He gets to that point at the end of his column, titled “Getting the Military Out of the Nuclear Business.” The bulk of the piece isn’t so much dedicated to defending the title as it is Arkin clumsily fumbling around the findings of an Air Force Blue Ribbon commission. An example:
Wrong. Air Force missileers spend all four years of their “missile tour” focused on ICBMs–space and conventional weapons play absolutely no role. After that initial assignment, missileers have traditionally moved on to either a space assignment, an ICBM instructor or missile flight test officer at Vandenberg AFB, or go on to Air Force weapons school. What the panel is suggesting is that because ICBM launch officers have little interaction with the actual missiles (they sit in underground missile alert facilities miles from the “sorties”), the missileer career path should be modified to include a tour as a missile maintenance officer. There is no “diluting” in ICBMs, though I’ve heard from some bomber pilots who lament their split conventional/nuclear strike duties. Arkin stumbles along:
Wrong again. In 2007, the Air Force had to cut 20 some missile officers at the lieutenant and captain level because they were overmanned in the field. In fact, a quick phone call to Air Force Personnel Command confirms that current 13S (ICBM) manning levels are “optimal.” And there’s never been a shortage of young men and women willing to fly bombers. There’s no Army recruiting “crisis,” either. Now my favorite part. After incorrectly interpreting the report, and drawing a false conclusion based on what seems to be little or no research, Arkin decides that nukes either need to be handed over to the Department of Energy (which retains non-military control of nuclear weapons) or outsourced:
I was unaware that the DoE had nuclear delivery capabilities. And I’d love to know which contractor would receive the fat nuclear weapons contract. Blackwater perhaps?
I’m not sure what polling data Arkin is referencing when he decided to speak for the entire country, but I do know that I’d rather have military nuclear professionals (who have a spotless, 60+ year record of accident-free nuclear handling) responsible for these weapons than some corporation or government agency that has no idea how to actually employ them. This is just another solution in search of a problem, predicated on sloppy research and a poor understanding of the subject matter.
