Russia’s aggressive moves in the Middle East have raised speculation about a new Cold War. A more accurate description would reference the geopolitical, historical, and cultural factors underpinning Russia’s imperial ambitions in the south—ambitions that preceded the Cold War and took root in the czarist era.
In terms formulated by the renowned British geopolitician Halford Mackinder in his 1904 article “The Geographical Pivot of History,” Russia occupies the “heartland” of Eurasia, that is, the central position on the Eurasian landmass. According to Mackinder, “who rules East Europe commands the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island [encompassing all of Eurasia, including Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa]. Who rules the World Island commands the world.”
Mackinder foresaw a continuing struggle between land-based and sea-based nations to maintain a balance of power so that no single entity would rule the World Island. Great Britain, whose naval forces commanded the seas in the early twentieth century, and the United States, with its new oceangoing navy, held the fate of the World Island in their hands. A century later, little has changed except that the predominance of American over British seapower is undisputed.
Nicholas Spykman, the preeminent American geopolitician, updated Mackinder by arguing that the littoral areas of the Heartland, or what he called the “Rimlands,” held the key to control of Eurasia. Spykman posited, “Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.”
Czarist Russia’s imperial aspirations reflected these verities. The Russian Empire had a harsh climate and was largely landlocked, with direct access to the ocean only in the far north (through the Kola Peninsula) and northeast (via Vladivostok). Thus, the Russians traditionally sought ice-free maritime outlets, especially the warm-water ports of the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.
Czarist expansionism followed the path of least resistance, turning eastward and southward until blocked by Ottoman Turkey, British India, imperial China, and the Pacific Ocean. During the “Great Game” in Asia, the Russian and British empires jockeyed for power in this strategic area. Afghanistan, which became known as the “graveyard of empires”—a distinction it retains today—was a buffer between the contestants.
Most of the Russian Empire’s expansion occurred in the Caucasus and Central Asia down to the Black and Caspian seas through the defeat or annexation of nomadic tribes and feudal Muslim khanates. The Kremlin also asserted a right to intervene whenever necessary to protect its Orthodox coreligionists and fellow Slavs in the Balkans and other parts of the Ottoman Empire.
During negotiations in 1939 between foreign ministers Vyacheslav Molotov and Joachim von Ribbentrop on the secret protocol for the Soviet-Nazi Pact, Molotov voiced agreement to the protocol “provided that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the focal point of the aspirations of the Soviet Union.” Moscow also aspired to a dominant position around the Turkish straits leading from the Black Sea to
the Mediterranean.
At the end of World War II, the Kremlin sought to advance its objectives by staking claims to the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan and establishing Soviet puppet regimes in the Azerbaijani and Kurdish areas of Iran. President Truman’s support to Turkey and Greece against Communist pressure and his demands for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Turkish and Iranian soil were instrumental in frustrating Moscow’s ambitions.
Russian president Vladimir Putin’s recent forays into Ukraine were apparently designed to reintroduce Russia as a major player on the world stage and to salvage some components of the Soviet Union, the breakup of which he called the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.” (One could argue that its creation rather than its collapse fit that description.) Putin’s annexation of the Crimea is the latest chapter in the checkered history of that strategic piece of real estate. The Crimean War of 1853-56 pitted Russia against a coalition of Britain, France, the Kingdom of Sardinia, and the Ottoman Empire. The allied forces succeeded in projecting power onto the Crimean Peninsula more quickly and effectively than Russia despite the greater distance involved. The shock of Russia’s defeat spurred a domestic reform movement, including Czar Alexander II’s abolition of serfdom.
When the USSR was established in 1922, the Crimea became part of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic; but in 1954 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev transferred it to the Ukrainian SSR. When Ukraine became independent in 1991, the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet was still homeported at Sevastopol in the Crimea. The fleet’s assets were divided, with Russia receiving the lion’s share, and through an accord of 1997, Russia obtained a 20-year lease on its headquarters. In 2010 the pro-Russian government of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych agreed to extend the lease for an additional 25 years, but he was ousted in 2014. The subsequent conflict between pro-Russian and Ukrainian nationalist forces resulted in Moscow’s military intervention, with the outlook for Ukraine’s territorial integrity still in doubt. Russia is now firmly ensconced in the Crimea, with its naval base at Sevastopol and an impressive array of naval and air assets supporting the Black Sea Fleet.
Putin is equally determined to retain the naval base at Tartus in Syria, which is Russia’s only base in the Mediterranean (it is also refurbishing its airbase in Latakia). Retention of the base is a major reason for Moscow’s entry into the Syrian civil war on the side of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, a longtime Soviet and Russian ally. Syria has now provided Russia with a springboard for projecting its military power into the heart of the Middle East. But the war has also posed a grave threat to NATO’s southern flank, as witnessed in Turkey’s recent shootdown of a Russian warplane along the Syrian-Turkish border. Diplomats hurried to dampen tensions, but the possibility of escalation persists.
Although Putin has declared that Moscow will not commit combat forces to the Syrian war, an attack against one of its facilities could cause a change in plans and spark Russia’s first military campaign beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union since the final withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. Meanwhile, Russia has boots on the ground in the form of an estimated several hundred elite troops protecting the base at Latakia, as well as military trainers and advisers for Assad’s forces. In geopolitical terms, Russia now seeks to revive its presence and influence over the “Rimlands” of the “World Island.”
Russia’s newly reinforced presence in the Mediterranean region also represents a step on the way to the fulfillment of its historical search for warm-water ports. Russian ultranationalist army officer, politician, and presidential wannabe Vladimir Zhirinovsky offered a vision of this goal in his book The Final Thrust to the South. “As I dream of it,” he wrote, “Russian soldiers will wash their boots in the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and forever change to summer uniforms.” Zhirinovsky may be a demagogue, but his sentiments resonate among Russian leaders and ordinary citizens who rue the loss of the country’s imperial glory.
Russia’s aspiration to renewed superpower status has been exemplified by the growth and modernization of its military apparatus. Upgrades are apparent in every category of military power, from cruise missiles to warplanes to submarines to air-defense systems to equipment for ground forces. Against this backdrop lurks Russia’s nuclear arsenal, which is barely diminished by arms control treaties. Putin proudly proclaims his nationalism and rallies support from a patriotic population and the Russian Orthodox church. Having reentered the international arena as an influential player, he is unlikely to retreat.
Marian Leighton is an intelligence officer with a background in the Cold War.
