Very effectively resisting Russia’s invasion, Ukraine has found support from much of the democratic world.
Yet some nations are doing more for Ukraine than others.
The world’s most populous democracy, India, was one of the very few nations to abstain in a United Nations vote condemning the invasion. So also is Viktor Orban’s Hungary, a European democratic outlier in its reluctance to support Ukraine. While Orban’s penchant for Vladimir Putin is long-standing, his reaction to Putin’s invasion will only fuel Hungary’s growing isolation from the European Union. Hungary stands in notable contrast with Poland, which, although having significant disagreements with its EU partners, has won widespread praise for its support of Ukrainian refugees.
However, Israel offers the most interesting example as to how democracies are responding to Russia’s invasion.
While Israel voted to condemn Russia’s invasion, it has refused to provide Ukraine with weapons and to condemn Russia in more forceful terms. Russian oligarchs now under Western sanctions also appear to see Israel as a viable safe haven for their wealth and living standards. And a new report suggests that Israel refused to allow Ukraine access to its advanced “Pegasus” communications spyware. This restriction is particularly uncomfortable in that Israel has allowed Pegasus exports to authoritarian governments.
Addressing the Israeli Knesset last weekend, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky implored Israeli parliamentarians. He quoted former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir: “We intend to remain alive. Our neighbors want to see us dead. This is not a question that leaves much room for compromise.” Zelensky’s speech was a clever drawing of parallels between Israel’s resistance to Arab wars of annihilation and Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s attempt to annihilate its sovereign democratic existence. The Ukrainian president’s references to the Holocaust were ill-placed, but his address was otherwise compelling.
Israel should be doing more for this fellow plucky democracy. The sanctioning of Russian oligarchs, even those with Israeli citizenship, should be a no-brainer. That said, Israel’s reluctance to send weapons or spyware to Ukraine is more complicated than the black-and-white moral argument Zelensky offers. Israel’s choices here do not ultimately take root in its relationship with Russia, per se, but rather how its relationship with Russia affects Russia’s engagement with Iran. Israel believes that it is more important to maintain access to Russian leverage over Iran than it is to help Ukraine.
Facing Iran’s prospective accession to the status of a nuclear-armed power, Israel fears an existential threat to its security. The fundamental foundation of Israeli security strategy, after all, is its presumption that an Islamic Republic of Iran in possession of nuclear weapons would mean a second Holocaust. This is not a small concern, then.
Israel’s interest in maintaining its Russian relationship finds topical relevance.
As Moscow now delays the completion of a renegotiated JCPOA nuclear deal between Iran and the West, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett sees Putin as his holdout for diplomatic leverage over Iran. Desperate to restore that nuclear accord, the Biden administration has rejected Israeli concerns that the deal will enable Iran’s smoother path to a nuclear weapon. Indeed, so keen is the Biden administration to restore the accord that it is giving Iran an effective free pass on its attempted acts of war on U.S. soil.
Russia’s importance to Israel doesn’t end here.
Iran now seeks to use Bashar Assad’s restored power in Syria as a conduit for its overland arms flow to southern Lebanon and Syria. The advent of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’s ballistic missiles and drone capabilities makes this land corridor a preeminent Israeli concern. Again, however, as Assad’s savior and a top Iranian client, Russia has unique influence and information to help Israel protect its interests. The information point should not be discounted here. If only very quietly, Russia has enabled Israeli military strikes in Syria. Russian air defense and air forces in Syria have also repeatedly stood down in the face of Israeli air incursions.
Put simply, for Israel, wherein the very idea of existence is seen as something new, cherished, and under sustained threat, Russia is a partner that must not be lost. Israel can and should do more for Ukraine. But unless and until Iran shuts down its nuclear reactors and missile factories, Israel will not (and cannot be expected to) become a key Ukrainian partner.
