In President Joe Biden’s speech and leaked talking points on Monday, the Biden administration insisted it can address any escalated terrorism threat originating from Afghanistan.
The White House says it will “prevent, detect and disrupt terrorism threats with over the horizon capabilities.” If the Taliban allow al Qaeda to operate from Afghan soil, there will be “consequences.”
But the undefined nature of those consequences speaks to the vacuous nature of this pledge. The simple truth: It will be a lot harder to disrupt terrorist threats in Afghanistan.
First off, there’s the strategic challenge posed by the Taliban’s restored control.
Contrary to the claims of both the Trump and Biden administrations, the Taliban and al Qaeda remain close allies. The idea the Taliban will now restrain al Qaeda from pursuing its global holy war is plainly laughable. While the Taliban are, at least for the moment, centered in a more localized Islamic governance narrative, the two groups share a deep ideological kinship.
Most important is their common belief Western ideals and influence must be constrained by coercion. The Taliban gave safe harbor to al Qaeda prior to 9/11 for one simple reason: It supported the group’s global Salafi-Jihadist agenda. While the Taliban might be enemies with the Islamic State, they will now use their governing prestige and power to attract and co-opt ISIS officials into its ranks. Put simply, the Taliban are not interested in joining the international community. Instead, they seek to advance their brand of Islamic governance and attack those unfaithful to that interest. Al Qaeda comports with this agenda.
The Taliban’s return to power has also earned the perception that their victory over the West is divinely ordained.
The displacement of America and Afghan democracy will be seen by the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Salafi-Jihadists everywhere as a sign of Allah’s beneficence toward the faithful. The Taliban will relish in this perception, advancing themselves as the global leader for true Islamic governance. The group’s impulse for hostility toward the West, certainly to allowing al Qaeda’s external hostility, will be fueled by the sense their restored Emirate is just the first of many victories to come. The group’s spiritual leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, has previously made clear the defeat of the Afghan government and of international forces is only the first necessary step. What follows is the construction of an Islamic emirate that will seek to expand the reach and control of Islamism across the world.
Then there’s the tactical counterterrorism challenge. Beyond a few CIA officers operating in the shadows, the U.S. no longer has a presence in Afghanistan. That means it has far fewer means to recruit intelligence agents and monitor the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other enemies. Yes, the U.S. can still monitor terrorist phone calls, chat rooms, and emails where and when they decide to use those platforms. But absent presence, knowing who to target for intelligence gathering and how to do so is a lot more complicated. Al Qaeda has learned from 20 years of war how to mitigate its detection to intelligence gathering. The Taliban will give al Qaeda space to plan, operate, and initiate new attacks against the West.
Jim Reese, a former Delta Force Lieutenant Colonel who helped lead counterterrorism actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, told me there is a fundamental “cold start” issue with ending any U.S. presence in Afghanistan. If the U.S. needs to be in Afghanistan, even if for a mission that is limited in time and target, the complexity of doing so is now a lot greater. Those forces would need the sign-off of a neighboring nation to operate, and their access to supporting aviation, intelligence, and strike capabilities would also be commensurately limited. The risks of any such operation would be profound.
A Taliban government is a shared victory for al Qaeda. America will be less safe as a result.
