PARALYZED BY AN ALL-IRAQ, all-war, all-the-time fever (not to mention a desperate opposition to the possibility of said war), the media managed to miss one of the central stories of President Bush’s Crawford vacation: the administration’s emerging plan to remake the structure of U.S. military forces. Yes, defense “transformation” is about to rise from the grave, revitalized by the sweeping changes in American and international politics caused by the events of last September 11. And what appears to be a normal turning of the bureaucratic wheel–the preparation of the 2004 defense budget request–stands every chance of heralding a profound reengineering of the Pentagon and the armed services. The meeting at the Crawford ranch was to rehearse the scope of defense program and budgetary changes, and the political storm that might result. This is a complete reversal of the situation one year ago, before September 11. Back then, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s mission to transform the U.S. military to exploit the “revolution in military affairs”–particularly the effects of information technologies on the art and science of warfare–had ground to an inglorious halt. The military services had successfully dominated the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review process. This had the effect of sharply limiting the prospects for reform; the service chiefs could rightly point out that preparing for the future was at odds with preserving the peace today. The defense budget could not support all the programs needed for a smooth transition. And Rumsfeld was widely expected to be the first cabinet casualty of the Bush administration. But the wartime urgency generated in the wake of the September 11 attacks shattered the status quo. Rumsfeld emerged as a dynamic “secretary of war”–a charismatic figure in a time of crisis–and he now has an opportunity to be a great secretary of defense, to reshape the military establishment. And it appears he has learned the lessons of his initial failure. First, Rumsfeld has seized the bureaucratic initiative, making subtle but key personnel changes. He hasn’t fired any generals, but he has shifted some of those most opposed to change. For example, he has all but named Gen. John Keane as the next Army chief of staff. Keane is a paratrooper by trade (who at a transformation conference this past week declared that the Army had bought its last main battle tank), and Keane knows he will be judged by his ability to change his army. Similarly, retired Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, whose idea of a smaller “streetfighter” warship has now been enshrined as the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship program, has returned to lead the Pentagon-wide “office of force transformation.” Perhaps even more important, Rumsfeld has made Dr. Steven Cambone the head of analysis and evaluation, bringing him directly into the budgeting and programming process. Fairly or not, Cambone has long been viewed as Rumsfeld’s henchman, almost universally loathed–but more important, feared–by the services. The message is that, this time, Rumsfeld will get what he wants. Rumsfeld has also learned from his success in terminating the Crusader howitzer program that the political price of change is far less than originally feared. The vaunted array of Crusader supporters in the Army and on Capitol Hill collapsed rapidly and completely once the decision was reached. In a time of war, congressional resistance to executive energy on national defense issues proved–surprise!–difficult to build or sustain. The services are thus bracing themselves for big changes to come. Over the next few weeks, decisions on a wide variety of programs will be made as the process of budget preparation nears its conclusion. While the figures are still to be reckoned and rationalized, it’s clear that lots of major weapons projects are in jeopardy, from the Army’s Comanche helicopter to the Navy’s F/A-18 Hornet, the Air Force’s F-22, and the Marines’ V-22 Osprey. Even if none is cancelled outright, the number of each to be bought would be severely limited. As one insider puts it, “Rumsfeld is determined to clear away some tall timber to allow for new growth.” Also on the plate are personnel cuts. Through the summer, the defense trade press has been filled with predictions of dramatic force cuts in the Army. While the actual numbers may be smaller, it does look as though there will be real reductions: In his cover letter transmitting the Navy’s budget memo to Rumsfeld, Navy Secretary Gordon England proposes a cut of 8,500 active-duty sailors in 2004 and promises more to come in future budget years. Even the Bush administration’s ambitious plans for missile defenses are in line for reorganization, with the emphasis probably shifting to space- and sea-based efforts, along with some greater effort to expand (or at least preserve) international participation in missile defense through the so-called MEADS program. The losers could be the more mature current systems like the PAC-3 version of the Patriot missile. These sorts of decisions, while revealing new energy in Rumsfeld’s leadership and a fresh opportunity to introduce new ideas and weaponry into U.S. forces, also reflect the money problems that still hamper the transformation project. As England wrote, “It is evident that we cannot rely on topline growth alone to buy down future risk.” That’s Pentagonese meaning: “There’s not enough money to do all the things we should.” Engaging in a transformation of the military–in addition to fighting a war–will require repeated, substantial increases in the defense budget. It’s not yet clear the administration is willing to commit to this. Indeed, much of this year’s highly touted defense increase will be consumed by the operational costs of the war on terrorism and the proper accounting of past expenses. As England admits, “It is important to recognize that over $6 billion of the $17 billion increase in [the Navy’s] budget relative to what was projected from the prior administration has gone not to manpower costs, current readiness, transformation, or recapitalization, but to accounting changes that expense future retirement and health costs in the current period.” In other words, more than a third of the increase did nothing to improve U.S. combat power directly, either today or in the future. So, even though Bush and Rumsfeld have regained the initiative on transformation, big hurdles lie ahead. The 2004 budget won’t go to Congress until next February, by which time Iraq-war fever may reach a still higher temperature. It’s hard to say how that will influence the politics of defense spending. But cancelling or even capping a big aircraft program will be much more controversial than killing the Crusader, which, at a few hundred million dollars a year, amounted to no more than a rounding error in defense budget terms. And over the next few weeks, as program decisions are made and leaked, even the media may notice the changes afoot in the Pentagon; what was done at Crawford could come undone in Washington. Tom Donnelly is senior fellow at the Project for the New American Century.
