Iran regime change would cost boots on the ground and China war readiness

That said, some conservatives, such as Fox News host Mark Levin, want Trump to do much more than simply punish Iran. They want him to bring an end to the Islamic Republic.

A NEW WORLD ORDER IS HERE, AND IT’S HERE TO STAY

They note, correctly, that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s regime is an ardent American enemy, one stained indelibly by the blood of hundreds of young Americans — read The Good Soldiers. They point out that Iran seeks nuclear weapons with which to blackmail the world into obedience with its other malfeasance. They observe that Iran is the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism, responsible for empowering groups that attack U.S. allies in Israel and Jordan, and jeopardize prospects for greater democratic stability in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

These are all significant concerns. And were a limited-duration air campaign likely to drive Khamenei’s regime from power, it would deserve support. Unfortunately, such an outcome is highly unlikely. And it is in that context that we must confront the near-certain negative consequences of a regime change operation.

For a start, that operation would force the Iranian regime into a corner. It would deny Tehran any aspiration of credibly avoiding uncontrolled escalation. It would thus spark major Middle Eastern security and economic instabilities and dramatically increase threats to U.S. forces and citizens. It would also heavily expend highly finite and short- to medium-term irreplaceable weapons stocks crucial to victory in any likely approaching U.S. war with China. And it would require deploying at least 1,000 to 10,000 U.S. ground forces into combat inside Iran.

The China contingency and “boots on the ground” calculation demand special emphasis.

The Iranian regime wouldn’t simply sit quietly as the United States and Israel acted to drive it from power. Iran would deploy its drones, cruise and ballistic missiles, and both its regular, irregular, and proxy forces to retaliate. It would hope to create so much chaos that Trump would back down and accept a ceasefire.

But defending against these attacks would mean degrading already greatly reduced Terminal High Altitude Area Defense ballistic missile and Patriot missile defense munition stocks. This is a problem. After all, in any war with China over Taiwan, China would throw thousands of far more advanced and independently targeted missiles against U.S. military bases on Guam and Okinawa.

Observing the depletion of air defense munition stocks, the commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, Adm. Sam Paparo, has noted that, “Inherently, it imposes costs on the readiness of America to respond in the Indo-Pacific region, which is the most stressing theater for the quantity and quality of munitions, because [China] is the most capable potential adversary in the world. … You know, it’s a time for straight talk.”

Then there’s the boots-on-the-ground issue.

Air power is not the drill torpedo out of the James Bond movie Tomorrow Never Dies. It is not a military magic pill. Regime change-focused air campaigns require precise and time-sensitive targeting intelligence, mitigation against civilian casualties, and an ability to exploit and expand tensions within the security forces.

Some argue that taking out Khamenei and his inner circle will allow Trump to do what he did in Venezuela, and co-opt whoever replaces the ayatollah. Marc Thiessen suggests that “even if the regime does not fall, Trump will own its remnants — just like he has leverage over the remnants of the regime he toppled in Venezuela today.”

I disagree. Trump’s use of limited force has worked thus far in Venezuela, where survival and corruption are the primary motives for supporting the regime. Here, air power can gel with Central Intelligence Agency suitcases full of $100 bills to forge new political arrangements. In Iran, however, while corruption plays a major role in securing security forces’ loyalty, support for the regime’s Khomeinist ideology also heavily drives loyalty. There are a great many fanatics in the Iranian security forces who would fight to preserve the revolution. They are motivated both by a political fear of what a new Iran might mean for their interests and by their theological belief that the Islamic Republic is a holy waiting room for the reappearance of a Jesus-like figure, the Mahdi. They are not just going to give up or become Trump’s puppets.

Nor do we see obvious prospects for an armed revolution by more moderate elements of the security establishment.

The recent protests centered on the increasing inability of Iranians to access the most basic goods and services. Members of the security forces have also been significantly affected by these concerns, albeit to a lesser degree than civilians. Nevertheless, the protests did not see even a localized uprising by security forces. Defections by elements of the security forces might occur if a U.S. air campaign lasted for weeks. Even then, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps would attempt to outlast the U.S. military, distributing their forces behind human shields and denying the U.S. strategic targets from the air.

Yes, Khamenei would likely be killed in short order, and with him other senior officials and military commanders. But this is only the tip of the revolutionary iceberg. There are hundreds of powerful regime figures capable of taking over. Figures who would command loyalty and firepower over hundreds of thousands of highly loyal security force members. The Iranian revolutionaries celebrate martyrdom with a passion Salafi-jihadis such as the Islamic State group can only dream of.

Yes, civil war would eventually occur. But after how much chaos, how long of an air campaign, and how many civilian casualties? The street-level revolutionary apparatus of terrorism would broadly remain in place. It would possess the arms and political-theological motive to slaughter the Iranian people rather than surrender to Trump. Moreover, this apparatus would rest heavily not on optimal targets for air attack, such as command centers, barracks, and tanks, but more simply on guns in the hands of zealots.

Again, there is no air power silver bullet. American targeting intelligence for air strikes would be superb in hitting fixed compounds and air defense systems. It would likely be well-served by Israel’s extraordinary penetration of Iran’s security apparatus. But regime loyalists will know to stay off the grid and avoid the U.S. intelligence behemoth once the bombs start falling. Ending this regime would thus depend on an intelligence system built around duration, scale, and varied capability.

Duration bears note amid the constitutional question over Congress’s role in authorizing an open-ended, high-intensity conflict. Scale and capability matter vis-à-vis ground forces.

The Israelis have a very impressive ability to monitor the movements of top regime officials. But only the U.S. has the intelligence capabilities and manhunting forces necessary to take down the middle to high-ranking echelons of the Iranian regime. Mossad and the military’s Depth Corps special operations units could provide key support, to be sure. But they are too small to conduct a dynamic targeting-elimination effort across Iran’s vast territory.

INDICATIONS THAT TRUMP IS ABOUT TO BOMB IRAN

Iran is four times bigger than Iraq, and it was ultimately the thousands of Joint Special Operations Command, National Security Agency, and CIA officers, and allied counterparts, that brought down al Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria. Drones, carrier air wings, and B-2 bombers played a secondary role. Once the fight pushes down to the local level, you need a lot of people on site to gather intelligence on targets, find those targets, and finish them off.

Those calling for regime change are calling for a strategy with far greater complexity and risks than they imagine.