THE ANNOUNCEMENT LAST WEEK that the Bush administration would seek a supplemental appropriation of $5.6 billion for defense for this fiscal year confirmed the fears of many on Capitol Hill and in the Pentagon: Bush’s commitment to rebuilding and reforming the military is less than anticipated or advertised. “It’s better than zero,” one defense committee staffer shrugged in discussing the request. But not much better. More than half the supplemental simply makes good on military pay and health benefits and operations already committed. The request contains almost nothing for modernization. Indeed, it slows down development of the Marine Corps’s V-22 Osprey to help cover these other expenses. Representative Ike Skelton, the ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, commented that the supplemental would not even “cover the waterfront,” but would leave the military short of money at the end of the fiscal year. It didn’t have to be this way. President Bush made rebuilding U.S. military strength a theme of his campaign, and he entered office with broad congressional support for increased defense spending. There was a consensus on Capitol Hill that combat readiness was slipping, weapons systems wearing out, and the quality of military life substandard. Before the inauguration, a bipartisan delegation journeyed to Austin to pledge to support the president if he moved rapidly to address these pressing problems. The administration turned its back, arguing that any spending increases for defense should be subordinated to tax cuts. The White House even blindsided Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, announcing early in February that it would not immediately seek a 2001 defense supplemental. Spokesman Ari Fleischer portrayed the decision as “a signal of fiscal discipline” and an assertion of civilian control over the military. Defense hawks were told to wait for the results of Secretary Rumsfeld’s much-heralded strategic review of defense requirements. This was to be a rapid but thorough reconsideration of American strategy and forces, with an eye toward “transforming” the armed services for new missions and emerging technologies. The review was to be the basis for additional defense requests—the administration was willing to “spend more wisely.” But the Rumsfeld review shows every sign of becoming a fiasco. The process has been scattered from the start, with dozens of panels looking at a wide range of issues, but no overarching guidance. Experts looking at strategy are out of synch with those considering the possibilities for transformation; the Joint Staff, the service chiefs, Congress, and the defense industry have largely been excluded from the process. Recently, Rumsfeld himself has started to walk away from the review. In a series of interviews he has distanced himself from the work of the panels, including the keystone strategy panel. “The strategy paper is the strategy paper, and it doesn’t mean it’s the strategy,” he helpfully explained. He has indicated his displeasure with the traditional “two-war standard”—American forces should be capable of winning two nearly simultaneous large wars—that has long provided the benchmark for sizing the military. But he has suggested no alternative. In meetings with Congress, the secretary has said only that he wants to “prepare for the unexpected,” and has passed out lists of historical surprises and the introduction to a book about Pearl Harbor. In what looks like an admission that the review process has been a failure, Rumsfeld now says he will roll his review into the formal Quadrennial Defense Review. This is the congressionally mandated review of defense planning—the very vehicle that Rumsfeld’s review was supposed to replace. And rather than beginning with the administration’s guidance, around which a defense program can be built, it now seems that a truncated quadrennial-review process will itself be expected to answer fundamental questions about the nation’s military posture. Against this pattern of confusion and indecision, the 2001 defense supplemental is compelling evidence of Rumsfeld’s weakness and the president’s uncertain commitment to a defense build-up. Last week, Rumsfeld dispatched aides to Capitol Hill to justify the lateness of the supplemental. One aide confessed, “The administration had to see what the amount of the tax bill would be to determine what was left over for defense.” In placing such emphasis on its tax cut, the administration may have squandered its opportunity to rebuild and reform the military. Not only is the supplemental request less than the Pentagon needs, but any increase in the 2002 budget appears certain to be modest—$12 billion or less, perhaps not enough to cover shortfalls in pay, benefits, and operations. Moreover, the Republicans’ loss of the Senate will make defense increases harder to push through Congress. Already, incoming Senate Budget Committee chairman Kent Conrad has threatened to make “defense the first casualty in this year’s budget battle.” Senator Carl Levin, now to head the Armed Services Committee, predicted that Democrats “won’t support major increases in defense spending.” Nor will the Democrats be more favorably disposed next year, when the administration finally reveals the full scope of its defense plans. By the time the fiscal year 2003 budget arrives on Capitol Hill next spring, the Democrats’ fight to regain the House as well as the Senate will have begun. Should they sweep the fall elections, Bush’s chance to rebuild the armed forces may turn out to have slipped away. George W. Bush repeatedly pilloried the Clinton administration for its neglect of the military. “Help is on the way,” Vice President Cheney vowed. Bush appointees in the Pentagon excuse their tardiness with the depredations of the Clinton years. The military, they say, is in worse shape than they ever imagined. But their shock sounds contrived in light of Bush campaign rhetoric and the many warnings issued by the Defense Department itself in recent years. In preparation for the upcoming quadrennial review, Clinton administration officials estimated that the military needed $30 billion to $50 billion more per year; the outgoing secretary of the Air Force pegged the figure at $100 billion annually. While there is no doubt that the Bush administration inherited a Pentagon beset with problems, it is on the verge of compounding rather than remedying them. The administration is even bungling the issue that is the centerpiece of its defense reform program, ballistic missile defenses. This was the symbol of the administration’s commitment to reshaping the military for the future. As early as last December, one of Rumsfeld’s top advisers said, “You can judge how serious we are when it comes to fixing defense by whether we add money for missile defense in the [2001] supplemental.” By this measure—the supplemental contains no missile defense funding—they aren’t serious. Indeed, missile defense has become a leading indicator of the gap between Bush defense rhetoric and reality. Recent efforts to enlist support on Capitol Hill and in NATO capitals have flopped as a result of the administration’s inability to define a missile-defense strategy, architecture, program, or cost. And opposition to the plan is certain to unite Democrats: From Senate majority leader Tom Daschle on down, they are vehemently opposed to any system that would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty—which is to say any missile defense of strategic value. Fading hopes for rebuilding and reforming American armed forces now rest with President Bush himself. What he might have had for the asking in February he will now find difficult to secure. Half the battle will be in his own administration. Thus far, it appears that Rumsfeld and his lieutenants cannot count on the backing of their commander-in-chief against the Office of Management and Budget and other agencies. In the 2000 campaign, Bush charged the Clinton admin
istration with creating a military that had to report itself “not ready for duty.” Unless the president acts decisively to increase defense budgets, spurs the Pentagon to develop a clear strategy for maintaining American military strength, and leads the way on missile defense, the same report may have to be issued on his watch. Tom Donnelly is deputy executive director of the Project for the New American Century.
