“PARSING RUMMY” is getting to be as common a Washington game as “Parsing Bill” used to be. The defense secretary hasn’t yet asked about the definition of “is,” but if he needs to wiggle out of a tough question–well, never say never. The latest rhetorical cat-and-mouse contest with the press came over the issue of U.S. military bases in Iraq. A week ago, the New York Times reported that the Pentagon was–surprise!–facing up to the need to maintain forces in the Persian Gulf region. Given that the Turks had been truculent about access by ground before Operation Iraqi Freedom, that the use of Saudi Arabia has been a delicate matter for the past decade, and that Iraq is ideally situated for operations throughout the region, there is a compelling case for siting U.S. bases in Iraq.
With Rumsfeld himself pushing for an overdue review of America’s posture and garrisoning around the world, with another round of base closures and realignments scheduled for 2005, and with the pressing need to rationalize the burdens on an overstretched force bearing global responsibilities, the idea of locating bases where troops are required might seem obvious. But all the secretary could say at a recent press conference was the epically cryptic: “I have never, that I can recall, heard the subject of a permanent base [in Iraq] discussed in any meeting. . . . The likelihood of it seems to be so low that it does not surprise me that it’s never been discussed in my presence–to my knowledge.”
Is that clear?
What is clear is the rationale behind a quasi-permanent American garrison in Iraq–with, say, a Guantanamo-style long-term lease. President Bush has plainly stated his intent to stabilize and liberalize the entire region. He did not define victory as simply the toppling of Saddam and his statues in the squares of Baghdad. The protection of the embryonic Iraqi democracy is a duty that will likely extend for decades, as did our commitment to defend the fragile democracies of Western Europe from the Soviet Union after World War II.
The greater Middle East is still a nasty neighborhood. Iraq is surrounded by two terror-sponsoring states, Syria and Iran, who will become increasingly agitated by an increasingly free Iraq. The royal family in Saudi Arabia understands that the Gulf order is changing–the crown prince has even hinted at the possibility of a little liberalization. But he has been a man of day-late and dollar-short plans. Nor will it be easy for the House of Saud to renegotiate its pact with homegrown Wahhabi extremists.
In short, the liberation of Iraq adds to the substantial list of U.S. interests in the region. Indeed, what before was regarded as simply an economic interest in Gulf oil has been transformed into a central question about America’s global leadership. We cannot afford to let Iraq fail.
The idea that U.S. military forces can “come home” from Iraq is thus spectacularly myopic. While the troops’ role is already changing from combat to nation-building inside Iraq, the regional-security mission will endure even when Iraq matures as a democracy and stable state. In one sense, though, the burden will actually be lighter than during the 1990s, when U.S. forces were running at full speed to “keep Saddam in his box.” The number of air sorties flown during the decade of no-fly-zones roughly equals the total flown in both operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. There has been an armored brigade stationed in Kuwait on almost a full-time basis since 1994. And the navy and Marine Corps have essentially kept battlegroups in the Gulf ever since the 1987 “Tanker War.”
Garrisoning U.S. air and ground forces in western Iraq–at the “H2” and “H3” airfields, for example–would kill a number of birds with a single stone. The airfields are ideally located for deployments throughout the region, and indeed to provide regional missile defense. There’s plenty of space, not only for installations but for training. And they are far enough removed from Mesopotamia that they would not be “imperial” irritants to the majority of Iraqis.
Such facilities would dovetail neatly with other U.S. installations in the region, including the airfields and ground-force garrison in Kuwait, the new Central Command headquarters in Qatar, and the traditional home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. Importantly, they would allow U.S. forces to withdraw from Saudi Arabia, easing the pressure on the Saudi government while making our access to the region less dependent on the anxieties of the royal family. They would also deprive Osama bin Laden of one of his main talking points.
Such a posture in Iraq and in the Gulf would further fit well with the larger rationalization of the U.S. military posture in Europe and the certainty of continued operations in Central and South Asia. There is no doubt that, as forces are drawn down in Iraq, the American garrisons in Germany will begin to shift eastward in Europe; Rumsfeld and NATO commander Gen. James Jones are determined to use this opportunity to make long-overdue changes, even while retaining important facilities like Ramstein Air Base in Germany. A chain of NATO bases in Eastern Europe extending from Poland to Romania and Bulgaria could be easily linked to those in the Gulf, helping to support operations from the Balkans to Central and South Asia. Over the long haul, there is no reason why Iraq could not join an expanded “Partnership for Peace,” or even the alliance itself.
Moreover, these bases would lessen the pressure on the new Turkish government. The snafu over the deployment of the 4th Infantry Division prior to the war underscores the shifting nature of Turkish domestic politics. Insulating Turkish-American relations from machinations in Ankara would be very wise, and indeed we should try to be supportive of the new pluralism there, and be ready to resume a close partnership when the Turks have sorted themselves out. And from a strictly military perspective, the airbase at Incirlik is too small and too close to the surrounding city to allow for expansion.
The sooner Rumsfeld fesses up and makes this issue a plain part of the public debate over post-Saddam Iraq the better. Already, the enemies of a free Iraq–Iranian-sponsored Shia clerics, the other forces of totalitarianism and terror in the Middle East, and their “Arabist” allies in America and around the world–are arguing that any U.S. military presence in Iraq is “colonialism” or “imperialism.” It is no such thing. U.S. bases are the surest guarantor of Iraqi freedom–and an essential underpinning for our ability to sustain a larger struggle.
Tom Donnelly is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
