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Troop numbers are a poor measure of U.S. military support for NATO.
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What matters is the type and location of U.S. military deployments in Europe. That distinction matters amid the controversy over President Donald Trump’s recent decision to pull the 2nd Cavalry Regiment from Germany and to cancel the deployment of an advanced artillery unit, the 2nd Multi-Domain Task Force, to that country. The War Department also canceled a planned deployment of the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team to Poland. Following Polish concerns, Trump said the troops would indeed go to the country. But all of this has raised concerns that Trump is undermining NATO and risks encouraging new Russian aggression.
These concerns are significantly overstated. Contrary to most media coverage and the House Armed Services Committee’s efforts to restrict U.S. military relocations out of Europe, the Trump administration is generally acting prudently when it comes to the military footprint in Europe.
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That’s a good thing. Notwithstanding serious internal NATO disagreements over the status of Greenland and the war in Iran, the alliance still provides immense value to America and vice versa. As I’ve noted, “NATO aligns allies in support of America’s global diplomatic and economic objectives. It fosters an intelligence-sharing network of unprecedented scale and capability. The alliance would generate significant economic and likely even limited military support for Washington should China ever attack Taiwan, Japan, or the Philippines.”
The alliance also provided the security for $1.1 trillion in U.S. exports to NATO member states in 2025, and $300 in new foreign direct investment. These figures are 78 times greater than Russia’s economic value to the United States in 2021, before Moscow was hit with major sanctions after invading Ukraine. The Trump administration recognized this value when it pushed back against Russian threats to NATO ally Latvia last week.
Nor is it accurate that Trump has jeopardized the alliance’s military posture. In some areas, the opposite is true.
Consider how Trump has strengthened the most important NATO foundation: nuclear deterrence against Russia. U.S. Navy attack submarines continue to shadow Russian ballistic missile submarines — very closely, as Trump occasionally revels in pointing out — from the moment they leave port to when they return home. U.S. air, land, and submarine nuclear forces are unmatched in skill and capability, including in comparison to Russian hypersonic platforms. All of this means that while Russian nuclear forces could inflict grave harm on America, they would be highly unlikely to end America’s sovereign existence even in a full-scale war. The same does not apply in reverse.
But we also need to recognize that not all U.S. military deployments to Europe are of equal value. While the aborted troop withdrawal order pertaining to Poland was foolish, the drawdown from Germany is justifiable.
Yes, Chancellor Friedrich Merz has abandoned the defense neglect policies of his freeloading predecessors, Olaf Scholz and Angela Merkel. As such, he deserves close engagement from the Trump administration. But where Germany is only now taking defense spending seriously, Poland has long answered Trump’s calls for fairer burden sharing in NATO. Spending 4.8% of GDP on defense this year — the U.S. will spend 3.3% of GDP in 2026 — Poland is leading NATO in investing in hard combat power. Deeply pro-American, Poland also offers a proximate stronghold to the Baltic State allies most at risk of future Russian attack.
This is hugely important. It means that, in the event of war, a U.S. mechanized infantry or armored brigade in Poland could quickly join that country’s large and capable army to interdict any Russian invasion of Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania. Elements of the Polish 6th Airborne Brigade, British 16th Air Assault Brigade, French 11th Parachutist Brigade, and 173rd Airborne Brigade would also be able to conduct airdrops into battle within 24 hours, supported shortly thereafter by a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division. Moving more U.S. forces into Poland means more effective deterrence of Russia and more effective means of defeating any attack. Even, that is, if this deployment joins a reduction in the total number of U.S. troops in Europe.
On that point, a sense of proportion is also needed when analyzing U.S. deployment changes.
After all, it’s hardly accurate to suggest that Trump is abandoning NATO. Germany will rightly continue to host the U.S. Army’s 41st Field Artillery Brigade, which provides long-range artillery, and the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, which provides Apache helicopter gunship support. Germany will also continue hosting U.S. signals, engineering, and intelligence brigades. Indeed, rather than focusing on Germany, Trump should be relocating forces out of Spain and Italy. For one example, the 173rd Airborne Brigade should be permanently relocated from Italy to Poland.
Yet Russia isn’t America’s only adversary. In turn, we must be more honest about the responsibilities that come with recognizing China as the primary threat to U.S. interests. That threat requires the U.S. to urgently array greater combat forces in deterrence of Chinese claims against our other treaty defense allies in Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan. Again, this isn’t just about supporting allies for the sake of it. It’s because American prosperity, security, and the moral interest in human freedom depend on these alliances. But getting the global military posture right means hard choices.
That concern underlines the folly of the expansive and ill-thought-out war in Iran. U.S. air defense munitions of critical value to any future China war have been utterly depleted in that war, while Israel has stockpiled its own air defense munitions. The U.S. has also made major but only tactical gains against Iran’s missile, military, and nuclear programs.
What does this mean for the U.S. role in NATO going forward?
Well, at least three of the seven strike fighter squadrons, including both F-35A squadrons, stationed in Europe should be redeployed to the Pacific theater. While European air forces have suffered from decades of significant underfunding, the punitive damage that the Russian air force and economy have suffered in Ukraine means that European air forces, alongside the three remaining U.S. fighter squadrons, will be able to overmatch Russian air power very significantly for the foreseeable future. The Navy should also relocate three of the five destroyers stationed out of Rota, Spain, to the Pentagon’s Indo-Pacific Command. Again, while the Europeans have the naval forces to manage Russia’s threat effectively, they have simply long preferred to rely on the U.S. to carry the expense and challenge of these operations on their behalf.
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NATO remains well-positioned to deter and defend itself against Russian attacks, whether conventional or nuclear. The alliance deserves robust American support, and if Russia ever attempts to test this historic partnership, its forces should find themselves dying under American force of arms.
But the U.S. cannot do everything, everywhere in 2026. U.S. military deployments must be structured to strengthen our best allies and to manage China’s grave threat in the Pacific. As things stand, the Trump administration is broadly getting this balance right.
