Diplomatic “talks” are often little more than that—gabfests—but Tuesday’s meeting in Vancouver signals a hard-headed determination to deal with the problem of North Korea. The talks, hosted by the U.S. and Canada, brought together 20 nations, primarily those that aided South Korea in the Korean War of 1950 to 1953. Japan also attended. Russia and China were not invited.
With meetings taking place between North and South Korea, ostensibly about the upcoming Olympic Games in Seoul but touching on weightier matters as well, some in elite foreign policy circles would revive the credulous idea that the North Koreans may be ready to negotiate a halt to their nuclear endeavors. Nuclear aggression is now a fixed part of the Kim dynasty’s self-identity: Kim Jong-un has no plans to cease being a global nuclear threat. If the North shows some signs of a readiness to negotiate, it’s only for the purpose of relaxing sanctions long enough to further its nuclear ambitions.
That China and Russia weren’t invited to Vancouver is encouraging. China doesn’t want war, but it doesn’t want the North Korean regime to implode either, since that might lead to unification and an American ally on its border. Russia will oppose any advance of American interests in the region—or in any region. China loudly objected to the Vancouver talks by calling them a return to a Cold War mentality, but any effective multilateral strategy to deal with Kim Jong-un will necessarily involve likeminded nations and exclude those with adversarial aims, which in this case means China and Russia.
The U.S. administration says its policy is to pressure Pyongyang to de-escalate its nuclear program, and it’s probably necessary to describe it that way in public. But our aim should be to squeeze the Kim regime so hard that the country’s military elite finally move against the dictator and his dynasty. As a policy it’s far from ideal, but it’s better than the alternatives. And so far, the administration seems wisely intent on bringing about that end. The U.S. has adamantly rejected China’s “freeze for freeze” idea: the proposal that if the U.S. and South Korea stops its joint military exercises, the North will halt its nuclear program. The idea is risible—and not just because Pyongyang has no interest in such a halt. Joint military exercises force the North to use expensive fuel and precious manpower to keep up the facade of military parity.
A far sounder policy is the one Secretary of State Rex Tillerson enjoined on the 19 other allies: maritime interdiction. Current U.N. sanctions on North Korea were passed under
Article 7, Chapter 41 of the U.N. Charter, which specifically disallows “the use of armed force” to ensure their implementation. That means a ship transporting banned goods to North Korea may be followed but not boarded and searched without the ship’s permission. Put otherwise: We can watch China and others violate the sanctions, but we can’t do anything about it. Reimposing sanctions under the authority of Article 7, Chapter 42, by contrast, would allow U.S. or other U.N.-empowered ships to use armed force to interdict illegal transactions with the North.
From what we know so far, Vancouver was clear-eyed multilateralism at its best—open dialogue without the aimlessness and willful gullibility.