IN A SPEECH Monday at George Washington University, Senator Ted Kennedy accused the president of conducting an Iraq policy that has made it more likely that al Qaeda could launch a “nuclear 9/11.” According to Kennedy, American military resources were needlessly diverted to the war in Iraq rather than being deployed against Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. But General Tommy Franks, the commander of U.S. forces for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, disagrees. “Operations in Afghanistan did not suffer as a result of the one in Iraq,” Franks said in a CNN interview last month.
Nevertheless, Kennedy charged that “the war in Iraq has made the mushroom cloud more likely, not less likely.” Of course, he is entitled to his view. No doubt his claim will be vigorously debated in the coming days, along with the senator’s message that somehow he and his fellow critics would be far more ruthless going after bin Laden than the current administration. So with talk of mushroom clouds while Saddam Hussein awaits trial for crimes against humanity, this may be a good time to revisit just how close Saddam came to acquiring nuclear weapons over a decade ago.
In 1991, Senators Kennedy and Kerry opposed the resolution authorizing force to eject Saddam from Kuwait. On the Senate floor, Kerry argued that “time is not on Saddam Hussein’s side, but ours. Sanctions cost Iraq much, they cost us little.” Kennedy likewise declared that “time and patience are on our side, not Saddam Hussein’s.”
The Kennedy-Kerry position of waiting Saddam out did not prevail and soon after the Senate vote Saddam was ejected from Kuwait. But the war had also revealed something unexpected, a massive, clandestine, nuclear weapons program that had gone undetected by Western intelligence agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency until after inspectors had entered Iraq.
On August 11, 1991, the Washington Post reported that:
The location of the sophisticated, secret factory for manufacturing hundreds of uranium gas centrifuges was unknown to any foreign intelligence agency despite intense scrutiny and untouched by five weeks of severe aerial bombardment during the Gulf War that supposedly eviscerated the Iraqi nuclear project. As such, it is a monument to the world’s ignorance about what a determined bomb-builder such as Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein can do.
The factory was a key component in Iraq’s elaborate highly redundant and largely secret network of physics, chemistry and metallurgical laboratories, industrial mines, metalworking factories, electrical power generators, nuclear research reactors and radioactive waste processing sites – all aimed at swiftly putting a nuclear weapon in the hands of one of the world’s most ruthless leaders.
It turned out that time wasn’t on “our side.” The Post also reported just how close Saddam came to getting a nuclear bomb:
Thirteen years later, the former head of Iraq’s nuclear centrifuge program, Mahdi Obeidi, addressed the current debate on whether Iraq was a “potential threat” in last Sunday’s New York Times:
Iraqi scientists had the knowledge and the designs needed to jumpstart the program if necessary. And there is no question that we could have done so very quickly. In the late 1980s, we put together the most efficient covert nuclear program the world has ever seen. In about three years, we gained the ability to enrich uranium and nearly become a nuclear threat; we built an effective centrifuge from scratch, even though we started with no knowledge of centrifuge technology. Had Saddam Hussein ordered it and the world looked the other way, we might have shaved months if not years off our previous efforts.
On the issue of deposing Saddam Hussein, Senator John McCain has it right:
The years of keeping Saddam in a box were coming to a close. The international consensus that he be kept isolated and unarmed had eroded to the point that many critics of military action had decided the time had come again to do business with Saddam, despite his near daily attacks on our pilots, and his refusal, until his last day in power, to allow the unrestricted inspection of his arsenal.
Our choice wasn’t between a benign status quo and the bloodshed of war. It was between war and a graver threat.
Senator Kennedy has it wrong.
Daniel McKivergan is deputy director of The Project for the New American Century.
Previous Campaign Memos:
Kerry’s Phony Foreign Forces, Would President Kerry be able to get France and Germany to help share the burden in Iraq? Chirac says, “Non!” September 22, 2004
Nothing To Do With the Truth, John Kerry continues to insist that Saddam Hussein had “nothing to do with al Qaeda.” And he continues to be wrong. September 22, 2004
Lugar’s Other Comments, The media played up Richard Lugar’s recent remarks about President Bush; will they do the same with his assessment of Senator Kerry? September 21, 2004
For Kerry, It’s Always Vietnam, The subtext of John Kerry’s Monday morning Iraq speech. September 20, 2004
Kerry’s Flip-Flopping on Russia, The senator has two views on promoting democracy in Russia, too. September 16, 2004
Wrong Choices, A look at John Kerry’s record. September 15, 2004
Another New Kerry Position on Iraq . . . and the same one on Vietnam. September 15, 2004
Kerry and the “Direct Link,” The Kerry campaign is distorting Dick Cheney’s words. September 13, 2004
Kerry’s North Korea Non-policy, John Kerry calls the New York Times with complaints, but no plan. September 13, 2004
If John Kerry Were President, . . . Saddam would still be in power. September 8, 2004
Kerry vs. Kerry, What does “the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time” mean? September 7, 2004
The Kerry Record, What John Kerry about foreign policy and defense in 1984 and 1985. September 3, 2004
It Was This Big . . ., Does John Kerry still believe that the terror threat is an “exaggeration”? September 1, 2004
John Edwards: Disrespecting Our Allies, America isn’t acting alone. September 1, 2004
No Bargain, The “grand bargain” John Kerry and John Edwards are prepared to offer Iran deserves serious scrutiny. September 1, 2004
