Democratic Delusions The Initiative Process in America by Richard J. Ellis University Press of Kansas, 240 pp., $17.95 paper TEVYE, the conflicted main character of “Fiddler on the Roof,” pondered tough choices by arguing with himself, starting each new line of thought with the phrase, “On the other hand . . .” For conservatives, the initiative process is a Tevye issue. Two dozen states and many localities have some version of the initiative, which enables citizens to make law by popular vote. Conservatives have scored important political triumphs this way. Proposition 13, a 1978 ballot measure that cut property taxes in California, revealed the political potency of the tax issue and helped shape the Reagan presidential campaign two years later. More recent initiatives have rolled back racial preferences and stopped harmful programs that kept immigrant children from learning English. On the other hand, conservatives revere James Madison, who warned that direct or “pure” democracy “can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction.” Acting through direct popular vote, unchecked majorities can roll over minorities. The careful, deliberative work of legislation simply cannot take place among a large mass of citizens, even when they are all wise and intelligent. “Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates,” Madison wrote, “every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.” One may find ample justification for such misgivings in “Democratic Delusions,” by Richard J. Ellis, a professor of politics at Willamette University. He starts with the example of Measure 58, a 1998 Oregon ballot initiative to let adoptees see their birth certificates. He admires the idealism of the initiative’s author but questions whether the voters knew what they were doing. “The initiative was a species of tyranny of the majority, with a large but unaffected public that adversely affected a tiny minority of birth mothers.” Ellis ably sketches the evolution of the initiative process from its origins in the late 1800s. Though we tend to associate it with clean-fingernails reformism, he notes that its earliest proponents were hard leftists who thought it would transform American society. “Direct legislation began as the handmaiden of economic radicalism.” Thanks to support from more moderate elements, who depicted it merely as a check on the legislatures, it spread to nineteen states by 1918. Very early, though, the process started to show most of the defects that critics attack today: confusing ballots, confused voters, misleading titles, and most of all, the influence of organized groups that manipulate it for selfish gain. Ellis does a fine job of explaining the unanticipated consequences of ballot access rules. To get a measure on any state ballot, proponents must gather a certain number of signatures. The original goal was sensible: to screen out initiatives lacking even a minimal level of public support. In practice, these requirements have given rise to initiative-qualification firms, who use paid workers to collect the signatures. Whereas volunteer gatherers care about their issue and are willing to explain it to potential signers, professionals only want ink on paper. Ellis quotes a handbook that tells paid gatherers not to “converse at length with signers or attempt to answer lengthy questions. . . . The goal of the table operation is to get petition signatures, not educate voters.” In the initiative business, the practical approach trumps the deliberative one. Ellis provides Oregon data showing that initiatives with paid gatherers are much more likely to make the ballot than volunteer efforts. Unfortunately, Ellis takes some gratuitous swipes at conservative positions. Though faulting the Florida Supreme Court for blocking Ward Connerly’s proposed measures against racial preferences, he adds: “Was Florida better off without Connerly’s four sweeping initiatives? Almost certainly.” Nevertheless, his focus is on process instead of ideology, and conservatives could accept much of what he says. On the other hand, while Ellis offers a wealth of shrewd insights into the shortcomings of the initiative, he has little to say about the alternative, namely the regular workings of the state legislatures. His few observations on the topic are debatable. Initiative activists may talk a populist game, he says, but legislators actually have to face the people. “When voters no longer like what a politician is doing, they can vote them out of office. Elections hold politicians accountable for their words and deeds.” The reality is quite different in many places, especially California. The only way an average state legislator can appear on Los Angeles television is to get into a freeway car chase. With the media paying scant attention to state politics, voters know little about their lawmakers’ words, deeds, or even identities. What is more, the recent redistricting has effectively abolished interparty competition in state legislative elections. With most of the districts having strong Democratic margins, and the small remainder having strong Republican margins, few seats will change hands in the next decade. Just about the only competition will come in party primaries for open seats. Ironically, there will be so many open seats only because of term limits, a product of the initiative process. Compared with the initiative, Ellis says, the regular legislative process is better at correcting and learning from errors. There is merit to his argument, but he overlooks the tendency of politicians to back their own bets. To create a policy or program is to create a constituency for its preservation and expansion. Politicians are loath to anger constituencies that they themselves have begotten, and so the government grows. During the 1980s, state and local spending (minus federal aid) averaged 8.8 percent of gross domestic product. During the 1990s, it averaged 9.7 percent–a huge increase in a multitrillion dollar economy. Some would claim that it all went to good causes, but a skeptical conservative might wonder whether state legislators were merely papering over their mistakes with wads of cash. Maybe the initiative is a worthwhile alternative after all. On the other hand, conservatives make a big mistake if they assume that direct democracy automatically produces more favorable results than representative democracy. The electorate giveth, and the electorate taketh away. A decade after Proposition 13, California voters enacted Proposition 98, a union-backed amendment to the state constitution, which guarantees the educational establishment about 40 percent of state revenues. In California and other states, the unions have also vanquished school choice, a top priority of many conservatives. Oregon voters in 1994 narrowly passed a law legalizing physician-assisted suicide, and three years later beat back a measure to repeal it. The Justice Department is now seeking to thwart the Oregon law. Although these examples do not rule out conservative support for the initiative process, they do suggest the need for caution. We should approach the issue with both eyes open–and both hands ready. John J. Pitney Jr. is professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and author of “The Art of Political Warfare.”
