Cover at the Corner Peter Wehner takes Mark Helprin to task for a piece in the Wall Street Journal that, while dealing mainly with the manifold sins of talk radio, also includes the following bit on the conduct of the Iraq war:
Wehner’s critique of this statement deals mainly with the strategic ramifications of such a rapid withdrawal, such as the descent of Iraq into anarchy, the creation of a power vacuum to be filled by al Qaeda, the opportunity for Iran to extend its influence to the far side of the Persian Gulf, etc. All of which is true, but there is another and more general aspect to be considered. As a military analyst, I see Helprin’s prescription for Iraq as breathtaking in both its arrogance and its ignorance of military affairs. It is a striking example of the contrast between what Karl von Clausewitz called the difference between “war on paper” and “real war.” Helprin breezily asserts that the U.S.”should have cut through Baghdad after three days and exited three weeks later,” which makes one wonder if he has ever looked at a map of Iraq and checked out the distances. Not even the Soviet Army, in its deepest Cold War fantasies, ever believed it could advance at such a rate–indeed, not even George Patton’s legendary Third Army in World War II was able to do so. As for pulling out in three weeks, this statement merely confirms the old adage that “amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics.” If getting to Baghdad was a challenge, getting all our forces back from Baghdad, intact and with all of their supplies and equipment, would have been a prodigy of arms. A professional looking at Mr. Helprin’s plan would only shake his head in disbelief. Helprin seems to think that war is simply a matter of drawing up some plans on a map, handing the plans to the commanders, and telling them to go. It is never so easy, in part because the enemy might have something to say about one’s plans, but also because of that pervasive phenomenon that Clausewitz called “friction.” In On War (which almost as many claim to have read as claim to have read the Bible), Clausewitz writes, with people like Helprin in mind:
What Clausewitz wrote in the 19th century remains absolutely true today, and his critique of armchair generals can be applied equally to those members of the breed busy at work today second-guessing those who have to deal with “real war” as opposed to “war on paper.” And Halperin is, of course, not the only or even the worst offender in this regard. It seems one can hardly find a congressman or senator who, despite his dearth of experience, is unwilling to express his opinion on what our military commanders ought to do, and why what they are doing does not come up to the mark. However, their bloviations fade to insignificance as compared to the hubristic nonsense one hears far too often from the mouths of the commentariat. So, what can we say about our performance in Iraq? Certainly there were many missteps, but the initial invasion was marked by a speed and audacity seldom matched in military history, to accomplish so massive a victory with so quickly and with so little loss. We were wrong-footed by the emergence of the insurgency, mainly as a result of misreading the socio-political situation and putting too high a priority on minimizing U.S. casualties at the expense of protecting–and therefore winning the support of–the Iraqi civilian population. But this type of error is to be expected of “real war.” Far more remarkable–from the perspective of those who know war–is the speed with which the U.S. was able to evaluate the situation, devise and implement the appropriate strategy, operational methods and tactics, and so totally reverse the direction of the war in barely six months. We are well on the path now to winning the counter-insurgency battle on both the military and political front, and only the obstructionism of defeatists at home can save al Qaeda from a stunning and perhaps catastrophic defeat. It is not coincidental that those most vociferously criticizing our performance in Iraq and calling most loudly for our rapid exit are precisely those who only deal with “war on paper.”
