What a difference an election makes. Benjamin Netanyahu, for eight years scorned and insulted by the Obama administration, found himself warmly embraced in the Trump White House last week. No more name-calling, no more deliberate “daylight” between Israeli and American positions, no more abandonment of Israel at the U.N.
This was the central achievement of the Netanyahu visit: to demonstrate a visible end to the Obama years and put Israeli-American relations back where they were in the George W. Bush administration. The warmth of the White House greeting was no doubt bitter gall to Bibi’s many enemies in Jerusalem, and in the Israeli press accounts they carped and complained about this word and that phrase. But having a close and supportive relationship with Washington is always an asset to an Israeli prime minister, and so it will be for Netanyahu.
Beyond this symbolic reset of the U.S.-Israel alliance, the visit was filled with several real developments. The American and Israeli press are mostly focusing on “the abandonment of the two-state solution” and quoting President Trump’s lines:
The criticism of Trump for this “abandonment” is misplaced. At least since Bill Clinton, a “two-state solution” has been the insistent American goal, but where has it gotten us—or the Israelis and Palestinians? Trump is focusing instead on the goal, which is peace, and saying any road that gets us all there can work for him if it can work for the parties. Criticism of this position is foolish, elevating the means over the end. He has not abandoned the two-state solution; the hand-wringing of the New York Times and the elation of some spokesmen for the Israeli right are both overdone. Trump is doing what he often does best: challenging the conventional wisdom and asking if there is a better path to peace.
In fact Trump has a theory of how to get there—the “outside in” approach that starts with the Arab states. The old two-state approach was to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian deal first, believing it would clear the way for the Arab states to improve their relations with Israel. Trump favors a regional approach: leverage Israel’s improving relations with Arab states to help win an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal.
Netanyahu was first to mention this when the two men appeared together:
Trump agreed fully:
Trump later added more:
No doubt the Israelis would in principle like to see “the big deal,” because it would mean normal diplomatic and economic relations with the Gulf Arab states. Can this work? You won’t know until you try, and Trump plans to try.
Perhaps the biggest news from the visit and press conference is that Trump is a “peace processor.” Instead of abandoning efforts at a peace deal as a waste of time, he plans to jump into them—or at least have his administration, led by his son-in-law Jared Kushner, do so. It’s possible that something can be achieved here. The older Israeli-Palestinian “inside-out” approach tends to be all-or-nothing, and when it fails, it produces nothing but anger and disappointment. Perhaps the administration can improve Israeli-Arab relations and cooperation even if a final peace deal is elusive.
But optimism should be restrained. Cooperating with Israel is always risky for the Arab states, which is why they do it in secret. It is a potential domestic political problem of great magnitude for them, so why should they risk it? The answer is that it would improve the lot of the Palestinians—but that has never been and is not now a compelling objective for most Arab leaders. It’s “nice to have” but not worth any real danger. They are most likely to try it if a strong and reliable American president presses them to do so, over and over again.
And that’s the rub here. Arab leaders do not yet know if they have a strong and reliable president with whom to work, or whether he is going to make this regional peace deal a major goal that he will pursue over time.
Arriving at the White House, Netanyahu barely missed passing national security adviser Michael Flynn on his way out. Who will handle the Middle East at the NSC under the new national security adviser, and what will that person’s views be? Who will be the next assistant secretary of state for Near East Affairs? What will be the balance of power among Trump, the new national security adviser, Jim Mattis at Defense, and Rex Tillerson at State? And for the Arabs, the far more critical question: What will be the new administration’s real policy toward Iran? One can envision a tough policy on Iran that defends and gratifies the Sunni Gulf states and leads them to cooperate fully on Israeli-Palestinian matters. One can also imagine a policy that they find wanting and that provides little incentive for them to court additional risks. Until they have made a judgment about President Trump and his administration, they will carefully hedge their bets.
At the news conference, Netanyahu had a lot more to say about Iran than Trump did. The latter did say, “I will do more to prevent Iran from ever developing—I mean ever—a nuclear weapon,” which may suggest an effort to extend the Iran deal negotiated by the Obama administration. But after that opening line, and despite Netanyahu’s repeated mention of Iran, Trump did not utter the word again. This will leave Israel and Arab states wondering where U.S. policy is heading.
The embrace of “peace processing” led Trump to reiterate something his administration had said a couple of times recently: Unrestrained Israeli settlement expansion is not a good thing. As Trump put it to Netanyahu, “I’d like to see you hold back on settlements for a little bit.” He also said, “I think that the Israelis are going to have to show some flexibility, which is hard, it’s hard to do. They’re going to have to show the fact that they really want to make a deal” and added, “As with any successful negotiation, both sides will have to make compromises. You know that, right?”
This is very vague, but it is enormously helpful to Netanyahu. Trump’s election victory was seen by some on Israel’s right as opening the gates: Now there could be many new settlements and indeed annexation of parts of the West Bank. Netanyahu, always cautious, has long resisted such proposals, but that would have been much harder for him if Trump embraced such ideas.
Trump did not. He called for compromise, flexibility, and “holding back” on settlement expansion. The meaning of those phrases will be hotly debated in Israel, but they give Netanyahu some cover. We now have an extremely friendly president, he can say; why antagonize him by seeming to take advantage of him or even to defy him with steps that undermine his plans for a regional peace initiative?
The impact of Trump’s desire for such an initiative was visible when he responded to a question on moving the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, which he had repeatedly promised during his campaign. Now Trump was all caution:
It has been reported that several Arab leaders weighed in with the new administration to suggest that moving the embassy would cause riots. In itself, such violence in Arab capitals would be no great problem for Trump. In the context of a regional peace initiative, however, riots might scare Arab leaders into backing away from Israel just when Trump wants them moving closer to the Jewish state. Thus the “great care” with which moving the embassy must now be analyzed.
Netanyahu’s own comments on peace with the Palestinians were concise. He has two demands:
On the first demand he got some support from the president, who said,
This focus on the teaching of hate may mean that, at long last, American policy will stop giving the Palestinians a pass on what is usually—and euphemistically—called “incitement.” If the Trump administration can get the Palestinian Authority to end the glorification of terrorists and the teaching of hate, it will have truly moved the parties toward peace.
Trump did not comment on the second demand, “security control” of the West Bank, but it may fit within his regional peace plan. After all, given their fear of Hamas and jihadist groups like ISIS and al Qaeda, there is no reason for Arab states to demand eviction of the IDF from the West Bank. Surely the Jordanians have no real desire to look across the Jordan River and see chaos—or worse yet see Hamas troops or jihadists replacing Israeli soldiers.
There is usually an exchange of gifts during official visits to Washington, ranging from artisanry to jewels, but in the Netanyahu visit the coin of the realm was mutual political support. Trump called Netanyahu a “friend” and said, “Bibi and I have known each other a long time—a smart man, great negotiator.” He also had Netanyahu’s wife Sara, the target of persistent criticism in Israel, rise for recognition: “I also want to thank—Sara, could you please stand up? You’re so lovely and you’ve been so nice to Melania. I appreciate it very much.”
And Netanyahu spoke of “radical Islamic terror,” using the president’s favorite terminology. Moreover, he ended with words that many Israeli columnists immediately derided: “I’ve known the president and I’ve known his family and his team for a long time, and there is no greater supporter of the Jewish people and the Jewish state than President Donald Trump.” This was over the top, but Bibi wasn’t seeking positive press coverage when he uttered those words; he had another target in mind. Those reporters should have focused more on the final comment at the press conference, which was Trump’s response: “Thank you very much. Very nice. I appreciate that very much.”
So the visit achieved its purpose: to put a very public end to the Obama period and its tensions, and to start the two leaders out as real friends and allies. It also demonstrated that the new administration has a plan: the outside-in, regional approach to Israeli-Palestinian peace. A lot was left unsaid in public, starting with how Israel and the United States will actually approach the problem of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. And as noted, the Arabs—who care far more about Iran than they do about the Palestinians—as well as the Israelis are watching the turmoil in Washington with (to use a Trump term) “great care.” Will the administration soon right itself? Will Trump be a strong leader, surrounded by strong and reliable advisers who understand the Middle East? Is the current drama a passing phase or is it just Act One in a longer play? The answers to those questions will largely determine whether Trump can succeed with his ambitious goals for peace in the Middle East. ¨
Elliott Abrams is a senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
