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President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are riding high nearly one week into the joint U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and many senior Iranian military and security officers are dead. Iranian air defense forces, command and control centers, and naval forces lie in ruins. All of this is very good news.
But what will it cost the day after tomorrow?
We know one significant cost is guaranteed. When final accounting is done, the United States will have used a very large portion of its already grossly inadequate stockpile of air defense munitions. Iran is continuing to attack targets across the Middle East with its drones and missiles. And contrary to the presumptions of some, the American air defense munitions stockpile cannot simply be reconstituted by larger Pentagon purchase orders.
KHAMENEI IS DEAD. WE’RE ABOUT TO SEE HOW MANY TERRORISTS CROSSED THE US BORDER
Unless a defense industrial revolution occurs, it will take until at least 2029 for the U.S. to somewhat credibly withstand Chinese missile barrages in any future war over Taiwan — and this assumes no other conflicts and the Trump administration’s continued rush to build more munitions. We must hope, then, that Chinese President Xi Jinping decides his purges prohibit the pursuit of his destiny project for the near future. Ultimately, Iran matters little to U.S. interests when compared to the Chinese Communist Party threat.
Regardless, only a fool foresees easy days ahead in Iran. While the Iranian regime has been greatly weakened, it remains intact. We have also yet to see mass military defections. If that doesn’t change, things will get messy. Israel has a win-win scenario here in that it has pummeled its mortal nemesis’s ability to threaten it. But if a bloody civil war breaks out, or a more conciliatory figure fails to replace Khamenei as Delcy Rodriguez replaced former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, the U.S. will be left to pick up the pieces.
That brings us to the Council of Fili.
On Sept. 7, 1812, Napoleon defeated Marshal Kutuzov at the Battle of Borodino. The French emperor’s victory opened the Western approaches to Moscow — while St. Petersburg was Russia’s political capital at the time, Moscow has been Russia’s cultural capital since the 14th century. Napoleon assumed one final battle would see him seize Moscow and secure Russia’s surrender. Instead, a few days later, at a council in the village of Fili, Kutuzov withdrew his forces. Napoleon took Moscow effectively unimpeded.
Kutuzov’s gambit was fraught with political controversy. But in military effect, it proved that dominating an enemy’s center of gravity does not necessarily entail a mission accomplished. In Moscow, Napoleon found himself sitting in a city that the Russians had burned rather than surrender intact. No Russian surrender was forthcoming. Napoleon was eventually forced to retreat. His great army was consumed by the brutal encirclement of the Russian winter, broken supply lines, and guerrilla attacks.
The most ideologically hard-line elements of the Iranian regime are likely to follow in the Council at Fili vein by going underground, biding their time, and seeking to outlast and outmaneuver the U.S. Constituted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Basij paramilitaries, and an association of other Islamic revolutionary groupings, they know they cannot contest the U.S. military in the air, in space, and at sea. They know that the U.S. has laid waste to the regime’s political and military centers of gravity. But they also know that the U.S. military will greatly struggle to locate and destroy them if they scatter their forces and blend into Iran’s 93 million-strong population. And though they might now be quiet, there are 500,000 to 800,000 organizationally armed hard-liners.
Their capacity for chaos should not be underestimated.
The Guard killed hundreds of Americans in Iraq. Arming and training Iraqi Shia militias, the Guard also multiplied its own military power. Its bloody innovation against the U.S. military behemoth is defined by phrases such as “explosively formed penetrator.” Just ask the men of the U.S. Army’s 16th Infantry Regiment. Just ask the men and women of the CIA and Joint Special Operations Command about the boots on the ground effort it took to corral these terrorists.
Would some of these fanatics choose peaceful transition or obedience to a U.S. co-opted Iranian regime? Yes. Would all of them? Not by a very long shot. Some ignore this concern.
Marc Thiessen, for example, argues, “There is no need for a U.S. invasion force. The Iranian people are the boots on the ground, and the fate of the country is in their hands. And if things do not turn out as we hope, and a government emerges that resumes its hostile posture toward America and its pursuit of nuclear weapons, Trump can eliminate it as well.”
I disagree. Yes, Trump hopes for a Venezuela-type scenario in which this current burst of military power leads to the emergence of a more compliant leader. Unfortunately, as I’ve noted, unlike in Venezuela, “support for the regime’s Khomeinist ideology also heavily drives loyalty. There are a great many fanatics in the Iranian security forces who would fight to preserve the revolution.”
Hopefully, a Delcy Rodriguez-style leader will emerge. Still, it is altogether another question whether such a leader could command the hard-liners’ respect. Not unless the Trump administration’s requirements for that leader were things that the revolutionaries could at least bitterly swallow. That would mean hard limits to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
If, however, the Trump administration adopted the Israeli preference of a de facto end to Iran’s Islamic revolutionary project, including its support for terrorism, terrorist groups, and political allies, the hardliners would launch an insurgency. They believe they are on a mission from God, not a mission to placate the American devil. They would turn Iran and the Middle East into their perpetual battleground. Believing this showdown to be a test for the Mahdi’s return, they might even attempt to construct a radioactive dirty bomb or, though it would be far harder to accomplish, a crude nuclear weapon.
And although it would increasingly worsen the military’s already diminished readiness, Trump could keep bombing Iran until an acceptable leader prevailed against his domestic enemies. But even this scenario is a very messy one.
As I put it on Feb. 5, the armed hard-liner “apparatus would rest heavily not on optimal targets for air attack, such as command centers, barracks, and tanks, but more simply on guns in the hands of zealots … regime loyalists will know to stay off the grid and avoid the U.S. intelligence behemoth once the bombs start falling. The Israelis have a very impressive ability to monitor the movements of top regime officials. But only the U.S. has the intelligence capabilities and manhunting forces necessary to take down the middle to high-ranking echelons of the Iranian regime. … Air power is not the drill torpedo out of the James Bond movie Tomorrow Never Dies. It is not a military magic pill.”
Manhunting forces would absolutely be necessary.
This speaks to a broader point. The prize of ending or constantly wearing down its nemesis means that open-ended U.S. combat operations in Iran and/or Iranian state failure would remain in Israel’s interest. Netanyahu knows that only the U.S. has the power to pick up the pieces if Iran were to descend into state collapse or a prolonged civil war. He also knows that while these scenarios would likely entail great human suffering, they would serve Israel better than the prewar status quo. But the U.S. has a different strategic calculus that weighs heavily against open-ended action. So does Trump. My colleague Byron York carefully examines the political risks in this regard.
Where does this leave us?
TRUMP’S SUPERCILIOUS CHARACTER DOESN’T EXCUSE STARMER’S STRATEGIC CONSTIPATION
The U.S. should impose continued destruction on the Iranian regime over the next week or so. This might throttle the regime into a more favorable understanding with the U.S. and Israel, or lead to the emergence of a credible opposition leader. But throwing bombs and simply hoping for the best isn’t a credible strategy.
Those adorning Trump with the laurel of victory are dancing on thin ice.
