There is an old saw that the English and the Americans are two peoples divided by a common language. While there is a certain element of humor in this, there was more than an element of truth in it during the war years (1942-45) in the European Theater. Niall Barr highlights this and other obstacles to execution and victory for the British and American armies in a fascinating look at how British and American staffs learned to cooperate, in spite of so many military and cultural differences, in World War II.
The British thought the Americans were reckless and brash while the Americans regarded the British as conceited and standoffish. There was a saying in England that the young American soldiers training there were “overpaid, oversexed, and over here.” But most friction between the armies was at the division level and higher; and the higher up the chain of command, the greater the friction. Combining staff functions and settling on strategies were no simple matters: The British Army was organized on principles and priorities that had evolved over centuries; the United States Army was structurally closer to the German Army (thank you, Baron von Steuben). Differences in equipment were obvious, but ultimately overcome; differences in tactics and training were another matter, and tension between and among senior commanders with huge egos threatened to undermine success.
While he admired the courage and skill of the British soldier, the American liaison officer Maj. Bonner Fellers said that “the British Army is not quite in phase with the tempo of high centralization and coordination demanded by the machine age” and added:
British commanders were equally forceful in their assessment of American troops’ performance. Commenting on his reluctance to trust the combat readiness of American troops in the 1942-43 Tunisian campaign, Lieutenant General Harold Alexander remarked that American soldiers, from private to general, “were soft, green, and quite untrained.”
Such was the environment Dwight D. Eisenhower found himself in in early 1942 when he assumed command of the European Theater of Operations. First among many problems were inadequate training facilities and the size of the U.S. Army (around 200,000). Indeed, when German tanks rolled into Poland in 1939, the American army was the 17th-largest in the world, behind Finland and Romania. For years, the thinking in Washington had been that the Army would be employed in a hemispheric defense role and the Navy would handle strategic defense. North America is flanked by two oceans and the Navy could blunt any attack well out to sea. What was the need for a large standing army?
Nonetheless, and despite the differences in command philosophy and leadership, the Allies moved forward: from North Africa, to Sicily, up through the “boot” of Italy and, eventually, to a cross-Channel invasion of France and defeat of Germany in May 1945. And who, in this fascinating narrative, stands out, above all, in making things happen? Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill deserve credit, but the steady hand of General Eisenhower was the decisive factor in securing victory.
From an American perspective, Niall Barr’s analysis of the story is evenhanded and fair—indeed, more than fair. As an Englishman, he comes down harder on Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and his lieutenants in the British high command than he does on the American chief of staff, Gen. George C. Marshall, or on the American generals such as Omar Bradley, George S. Patton, and their ilk.
So what’s not to like? Well, paratroopers jump onto drop zones, not landing zones (the British use the same terminology as the Americans). The M3 Grant/Lee tank is variously referred to here as a “tank,” a “medium” tank, and a “light” tank. (It was a medium tank.) And the airborne drop of American paratroopers from the 17th Airborne Division and British paratroops from the 6th Airborne Division in March 1945 (Operation Varsity) is mentioned only briefly. Yet that airborne operation was the largest drop of paratroopers by the Allied side in a single day: Operations Overlord and Market Garden both took several days to deliver troops, equipment, and weapons to forces on the ground. I would have appreciated a more thorough analysis of Varsity and its contribution to Allied successes.
But these are quibbles. Niall Barr’s prose is lean and his narrative moves quickly. He has produced a masterful, impressively researched history detailing the machinery of wartime decision-making, as well as the military alliance, led by Eisenhower, that defeated Hitler’s Germany.
Christopher Timmers, a West Point graduate who served in both the 82nd Airborne and Third Infantry divisions in Germany, lives in South Carolina.
