THE BUSH TEAM is advancing two distinctive visions for how to govern: compassionate conservatism at home and realpolitik abroad. Some critics see an inconsistency here — but whatever inconsistency there is could be easily removed by adding a compassionate conservative plank to the foreign policy part of his platform. This would make strategic sense and might be a political asset.
A compassionate conservative foreign policy would be realpolitik plus: power politics on the major issues, plus a sensible, measured commitment to the rest of the business of foreign policy. It would be judiciously realistic about the principal foreign challenges facing the United States, but it would also acknowledge that a superpower is necessarily involved (although not always militarily) in issues that are less vital to the national interest.
Bush’s vision of a “distinctly American internationalism” is a reasonable framework for making sense of the most important foreign policy issues: relations among the great powers, the balance between our foreign security commitments and our military posture, the threat from weapons of mass destruction, and the like. But in such areas as foreign aid, human rights, and economic development, compassionate conservatism provides an even better framework. While these issues are rightly considered secondary, they are important and worth addressing well — certainly better than they have been addressed in recent years.
What would a compassionate conservative foreign policy look like? It would begin with the best of the realpolitik approach. It would not apologize for grounding U.S. foreign policy in our national interest. It would not embrace every notion, every institution, or every treaty that appeals to the first five international lawyers in a reporter’s Rolodex; it would first see whether any given proposal made sense for the United States. It would get relations right with the great powers — friends, partners, competitors, and foes — but would do so through responsible pursuit of American interests, not through blanket appeasement or whimsical bluffing.
To this familiar stance, a compassionate conservative foreign policy would add three key principles: commitment, capacity building, and collaboration.
First, a nation as wealthy as ours should make a commitment to address a number of problems that do not directly threaten our life and liberty. A failure to do so at home builds walls that diminish us. A failure to do so abroad builds walls, too, and strengthens the growing forces of neo-isolationism. Compassionate conservatism recognizes that social Darwinism and the soft bigotry of low expectations are wrong, whether in Harlem or in Harare.
A compassionate conservative foreign policy would not be mere altruism, however. Helping the global poor helps America materially as well as spiritually. People stuck in poverty do not buy as many American goods as do those climbing out of poverty, and those on the road to full development are the best customers of all. There is a payoff on the military side, as well. Prudent investments in countries now can reduce the demand for troop deployments in the future. Finally, there is a payoff in terms of public relations. While our self-perception is that of a generous nation, the United States is gaining a reputation around the world for welshing on its international commitments.
We do not have an obligation to solve every problem, nor is every tragedy a national security crisis. A compassionate conservative foreign policy is the antithesis of both the global entitlement approach and the “everything is national security” approach advocated by the hard left. In the most important area, that of military intervention, it recognizes the limitations of military force in situations where the state has effectively ceased to exist. It also recognizes the need to temper humanitarian urges with unromantic calculations of national interest — hence, the need for clear criteria for those circumstances when humanitarian intervention should be contemplated.
A nation as blessed as ours can afford to give foreign aid, and a nation as skilled as ours can do so more effectively than it has in the past. Which leads to the second principle of compassionate conservatism, capacity building. Don’t dole out fish, teach fishing — it is cheaper in the short run and more effective in the long run.
The first step in capacity building is to better integrate developing countries into the global market. Reduction and elimination of trade restrictions around the world is an easy Republican issue, and it should be a mantra of the Bush campaign. There is something inherently Republican about the slogan “Trade is aid.”
But a compassionate conservative foreign policy would recognize that trade is not the entire answer; that some aid is needed to stimulate trade. Even here, however, a compassionate conservative approach to capacity building would eschew handouts in favor of creative alternatives — for instance, James Miller’s idea of replacing cash grants with intellectual property rights, a novel proposal advanced in these pages a few weeks ago.
A compassionate conservative approach would also press for responsible debt relief. The United States could lead, but our wealthy allies should follow; and in regions where they have a historical interest, they might have to shoulder most of the burden. Of course, a compassionate conservative approach to debt relief would not be a simple bailout of irresponsible lenders. Rather it would involve some combination of bank write-offs, perhaps in exchange for tax relief, and conditionality to insure more responsible lending in the future.
The third principle of a compassionate conservative foreign policy would be collaboration, leveraging the effectiveness of organizations already doing the work. This would mean leadership through strengthening and reforming national and multilateral organizations, particularly development organizations.
Such reform must begin at home, in the U.S. Agency for International Development. Washington’s strategy for development assistance has suffered from ad-hoc accretion over 40 years and is in desperate need of systematic review. The goal would be to align it more carefully with foreign policy priorities; to focus on issues critical for long-term peace and prosperity, such as enhancing good governance and the rule of law, strengthening local government, and fostering sound banking laws and stable regulatory environments for private sector growth — all areas where America has much to offer the world. A Bush administration could better target states where the political will and other preconditions for change are in place. All this would undoubtedly require the integration of AID into the Department of State, which Republicans in Congress have advocated for years.
But fixing the Agency for International Development is only a first step. A Bush administration would need to take a close look at all of the multilateral institutions of which the United States is a member. Although there is certainly scope for increased accountability and other reforms in these institutions, a compassionate conservative foreign policy would understand that they remain a cost-effective means of leveraging assistance for development about which the United States cares greatly, such as environmental cleanup along the Mexican border in the wake of the NAFTA agreement.
Yet the genius of compassionate conservatism is its recognition that non-governmental organizations are often better at doing things than is big government. The essential thrust of a compassionate conservative foreign policy would be to create a climate conducive to others’ coming to do the heavy lifting, whether for regional security or economic development. Public assistance is not a substitute for private aid and investment. The best the government can do is seek to create a climate hospitable to the private sector, by establishing the rule of law, transparency, and accountability.
Likewise, some of the best development work around the world is done by faith-based organizations. The U.S. foreign policy establishment has been even more skittish than domestic agencies about cooperating with faith-based organizations. As a result, opportunities for effective burden-sharing are sacrificed and a hostile climate is needlessly fostered. A Bush administration should conduct a systematic review to ensure that the U.S. government is not duplicating, or worse, undermining, work that is better done by these organizations.
A compassionate conservative foreign policy would also champion human rights, but in a way that avoided counterproductive confrontations. Thus, Ronald Reagan used every private meeting with his Soviet counterparts to press for the release of specific prisoners of conscience. Many brave religious and political prisoners are alive today because of this understated diplomacy.
At the end of the day, a compassionate conservative foreign policy would neither win nor lose the election for George W. Bush. But that is not the point. The principles of compassionate conservatism can be integrated into an essentially pragmatic foreign policy in a fashion that ennobles, without eviscerating, realpolitik. The United States stands for more than near-term advantage. A compassionate conservative foreign policy would emphasize the distinctive moral foundation of American internationalism.
And who knows, it might just help at the margins in the campaign as well. These principles clearly differentiate Bush from the isolationist wing of his party, removing a potential arrow from Al Gore’s quiver. At least as important, they should appeal to the center, which is where this election will be fought and won.
If George W. Bush can better integrate his foreign policy planks with his domestic policy planks, he will restore a degree of purpose and coherence in U.S. foreign policy not seen since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Governor Bush identified that purpose when he said in July 1999, “We are a wealthy nation. But we must also be rich in ideals — rich in justice and compassion and family love and moral courage.” Compassionate conservatism helps provide that coherence and makes sense both at home and abroad.
Peter D. Feaver is an associate professor of political science at Duke University. Edmund Malesky is a graduate student in political science at Duke University. The authors are indebted to Robert P. Beschel Jr. for his contributions to this argument.
