High Noon in Tokyo

Such risk-taking can pay dividends. Or it can land one in a huge pickle, as happened to Koizumi in early August, when the upper house of parliament voted down his plan to privatize Japan Post. He responded with characteristic temerity, dissolving the lower house of the Diet and calling a snap election for September 11. On that vote hinges the proximate future of Koizumi’s Liberal Democratic party (LDP)–and the political survival of one of George Bush’s closest allies.

Koizumi, 63, has lusted after the privatization of Japan’s postal system for years, at least since he served as a postal minister in the early 1990s. Which may seem odd, except that Japan Post doesn’t just deliver mail. It doubles as the nation’s principal savings-and-insurance institution, boasting roughly $3 trillion in assets. So, in effect, Koizumi wants to privatize the largest savings bank in the world.

According to recent polls, the crusading premier may get his way. The LDP, which has ruled Japan virtually without interruption since 1955, still commands far broader loyalty than its chief rival, the Democratic party of Japan (DPJ). As for Koizumi, his popularity had been slumping in the low 40s and high 30s–until postal reform went belly up and he chose to stake his signature initiative on a general election. His public support instantly shot above 50 percent, which for a Japanese prime minister is fairly high. Meanwhile, the government released fresh economic data showing a third straight quarter of growth, marked by crucial gains in exports and domestic private consumption.

That’s the good news for Koizumi. The bad news? His LDP is tearing itself apart over post-office privatization. The issue has become the raison d’être of Koizumi’s premiership, which tickles market-friendly LDP reformers but causes heartburn for the party’s more statist old guard. Koizumi has promoted this cleavage: He vows to smash the “old LDP” and create a “new LDP” more amenable to his reforms.

Such bluster should sound familiar to Japanese voters. Koizumi roared into office in April 2001 with flashy clothes, movie-star panache (he resembles a Japanese Richard Gere), and a bulging agenda for change. “If my party tries to destroy my reforms,” he pledged, “I will destroy my party.” His rallies looked more like rock concerts, replete with shrieking schoolgirls and starstruck housewives. As Koizumi’s job ratings soared into the 80s, the LDP busily churned out Koizumi merchandise, including dolls of the premier wearing a lion-skin. The first issue of his email magazine proclaimed, “I am Koizumi the Lionheart.”

But the lion’s roar soon quieted into a kitten’s purr–or so his critics chortled, as Koizumi got bogged down by government scandals, economic stagnation, and factional spats within the LDP. Some erstwhile comrades turned against him, and opponents tagged Koizumi a lame duck. “No Japanese prime minister has ever seen his popularity plunge more quickly unless he was caught in a scandal,” wrote the Guardian‘s Tokyo correspondent in April 2002. Though he had campaigned as an energetic reformer–“Change the LDP, change Japan” and “Reform without sacred cows” were two of his slogans–Koizumi had little to show for it a year later.

So what reversed his downward spiral? Five factors in particular. First, he managed to enact stricter accounting rules, which helped quell Japan’s dire banking crisis. Second, Kim Jong Il’s nuclear saber-rattling made many Japanese appreciate Koizumi’s robust security posture. They may disdain the “cowboy” aura of his pal George Bush; but Koizumi is their cowboy–he’s reportedly a big fan of High Noon–and his assertive diplomacy (especially on the North Korean abductee issue) has played well with the public. Third, Koizumi has repeatedly visited the Yasukuni Shrine, a memorial to Japanese war dead. This infuriates Beijing and Seoul–the shrine honors over a dozen Class-A war criminals and whitewashes Japanese militarism–but makes for good politics in Japan. (Though most Japanese probably know little of Yasukuni, they take umbrage at the Chinese and Koreans telling their premier what to do.) Fourth, the economy has ever so slowly come around to solid growth; in August, the Nikkei 225 index hit four-year highs. And fifth, Koizumi remains a dashing, telegenic leader, one whose personal gifts often eclipse his policy failures.

That said, he’s hardly enjoyed a carefree summer, and the current bout of LDP infighting may scuttle his premiership. When, on August 8, the upper house of parliament defeated post-office privatization by a vote of 125 to 108, 22 MPs from Koizumi’s party broke ranks. Since a Japanese leader cannot dissolve the upper chamber, Koizumi made good on his threat to fold the lower house–which barely passed postal reform–and call a snap election. He then purged the 37 LDP members who had opposed reform in the lower chamber from the party’s official register of candidates.

After Koizumi’s 37 expulsions, the LDP and its coalition partner, the Buddhist-backed New Komeito party, control a combined 246 of the 480 lower house seats, only five more than the 241 needed for a majority. The DPJ holds 175 seats. The Japanese media have floated multiple scenarios that could force Koizumi into early retirement. For example, the LDP-New Komeito bloc might win a plurality but not a majority. Or the DPJ might ally itself with the Communists, Socialists, LDP rebels, and/or New Komeito to form a majority. Or–and this seems rather unlikely–the DPJ might secure a majority outright.

What would a Koizumi loss mean for the United States? The consensus among experts seems to be: bad for Bush in the short term, but immaterial over the long haul. It’s true, Koizumi is one of a kind. He gets on famously with Bush. And his fierce devotion to the U.S.-Japan alliance led to his most historic decision: sending more than 500 noncombat troops from the Self-Defense Forces to help rebuild Iraq. Come December, Tokyo will have to decide whether to extend its Iraq mission–based in the southern backwater of Samawa–or bring the boys home.

If the DPJ takes charge, expect a hasty pullout. Party officials have zinged Koizumi’s chummy rapport with Bush, and their election manifesto endorses a full withdrawal from Iraq by Christmas. DPJ boss Katsuya Okada, 52, may also use anti-Iraq sentiment to cozy up with New Komeito, whose pacifist members always opposed the mission. “It’s a point on which Koizumi is vulnerable,” says Thomas Berger, a Japan specialist at Boston University, noting that the Japanese public has largely soured on Iraq.

Losing Japan’s help in Iraq would be a symbolic blow to the U.S.-led coalition, but it wouldn’t be a disaster like the Spanish pullout in 2004. Nor would it do any lasting harm to the U.S.-Japan relationship. Either way, Koizumi is term-limited by his party and must step down by September 2006. And while the DPJ includes a patchwork of ex-Socialists and assorted anti-American oddballs, its core is made up of former LDP members, most of whom are staunchly pro-American. “There is a general consensus” on the need for warm ties with the United States, says Daniel Okimoto, a Japan expert at Stanford.

Indeed, long-term structural forces–the end of the Cold War, the rise of China, and the ballistic missile threat in East Asia–have been pushing Washington and Tokyo closer together for over a decade now. While the DPJ is untested–founded in 1998, it has never held power–and surely less keen on Bush’s foreign policy than Koizumi, it cannot reverse those forces. The Bush White House will of course hope for another year with Prime Minister Koizumi. But no doubt they could live with a Prime Minister Okada.

Duncan Currie is a reporter for The Weekly Standard.