The Rubes’ Revenge

The first came after the election of 1964. Thanks to a combination of robust economic growth, the JFK assassination, and, perhaps most important, Barry Goldwater’s candidacy for president, which alienated Republican constituencies in the North, Lyndon Johnson enjoyed a robust Democratic advantage in the 89th Congress.

The second came after 2008, when Barack Obama was elected handily, but not overwhelmingly. So how then did we get Obamacare less than a year and a half later?

We got Obamacare because 12 Senate Democrats from states that voted for John McCain, and whose constituents overwhelmingly opposed Obamacare, nevertheless backed the president on this most important issue. These 12 had won election at various points by distancing themselves from the more leftist national Democratic party. But when national Democrats needed their votes, they fell into line. These 12, and their current status, are:

Thus, only 2 of these 12 senators have been returned to office so far. Most, wisely, chose not to run for reelection. 

Before delving into what this means, let us take a brief detour into theories of representation in a democracy. The “delegation model” holds that a legislator should reflect the interests of his constituents. The “trustee model” holds that a legislator should act in the best interests of his constituents, rightly understood. Since his constituents might not have the time or ability to understand how a piece of legislation will affect them, the elected representative must act to advance the people’s true interests. He may vote against their express preferences, but only because he knows better.

Neither of these models captures the vote the 12 senators took. Obamacare was a highly salient issue, generating enough interest that the public was reasonably well-informed. The people said no, they meant no, and their no carried weight because they had thought quite a bit about the proposed law. And since the law was enacted, a vast array of problems with it have become apparent, justifying the people’s opposition and showing that the 12 senators were grossly irresponsible trustees.

It seems that the Democrats have been developing a third model of representation of late: Call it the “sneak it past the rubes” theory. Under this approach, you pre-sent yourself to your constituents as an independent voice, not in hock to the national Democratic party, so as to get elected. Then the national party allows you generally to vote with your constituents, on the understanding that when the chips are down you will vote with the liberal leadership. Then you hope that the “rubes” back home can be sufficiently distracted by the “war on women” or some other phony issue that they’ll return you to office. And if they choose not to, there will be a consolation prize: a cushy, well-connected job as a lobbyist (Blanche Lincoln) or law firm adviser (Byron Dorgan) or association CEO (Ben Nelson) or strategic adviser in PR (Kent Conrad) in Washington, where you are more at home anyway, or even a job out of town as an ambassador (Max Baucus).

All of which brings us to the state of Kansas.

As should be clear, “sneak it past the rubes” is good for only one big deception before the voters catch on. Of the eight pro-Obamacare Democrats who could have faced reelection up to now, only two actually won another term. The rest either lost or chose not to run. Three more are up this fall, and the current Real Clear Politics average shows the GOP challenger leading in each race. 

In Kansas, however, where Republican Pat Roberts is up for reelection, the Democrats are trying a different form of deception. It appears they have decided to ditch the party label altogether. 

In a crafty bit of legerdemain, national Democrats convinced their  nominee, Chad Taylor, to withdraw from the ballot. Kansas law states that a candidate can withdraw only if he is dead or not capable of fulfilling the duties of the office. The Kansas Supreme Court apparently agreed that Taylor is not capable of fulfilling the duties of the office, though nobody actually believes this. Taylor remains the Shawnee County district attorney.

The reason for taking the Democrat off the ballot is that an independent, self-financed candidate has emerged who is actually quite a liberal Democrat by Kansas standards. He is Greg Orman. Over the last decade, Orman has contributed overwhelmingly to Democrats, he briefly ran in 2008 as a Democrat to try to unseat Roberts, and a perusal of his positions—especially on abortion—suggests he is to the left of the average Kansas voter. Perhaps needless to say, he will not commit to repealing Obamacare. 

Bottom line: Greg Orman is a Democrat running as an independent. So this is a variant of the game Democrats have been playing for years now, with an extra layer of deception: Find a candidate who can win over Republican voters in red states by talking about his independent-mindedness, and when he gets to Washington he’ll be there when you really need him. It’s “sneak it past the rubes” minus the party label.

It is good that six of the eight pro-Obamacare Democrats did not return to the Senate—and maddening that two managed to do so, but McCaskill and Tester were able to get away with defying their constituents because Republicans ran inept campaigns against them in 2012. It is to be hoped that Republicans will defeat Begich, Pryor, and Landrieu in less than two months.

And not just because the GOP needs the seats to win a Senate majority, but also because “independent” red state Democrats need to be taught a lesson. They cannot be allowed to defy their constituents on such a high-profile issue and get away with it. Otherwise, they will only be emboldened to do it more often in the future. (Little wonder, incidentally, that McCaskill, who held on in 2012 in Missouri even as Romney trounced Obama there, was a key operator behind the scenes in getting Taylor off the Kansas ballot.)

Similarly with Greg Orman: If Democrats think they can sneak liberals into the Senate from red states by walking away from their party label, it is an easy bet that they will try to do so again. If Orman wins, look for mass replication of this strategy in 2016 and beyond.

Winning in Alaska, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Kansas, then, is an imperative for the Republican party at least as important as taking the Senate majority. Regardless of how the rest of the races flush out on November 4, Democrats ought not be allowed to walk away from the upcoming midterms believing that “sneak it past the rubes” is a viable strategy.