Bing West, an embedded reporter, former Marine infantryman, and the acclaimed author of No True Glory, the story of the Second Battle of Fallujah, has returned from his thirteenth trip to Iraq and posted an assessment on the situation there and the path forward at Small Wars Journal. Mr. West properly describes both the successes and shortfalls in the execution of the new counterinsurgency strategy in Baghdad and beyond, and the challenges facing the Iraqi government and security forces. He correctly describes the nature of the fighting in Iraq. “Iraq is a low-level war with scarcely any firefights above a squad level,” said West. “In this war, the moral/psychological is to the physical as 20 is to 1. The new American military team has infused the effort with energy and strategic clarity, and seized the initiative.” On the upside, West noted the strategy to push from the large bases into the population centers is indeed working to build trust with the locals. The Iraqis by and large are welcoming the greater U.S. presence. He recognizes the success of the Anbar Salvation Council in the province. He also notes the Iraqi Army is performing well at the battalion level and below. On the downside, he recognizes the greatest challenges in Iraq exist at the national level of governance.”The national level–not the local level–is the critical impediment,” says West. “The Iraqi army at the battalion level–and many police unit–is advancing at an acceptable pace; it is the performance at the national level that is unacceptable.” There are serious logistical problems inside the Iraqi Army. He is highly critical of the Ministry of Interior, and advocates it being disbanded and giving control of its forces to the provincial governments. He questions the central government’s sincerity in moving forward with reconciliation, and he advocates increasing the number of the Iraqi security forces in Anbar to counter al Qaeda’s murder and intimidation campaign against our tribal allies. The document is well worth reading, and I agree with the assessment–of the situation in Iraq and Baghdad. The overall recommendations of the report are another matter. It is impossible to recommend a path forward in Iraq without mentioning the situation in Diyala. In the third paragraph, Mr. West provides an abbreviated description of his recommendations for succeeding in Iraq.
Not even once is Diyala mentioned in the report or its final recommendations. He describes “the two primary battlefields” as Anbar province and Baghdad. The reality is that there are four primary battlefields in Iraq: Baghdad, the center of gravity; Anbar province; Diyala province; and the “Belts” of Baghdad, the region approximately 20 miles outside Baghdad in all direction. The Belts region consists of the greater Baghdad province, plus sections of Diyala to the northeast, Salam Pak to the southeast, the “Fiya” towns of Northern Babil province to the south, and Abu Ghraib to the east. Diyala has become the main hub of al Qaeda’s operations. Al Qaeda in Iraq made Baqubah the capital of its rump Islamic State of Iraq. Since the inception of the Baghdad Security Plan in mid-February, the security situation, which was deteriorating after U.S. forces pulled back last fall, has markedly worsened. Al Qaeda has prepared fighting positions, supply bases, IED traps, bomb rigged buildings, and training camps in the province. Over 2,000 hardened al Qaeda fighters fled Baghdad and are operating in Diyala. An American intelligence official and a U.S. military officer informs us that al Qaeda is operating along the lines of Hezbollah’s military structure in Lebanon. Recent al Qaeda attacks in the region bear this out. Al Qaeda is organized in small military units with infantry, mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft teams, as well as suicide and IED cells and the accompanying logistical nodes. Al Qaeda has been conducting a terror campaign to remove tribal leaders and others who oppose them, while waging a campaign of intimidation designed to cower the local population. The Diyala Campaign is on the horizon, and it is a vital component of General David Petraeus’ strategy to secure Baghdad and greater Iraq. You cannot propose a way forward in Iraq without mentioning the need to drive al Qaeda from its safe havens in the strategic province of Diyala. Again, West’s assessment still has merit. In particular, he nails one of the most pressing issues we now face in Iraq – Iran:
