Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review released this past March–to raise the issue of the strategic threat China poses while also declaring the need for a substantial defense reorganization to hedge against China’s growing military power. Although Japan devoted greater attention to China in its 2005 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), it recommended only “to remain attentive to its future actions.” The Japanese defense budget has continued to decline for the past 7 years.
While an arms buildup in the Asia-Pacific has been well underway for at least the past decade, only China has seen fit to participate. What then explains Australia’s newfound willingness to not only recognize the strategic significance of China’s military buildup, but also propose a costly and expansive defense modernization effort over the next 20 years?
Part of the answer is being driven directly by China. Whereas Australia’s last White Paper in 2000 viewed China as only one of a number of strategic concerns, in the past several years Australia has been more inclined to talk openly about China’s military modernization. This document appears to represent the full maturity of this strategic perspective. According to the lead author of the 2000 White Paper, Canberra has “underestimated” the pace of China’s recent military growth, which has generated “much more demanding future operational circumstances than were envisaged.” China’s uninterrupted double-digit increases its defense budget over the past two-decades were unexpected. The recent Department of Defense report on China’s military budget observes that if trends in China’s budget growth continue, its 2009 budget will be almost double its budget in 2005. This year, even in the midst of global financial uncertainty, China chose to increase its defense budget by almost 15 percent.
In the 1990s and 2000s the consensus in Australia was that it was premature to pursue a military expansion aimed at China. Prudence allowed for carefully observing strategic developments and delaying an aggressive procurement strategy to future decades. But China’s rapid growth and development of its submarine and surface combatant fleet, anti-ship missiles, and cyber and space warfare technologies in the past decade have made it clear that in the coming decades, if the current trajectory is allowed to persist, the balance of military power in the region will tilt convincingly towards Beijing. Because strategy tends to outpace force structure, long-term defense planning requires long-term acquisition planning. It can take 15-20 years just to design, test, build, and field new defense systems; for Australia, the time to begin planning for the future is now.
Some early critics of the White Paper argue that Canberra should work to cooperate with Beijing, instead of committing to a hasty military competition. Cooperation across the military and economic spectrum is critical. But as long as Chinese defense budget enjoys double-digit increases, Australia simply cannot afford to take Beijing’s word that its unprecedented peacetime buildup is purely defensive in nature.
But the even greater development that appears to be driving Force 2030 is not be the rise of China, but the potential decline of U.S. military primacy. For decades, the U.S. military has been responsible for maintaining an uncontested order in the Asia-Pacific that has served to greatly benefit Australia. The decline of American primacy in the coming decades would jeopardize Australia’s security by fueling strategic competition amongst the economically charged powers of the region.
While Force 2030 concludes “the United States will remain the most powerful and influential strategic actor over the period to 2030,” it is concerned that American power may become too stretched as it seeks to content with emerging events, further constraining its ability to respond. “This is likely to cause the United States to seek active assistance from regional allies and partners, including Australia, in crises, or more generally in the maintenance of stable regional security arrangements.”
Perhaps drawing on the lessons of Australia’s inaction during the decline of British hegemony, Force 2030 seeks to build a force that will enhance Australia’s capacity to contribute to U.S.-led operations, while also granting the nation the ability to operate more independently if it needs to.
The divergence of opinion between Secretary Gates and Australian defense officials may also have a lasting impact on Australia’s defense posture. The outcome of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review could prompt an even more hasty erosion of U.S. primacy as Washington diverts more resources towards irregular warfare and stability operations, while trimming back its conventional capabilities in a bid to tighten the defense budget. belt. Nevertheless, a more dynamic ally, able to assist the U.S. internationally and contribute substantial assets towards ensuring peace and stability in the region should be a welcomed development for Washington.
After a lengthy development process, two outstanding issues could determine the enduring role the White Paper will have on Australian defense planning over the next two decades. First, a lack of consensus within the government and between Australia’s intelligence agencies and Defense Department could dilute the focus of Force 2030, ensuring action on its most fundamental proposals is avoided. The question also remains whether Australian’s will be willing to pay for the force that has been envisioned. The failure to provide estimates for what the total investment will cost has already given common cause to the opposition Coalition in Australia to threaten to block future military appropriations. Defense spending has remained relatively stable at 2 percent of gross domestic product since the 1970s. An additional $70 billion investment over the next twenty years, while still just 2-3 percent real growth each year, will be seen as a significant request now and in the future.
It remains to be seen if Japan or South Korea will follow Australia’s lead, more formally identifying the challenge China poses and committing themselves to their own military buildups to offset PLA gains. Present economic conditions may postpone such actions in the immediate future, but China’s defense budget growth, even in tough times, may not allow for delays much longer. Early reports from Tokyo and Seoul have both nation’s in agreement with the findings and proposal of the White Paper. Just days before its release, Japan’s Foreign Minister, Hirofumi Nakasone, even traveled to Australia in a show of solidarity, using the opportunity to express his government’s own concerns with China’s military buildup.
In an attempt to help allay Beijing’s concern and avoid potential diplomatic backlash, Canberra chose to brief Chinese officials even before the Australian opposition leadership was briefed. Initial reports of Beijing officials “bristling” over the briefing were expected. But strong economic ties and China’s reliance on Australian raw materials should help stifle the extent of Beijing’s displeasure.
The publication of Force 2030 is a natural step forward for an island nation contending with the shifting economic and military currents of the Asia Pacific. How Australia now chooses to proceed forward, and how Tokyo and Seoul position their defense budgets in the coming years, should provide an indication of the larger competition to come in the region.
Eric Sayers is a writer in Washington D.C.
