Washington’s revolving door, whereby policymakers and other government officials cash out and put their public service experience and connections to work for private interests, has always been corrupting to our democracy. But it’s also harmful to our national security.
When U.S. cybersecurity officials cash out to private firms, and those private firms go to work for foreign governments, they are making the U.S. vulnerable by sharing our secrets with U.S. adversaries.
In her new book on U.S. cybersecurity weakness, Nicole Perloth tells some stories from the cyber revolving door. An excerpt in the New York Times includes a couple.
Companies like CyberPoint took it further, stationing themselves overseas, sharing the tools and tradecraft the U.A.E. would eventually turn on its own people. In Europe, purveyors of the Pentagon’s spyware, like Hacking Team, started trading those same tools to Russia, then Sudan, which used them to ruthless effect.
Congress and the NSA should do something about this. Our own snoops shouldn’t be allowed to go to work for foreign countries.
