The Taliban is immolating President Trump’s Afghanistan policy.
The president claims he can withdraw all forces while also ensuring Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for al Qaeda.
Really?
As Kim Dozier first reported for Time, a U.N. report has established that the Taliban and al Qaeda remain close allies and that the Afghan insurgent group engaged with al Qaeda during negotiations with the United States over a U.S. withdrawal. Thomas Joscelyn, editor of the Long War Journal, outlined the significance of this engagement and the striking degree to which it undermines the Trump administration’s Afghanistan narrative. Put simply, it proves the Taliban has very little interest in honoring its obligations and quite a bit of interest in consolidating its power and supporting al Qaeda’s renewed export of Salafi-Jihadism around the world.
Trump refuses to accept that truth. Instead, as he did most of last week, Trump likes to make three incorrect arguments.
We are acting as a police force, not the fighting force that we are, in Afghanistan. After 19 years, it is time for them to police their own Country. Bring our soldiers back home but closely watch what is going on and strike with a thunder like never before, if necessary!
— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) May 27, 2020
Let’s take these one by one.
First off, the U.S. is most certainly not acting as a “police force” in Afghanistan.
Four Americans have died in combat in Afghanistan in 2020. A tragic loss, yes, but nowhere near the dozens of soldiers who were being killed and hundreds who were being wounded every month in 2009-10. This reduction in loss reflects the fact that the U.S. military is now operating at a far reduced scale in Afghanistan and, more importantly, is supporting Afghan security forces rather than engaging in direct ground combat itself (the exception being U.S. special operations activity against the Islamic State). It should also be noted that Afghan forces continue to take hundreds of casualties each month as they fight for their nation.
Trump’s second falsity is his assertion that the U.S. can achieve its counterterrorism interests with a total withdrawal.
In reality, that would only allow the Taliban to seize more territory and to co-opt more Afghan government authorities. While the group would likely be unable to seize Kabul, it could control much more of Afghanistan than it currently does, including major urban areas. That new positioning would give the Taliban territorial, political, and financial space to support its ideological brother, al Qaeda. At the same time, a total U.S. withdrawal would also deplete America’s ability to gather relevant intelligence as to al Qaeda planning and operations. (Satellites do not do a very good job of illuminating Shura meetings, especially since al Qaeda now knows to avoid electronic devices). This is something we should have learned on Aug. 7, 1998, Oct. 12, 2000, and Sept. 11, 2001.
Thirdly, Trump ignores the inspiration that withdrawal would give the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other Salafi-Jihadist groups such as ISIS.
It would play pitch perfectly to Osama bin Laden’s old but enduring message that America, ultimately, is a paper tiger. In turn, it would encourage these groups to redouble their attack planning in the belief that God had rewarded them for their perseverance. Total withdrawal would also obviously undermine America’s credibility with allies. After all, if the U.S. can’t be trusted to stick with a democratic ally under attack, what security alliance can it be trusted with?
In short, Trump’s present approach to Afghanistan has about as much recognition of reality as flat-earthers’ understanding of geography.
