The Senate will soon consider President Barack Obama’s nomination of Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal to command military forces in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez as his deputy and Adm. James Stavridis to command NATO. When these three military leaders take their posts, joining new U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, the president will have changed the entire U.S. senior leadership for Afghanistan — aside from Gen. David Petraeus, who arrived at Central Command in October 2008. The new leadership, combined with the increase in U.S. forces, creates the opportunity to revamp the effort to stabilize Afghanistan.
The challenges facing this outstanding team are daunting. It will have to reorganize the command structure of American and international forces, develop a comprehensive new military campaign plan, and support a fresh approach for the international relief effort. In addition, it will have to help the Afghans conduct presidential elections in August, begin an expansion of the Afghan National Security Forces, and continue to provide support on the Afghan side of the border for Pakistani military operations against common enemies in the Swat River Valley and elsewhere.
The overall levels of violence and American casualties in Afghanistan remain considerably lower than the peaks in Iraq in 2007. The Afghan political system is considerably more mature than Iraq’s governing structure when the “surge” began. Yet progress in Afghanistan is certain to come more slowly than it did in Iraq. This year, indeed, is likely to see a significant increase in both violence and American casualties without any obvious signs of improvement in the overall situation, particularly if the enemy seriously contests the elections or increases the use of suicide bombers. Violence will definitely increase in the months ahead, moreover, because enemy activity in Afghanistan is seasonal, rising every summer before a winter downturn. This apparent deterioration is not a sign of failure or of the impossibility of success, however. As in Iraq in 2007, things will seem to get worse before they start getting better.
Decisive operations will not occur in 2009. The new team will likely not arrive for a month or more and will need time to carry out the reorganization and planning efforts described above. The campaign itself will have to proceed in phases, as it did in Iraq. Coalition forces must concentrate against enemy strongholds and safe havens while continuing to protect the population as they go. Even with the additional forces Obama has authorized, it will be impossible to attack all of the enemy areas at once.
The new team will have to develop a plan for sequencing operations without losing momentum or risking gains it has made. The small size and slow growth of the ANSF will not permit an Afghan “surge” similar to the Iraqi “surge” we saw in 2007. Securing the election and seating the new government will also be a major task in advance of this effort. All of these activities are complicated by the fact that it is much harder to move forces around Afghanistan than it was in Iraq, not only because of the terrain, but also because of the extremely limited infrastructure. In short, we can only expect to set conditions this year for major operations in 2010.
So how will Americans be able to judge the war’s progress? Violence statistics, casualty figures, the number of civilians in the “civilian surge” and expenditures of funds will not be reliable gauges. The presidential election will also not be a useful indicator of progress. President Hamid Karzai will most likely be re-elected, and this election and its aftermath will be violent. It may take months for our commanders to understand the reaction of the Afghan people and enemy groups to these electoral outcomes.
It will not be possible to make a meaningful judgment about the course of the effort before mid-2010. In the interval, we must focus on the progress of reorganization, the development of new plans, and the appropriate deployment of forces and non-military resources.
This reality will be dissatisfying to those looking for quick indications of success or for benchmarks by which to measure progress. And it will be fodder for those who are determined to declare Afghanistan a failure and insist on abandoning the effort, which Obama has described as essential to American security. He is right in that evaluation, and he has put the right team in place in Afghanistan. It must be given the time it needs to succeed.
Kimberly Kagan, president of the Institute for the Study of War, is one of four defense experts who write monthly columns for The Washington Examiner. She is the author of “The Surge: A Military History” (Encounter, 2009).
