WHEN GEORGE W. BUSH embraced Social Security reform as a key issue in his presidential campaign, everyone knew it was a gamble. Sure, polls showed majorities of the public supported the concept of limited privatization. But these polls were untested in the real world of electoral politics, and they directly challenged long-entrenched conventional wisdom on the “third rail of American politics”: Don’t touch it. In proposing the most radical changes to the federal retirement system in its 65-year history, candidate Bush “didn’t just touch the ‘third rail,’” explains Bush campaign adviser Ed Gillespie. “He grabbed it, picked it up, swung it around, and said, ‘Here it is. I’m going to change it.’” The gamble, at least in the campaign, paid off. Shortly after Bush gave a speech in which he began to lay out his general principles for reform and called for voluntary personal accounts, Business Week magazine dubbed him “Mr. Social Security.” And on Election Day, Bush and Al Gore essentially split the senior vote. Bush advisers believe this marks the beginning of a new era of Social Security politics. Now, in order to deliver on his campaign promises, Bush will have to fight. Congressional Democrats are expected to be hostile. But if Bush attempts any substantive changes to Social Security, he may encounter resistance from members of his own party, apprehensive about the upcoming congressional elections. The battle—on both fronts—begins in earnest this week, as a Bush-appointed commission holds its first public hearings. Moving from abstract principles to actual proposals for changing Social Security promises to be even more hazardous than campaigning on the issue. Bush appointed a 16-member, bipartisan commission to study options and make recommendations. The group, co-chaired by longtime Democratic senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, had not yet assembled when the pile-on began. Democrats scorched Bush for having the audacity to select commissioners who, in the most general terms, agree with his position. When the commission issued its interim report, Democrats, to use the technical term, freaked out. Not only did Bush want to bankrupt Social Security to enrich his friends on Wall Street, but the report confirmed Democrats’ worst fears: Republicans pretty much hate old folks. Washington exploded with press conferences. “What is going on here is not a mystery,” House minority leader Dick Gephardt told assembled reporters. “The Republican party has always opposed Social Security and Medicare, and these latest scare tactics are part of a 66-year drive to gut Social Security and let people fend for themselves at age 65.” Not to be outdone, Senate majority leader Tom Daschle added: “Your Social Security benefits will be cut under the commission report by 41 percent, nearly one-half.” This, mind you, was the interim report. Bush advisers say such demagoguery didn’t work in the campaign, and it won’t work now. “Democrats will say all sorts of ungodly things about Republicans and Social Security,” says Gillespie. “That’s the way it has always been and probably always will be. We run on Social Security every two years whether we like the issue or not. We’re much better off trying to do it on our own terms.” Dan Allen, a spokesman for the National Republican Senatorial Committee, says that Democrats must offer solutions, not just criticism. “They’ve got a seat at the table, now that they’re in the majority in the Senate,” he argues. “And on issue after issue—and Social Security is one of the biggest—they’ve done nothing but attack. They’ve offered no solutions.” But some Bush advisers are concerned that an attacks-only strategy might work for the Democrats. They worry that Democrats are gearing up for a “What crisis?” campaign modeled on the one conservatives mounted to defeat HillaryCare in 1993. At least two left-wing policy groups—the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and the Century Foundation— stand ready to launch studies and monographs in the next month making just that case. “If the other side can convince people that there’s no crisis, then what are we doing this for?” asks one Bush adviser working with the commission. “It’ll be very, very tough to do this politically if people can be convinced that there’s no crisis.” These worries, and a different read on last November’s results, have some conservative activists and congressional Republicans doubting the Bush approach. Several GOP post-election analyses, including one by strategist Jeffrey Bell that appeared in this magazine, suggest Gore’s emphasis on Social Security in the campaign’s final weeks shifted large numbers of previously undecided voters his way. “Bush was courageous to embrace Social Security reform,” says Bell. “But there are strong signs that Gore’s ads on Social Security were effective in moving people, first in the swing states, then nationally.” Several Bush advisers are recommending a sustained, aggressive campaign—beginning with the hearings this week—to define the issue and shape public perceptions of the commission. Eventually, such an effort would include national ad buys, extensive use of Sen. Moynihan, and possibly a prime-time speech on the issue by President Bush. “If we fight to a draw among seniors and near-seniors, and manage the issue properly, we can generate enthusiastic support—maybe even turn out new voters—in 2002,” says Charlie Black, a Bush campaign adviser. “Democrats have always thought that this was a bread-and-butter issue for them. They might not know it yet, but they could be playing with fire, too.” Stephen F. Hayes is a staff writer at The Weekly Standard.
