Culture Shock
IN “O, MY AMERICA” (May 3), James W. Ceaser provides an insightful review of Samuel Huntington’s excellent book, Who Are We? Huntington’s book addresses our nation’s “identity crisis,” which, he says, is leading us toward national disintegration. Huntington treats American Culture (called “Anglo-Protestantism”) as the core of our national identity, while deemphasizing the American Creed. He says that it was out of the Culture that Creed developed, while Creed is insufficient to keep a nation together.
In contrast, Ceaser likens the disparity between Creed and Culture to the war between rationalism and religion. He focuses upon the need to find the proper relation between Creed and Culture. He claims that Huntington in the past “was too Creedal” and is now “too Cultural.”
I happen to agree with Huntington that Culture is primary, while Creed is secondary. Yet both Huntington and Ceaser miss the fundamental point: Creed and Culture act in unison. Both are being undermined in today’s America. Both require a renaissance.
Allen Weingarten
Morristown, NJ
THE FINAL PARAGRAPH of James W. Ceaser’s review of Samuel P. Huntington’s new book, Who Are We? begins, “Samuel Huntington is a fine asset to the nation he loves.” I was pleased to no end that a professor of political science had the courage to not only dignify Samuel Huntington with this praise but to also put it in print.
Indeed, Huntington’s work is not for the faint of heart. It requires rereading, meditation, and discussion. But each work is a masterpiece of political science theory applied to social realities. And yet Huntington is not read in many political science classes these days–often because of the very qualities that Ceaser so articulately praises in his review.
You see, Huntington has always clearly articulated the reasons why the cultures and populations of nation-states become strong economically, socially, and politically, or else disintegrate. These ideas have never appealed to left-leaning academics and multiculturalists, who believe nationality is a fictive concept. Yet, by rejecting the importance of nationality, these academics help create a balkanized culture. And such a culture can no longer sustain a national identity. The end result? Anarchy.
Henry Sheffield
Arlington, VA
Past Imperfect
JONATHAN V. LAST doesn’t address an important reason why the FAA didn’t change its pre-9/11 security policy, or “Common Strategy”: fear of lawsuits (“The Foreseeable Past,” May 3).
If a pilot resisted a hijacker’s attempt to take over an aircraft and a passenger died as a result, the pilot–and by extension, the airline–would’ve been blamed. On the other hand, if a pilot complied with a hijacker’s demands and all the passengers died, the hijacker would be blamed. From a liability standpoint, then, more deaths were easier to handle than one death and ensuing lawsuits.
Of course, as the 9/11 Commission–for all its faults–has shown, it didn’t matter how many terrorists threatened to use airplanes as weapons. There was simply no public support for an increased security policy prior to September 11, 2001. The country wasn’t on a war footing. Before the attacks, anyone who considered resisting a hijacker would have been held back by furious fellow passengers. Times change.
Michele Kerr
Santa Clara, CA
ONE DOES NOT NEED TO FAULT the FAA for its failure to heed the various intelligence and security scenarios before the September 11 terrorist attacks. The FAA failed in a simpler fashion. Had the FAA required a level of scrutiny close to what Israel’s national airline, El Al, has practiced for the past 30 years, the September 11 attacks would almost certainly not have occurred. Sure, the inconvenience would have caused a slump in air travel. But that would’ve been nothing like the slump that followed the attacks on September 11.
Mark Goldstein
Mercer Island, WA
JONATHAN V. LAST’S “The Foreseeable Past” shows that it was foreseeable, indeed foreseen by some, that suicidal terrorists might use hijacked aircraft as guided missiles. The problem was that there wasn’t any acceptance of the reality of such a threat by those with the authority to effect appropriate changes in security policy. They obviously thought the threat was not worth the worry.
Since it appears that no one with foresight and authority was pressing for these obviously necessary changes, it follows that all were unable, or unwilling, to confront and clear the conceptual hurdle involved in thinking like suicidal jihadists. Unfortunately it took the horror of September 11 to help us clear that hurdle.
John F. Cannon
NEW YORK,NY
