The United States and China have been engaged in strategic competition for years — a fact that only the U.S. has been slow to recognize.
But for the U.S. to prevail, it must recognize that the successful strategy of the last Cold War, containment, will not work against its new adversary. Seventy-five years ago this past February, a U.S. State Department employee named George Kennan dashed off what would later be called the “Long Telegram.” Kennan expressed his concerns over the aims, objectives, and growing power of the Soviet Union. The diplomat’s 8,000-word missive would later become famous, both for signaling the formal U.S. recognition of what would be dubbed the “Cold War” and as a precursor of sorts for the strategy that would lead to victory.
In 1947, a year after his famous telegram, recognizing the inherent weaknesses of the Soviet system, Kennan called for a policy of “long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” Containment meant countering the USSR through the “adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy.” Ultimately, with some variations, it served as the successful template for the Cold War’s surprisingly peaceful end 25 years ago this December.
But containment isn’t the right strategy for an increasingly assertive China.
The Soviet Union was crippled by both its economic and political systems. The former discouraged growth. The latter discouraged essential reforms. Both discouraged innovation and free thought. While it did offer a model that was imitated by both its satellite nations, fully industrialized nations largely resisted the Soviet example.
As importantly, by its very nature, the Soviet Union was largely economically walled off from the free world. This is not the case for China, which has copied the USSR’s Leninist political model but has economic reach, growth, and worldwide integration dwarfing that of its communist forebearer. The U.S. economy, as well as the economies of its key allies, are deeply connected to, indeed dependent on, China. And it goes both ways. Some have claimed that this mutual economic dependence reduces the likelihood of a conflict between China and the U.S. — a dubious claim, as Great Britain and Germany were chief trading partners on the eve of World War I.
China’s economy gives it leverage over U.S. allies, allowing Beijing to disrupt efforts by Washington to contain it. This is particularly true in Europe and other regions with borders and waterways far removed from the Asia Pacific and less threatened by China’s saber-rattling and territorial ambitions. Western Europe in general, and its leading powers like Germany in particular, have also shown a willingness to prioritize immediate economic profits over long-term security concerns.
The U.S. has recently attempted to steer another Cold War creation, NATO, toward focusing on Beijing. But such an effort is likely to be hobbled by the economic priorities of European partners. Instead of containment, the U.S. should look to what Elbridge Colby, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense, has called a “strategy of denial.”
The U.S. should prioritize and harness both its resources and its allies toward discouraging China’s attempts to dominate the Asia Pacific. To thwart Beijing from presenting a fait accompli in the region, the U.S. needs deterrence. That means recognizing that an active and growing military competition exists with China — and cannot be avoided. It also means prioritizing: The key to countering China isn’t in Europe and its decades-old security alliances. Rather, it rests with China’s neighbors, who are most directly threatened by her aggression.
New challenges require fresh thinking.
The writer is a Washington, D.C.-based foreign affairs analyst. His views are his own.
