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President Donald Trump has clearly been emboldened by successful applications of military force in the first year of his second term.
During his first term, Trump threatened to use force against North Korea in response to its ballistic missile and nuclear activities. He launched strikes against Bashar Assad in response to the Syrian dictator’s use of chemical weapons. He also ordered the strike that killed Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani. Still, these actions pale in comparison to what we have seen in Trump’s second term. What might Trump’s rising comfort with using military force mean for the next three years?
WHY MADURO’S CAPTURE IS SUCH A MAJOR CRISIS FOR CUBA
The stunning raid against former Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro last weekend has clearly elated the president. Under the shadow of a cyberattack that turned off the lights in Caracas, special operations forces and operators from the Army’s Delta Force special operations unit captured Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. At least 32 Cuban bodyguards and an undisclosed number of Venezuelan security personnel were killed, but no Americans.
While it is unclear what influence Trump holds over the new administration of acting Venezuelan President Delcy Rodriguez, he has already secured a big national security and political win. He has relocated a drug trafficking dictator from dancing luxury to a New York City jail cell. This action has also diminished the Cuban security services and increased pressure on that country’s communist government. And, of course, this is only one example of Trump’s expanded use of military force.
We have also seen strikes against the Islamic State group in Syria in response to the killing of U.S. soldiers, against Islamic State-linked terrorists in Nigeria in response to their killing of Christians, a two-month air campaign against the Houthis in Yemen, and U.S. strikes against the most hardened elements of Iran’s nuclear program. Crucially, all of these actions have been carried out with very low cost to U.S. lives and near-term security interests (albeit with high cost to weapons stocks that would be in very short supply in any future war with China). They have thus sat well with Trump’s preference for public relations-friendly shows of overwhelming power.
These successes have helped foster a developing Trump doctrine in which foreign actors had better do what Trump demands, or risk suffering profoundly negative consequences. But what might this doctrine entail in the months and years to come?
First off, it will have only a limited effect on China and Russia. Trump’s use of force has been focused against significantly weaker adversaries. This reflects Trump’s sustained desire to avoid a confrontation with China and Russia that might lead to a major war. And for all its rhetoric about deterring Chinese aggression, the Trump administration has tolerated Beijing’s escalating hostility toward Taiwan, the Philippines, and Japan without obvious responses to military posture. Indeed, Trump told Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi to be quiet when she warned that Japan might militarily intervene against a Chinese attack on Taiwan.
In much the same way, Trump has bolstered U.S. nuclear forces in the face of rising Russian threats while emphasizing his fear of a nuclear confrontation with Moscow. Given that the ship’s crew was recently reflagged as Russian, the seizure by U.S. forces on Wednesday of an oil smuggling cargo ship in the Atlantic will aggravate Russia. But because Russian President Vladimir Putin does not want to alienate Trump in relation to his diplomacy over Ukraine, any Russian response will be qualified.
Cuba, Iran, and North Korea are more likely to become targets of Trump’s rising doctrine.
Cuba has a big problem. Its economy has imploded, with increasingly vast numbers of Cubans having fled to the United States in recent years. But cut off from the crucial lifeline of Venezuelan oil supplies, Cuba’s ability to operate even a basic power network is in doubt. The ingredients for revolt are obvious, restrained only by the tyrannical skill of Cuba’s DI intelligence service. Even here, however, Cuba has a problem. After all, the DI’s credibility took a major hit when Delta Force killed dozens of DI officers during the capture raid against Maduro. Cuba’s security has thus been diminished by Maduro’s capture, Trump’s growing confidence in the utility of force, and by its loss of deterrent power.
Similarly, grappling with protests over soaring living costs, Iran’s leaders will also be very concerned. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei presides over a state hollowed out by corruption and economic mismanagement, and by international sanctions imposed in response to Iran’s nuclear program and support for various terrorist groups. But while Trump has often made clear his preference for a grand diplomatic bargain with Iran, Khamenei surely fears that he might soon be subject to an experience similar to that of Maduro.
True, a U.S. military or CIA raid to seize Khamenei from Tehran would be impractical and almost certain to fail. But the assumption of a capture raid misses the point. Instead, Trump’s growing willingness to entertain tactically (losing Americans in combat) and strategically (global escalation) risky military operations will make Khamenei think Trump is capable of anything. He will worry that Trump might suddenly and simply decide to drop a bomb on him. Trump will surely revel in maximizing this fear consideration as a point of leverage both to deter Khamenei or his subordinates from ordering attacks on protesters and to encourage them to make concessions to the U.S. on Iran’s nuclear program, etc.
How about Trump’s erstwhile friend, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un?
Although it received little attention, North Korea conducted a ballistic missile test following the Maduro raid. Kim said this was necessary to boost deterrence amid the “recent geopolitical crisis and complicated international events.” His concern is understandable. The North Koreans always knew Trump was unpredictable. Now they know he has an increasing appetite for targeting leaders he does not like. Like the Iranians, they also know that Trump has little time for the customs of congressional oversight that might have tempered prior presidents from reflexively using military force. Again, Trump will likely leverage Kim’s fear for diplomacy.
Yet, while Trump’s doctrine might presently seem like a zero-sum win for the U.S., the world will be a less forgiving servant. Two challenges confront Trump’s penchant for short, sharp uses of military force.
First, the risk of escalation. Sometimes actors do not act rationally. So even if, for example, Trump were to successfully eliminate or capture Khamenei or former Cuban President Raúl Castro, Iran and Cuba might respond with attacks against U.S. civilian interests that led to war. Both Iran and the Cubans have the capacity to carry out mass casualty attacks on U.S. interests, for example. And while these adversaries would seal their fate by pursuing such retaliation, escalation would also be fraught with unpredictable risk and cost for the U.S. This leads to the second challenge.
Namely, the depletion of military resources amid a Chinese Communist Party threat that demands resource stockpiling. This is particularly true in relation to air defense missiles and other systems that would be critical to any conflict with China. Undersecretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby is adopting the wrong strategy on Havana Syndrome, but he is right that the U.S. cannot do everything around the world that it wants to do without also suffering an unacceptable cost to its war readiness against Beijing.
CHINA TEACHES TRUMP TWO LESSONS ON TAIWAN
This point must be emphasized and repeated. The defense industrial base remains woefully inadequate to replace depleted missile and other weapons stocks. If Navy warships are off the coast of Venezuela, they cannot simultaneously be in the Pacific, undergoing maintenance, or resting their crews for Pacific deployments. And while the U.S. can tolerate Venezuelan socialists, Khamenei, Castro, and Kim remaining in power, it cannot afford to lose a war with China.
Trump must be prudent. He has immense power at his disposal. But it’s one thing to play whack-a-mole with terrorists. The unpredictable risks of applying that strategy to state actors are far greater.
