Redistributing up

Increasing government power gives more influence to the politically connected, which is often whoever can hire up the most ex-Senators and cabinet members-turned lobbyists. That’s never Mom n Pop.

George Will’s latest column waxes eloquently on this theme. Here he lays out the principle:

Government becomes big by having big ambitions for supplanting markets as society’s primary allocator of wealth and opportunity. Therefore it becomes a magnet for factions muscular enough, in money or numbers or both, to bend government to their advantage…

Will’s column focusses on pensions and entitlements for the elderly. These transfers are not terribly mean-tested meaning that much federal wealth-transfer is upwards. But Will also hits on my favorite theme: corporate welfare:

Beyond transfer payments, redistributionist government is itself governed by the law of dispersed costs and concentrated benefits: For example, sugar import quotas confer substantial wealth on a small cohort of producers already wealthy enough to work the political levers of redistributive government. The increased cost of sugar substantially penalizes consumers as a group but not so noticeably that individuals protest.
The tax code, government’s favorite instrument for distributing wealth to favored factions, has been tweaked about 4,500 times in 10 years. Generally, the beneficiaries of these changes are interests sufficiently strong and sophisticated to practice rent-seeking.

Will mentions sugar subsidies, but he could have mentioned the ethanol mandate benefitting the likes of Archer Daniels Midland, or the Export-Import Bank benefitting the likes of Boing, or green loan guarantees subsidizing Solyndra, or nuclear loan guarantees benefitting Southern Company, or wind-mill tax credits benefitting the likes of General Electric, or tax credits and eminent domain benefitting developers, and I could go on….

But Will also makes an important point often overlooked:

Not only does redistributionist government direct wealth upward; in asserting a right to do so, it siphons power into itself.

Increasing government power, increasing the influence of lobbyists, increasing business dependence on government — all of these things benefit lawmakers in their efforts to win reelection and get rich. See, for instance, how Chuck Schumer uses regulation and the revolving door to bring in political money:

Three years ago, Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., leaned on hedge funds to lobby more. The funds soon hired his banking staffer as a lobbyist. She began raising money for Schumer. Now he’s championing financial regulation that would benefit these hedge funds.

Or the congressmen who increase government influence over industry, thus giving industry more incentive to hire these lawmakers as their lobbyists. For instance, Bill Delahunt:

Former Rep. Bill Delahunt, D-Mass., has passed through the revolving door, in a particularly fitting way. The firm, Eckert Seamans, announced Delahunt was joining “to advise clients in highly regulated business environment[s].”
More specifically, Delahunt will provide “strategic counsel to firm clients on complex regulatory issues such as healthcare, financial services and energy and environmental matters.”
Of course, Delahunt was one of the people who made “healthcare, financial services, and energy and environmental matters” into “highly regulated business environments” by voting for and championing ObamaCare, Dodd-Frank, and dozens of other regulatory bills over his years in Congress. Delahunt made government bigger, and big government set the stage for his new lucrative job.
Delahunt’s new boss touts Delahunt’s “incomparable insight and connections at the busy intersection of business and politics.” And Delahunt helped expand that intersection by supporting regulations and subsidies.

And the staffers play the same game. The net effect of government growth, then, is enriching the wealthy and well-connected.

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