SIX-PACK

Not, I think, Clinton. Woodrow Wilson and FDR are the only Democrats since the Civil War to have won consecutive presidential elections. Bill Clinton is unlikely to follow in their footsteps.

Clinton has had a decent bounce in the polls recently — he’s now near 50 percent approval, with a lead of several points against Dole. But this is likely to be Clinton’s high-water mark. He’s had a free ride for months from Republicans, who’ve been busy governing in Congress and campaigning against each other for president. And Clinton hasn’t yet had to make the tough choices on the budget that are coming up soon. It will be downhill from here, and adviser Dick Morris’s “triangulation” strategy won’t help. Are there really many among the 57 percent of the American electorate who failed to vote for Clinton in 1992 who will support him in 19967 Doubtful. As the campaign progresses, Clinton’s vote should be driven back down toward the 43 percent who did pull the lever for him once before.

Now, the Republican candidatenor the GOP convention, or the GOP Congress — could drive some former Perot or Bush voters into Clinton’s arms. It’s also possible that 43 percent could be enough to win again, in a three- or four- way race. But the recent flap over Clinton’s quickly-retracted apology for the 1993 tax increase is a useful reminder of Clinton’s two unavoidable weaknesses. His is the party of tax and spend — of government — in an era unfriendly to government. And Clinton is weak and untrustworthy at a time when Americans crave strength and honesty.

Clinton’s political model is not, as some have suggested, Truman. Rather, it’s Eisenhower — the only president this century before Clinton whose party lost control of Congress in his first off-year election. Eisenhower yielded the ideological and legislative initiative to the majority in Congress and made his role the voice of moderation and caution. By yielding the political initiative, Ike hurt his party’s cause but not his own. Clinton hopes to achieve an analogous personal victory. But Clinton is no Eisenhower — and his opponent may be.

One advantage Clinton does have over most recent incumbents is the absence of a primary challenge. Though this appears a short-term benefit, it indicates an amazing collapse of ideological confidence on the part of his party’s core constituency. McCarthy in 1968, Reagan in 1976, even Kennedy in 1980 and Buchanan in 1992 — these men fought for the heart and soul of their respective parties. But no one now steps forward to fight for liberalism. Clinton has acquiesced in liberalism’s thoroughgoing ideological rout, after suffering the most massive repudiation of any administration since Hoover’s. Yet the left is too weak to produce even a protest candidate. Hoover was also unchallenged for the nomination in 1932, by the way. This didn’t help him much in the general election.

But if Clinton is Hoover, who is the Republican FDR? Bob Dole increasingly seems more like Walter Mondale — or even Ed Muskie, the supposedly unbeatable front-runner for the Democratic nomination in 1972. Surveys in Iowa and New Hampshire suggest that Dole lost one-quarter of his support over the summer-support no one else has yet picked up. This indicates widespread disaffection with Dole, rather than enthusiasm for any of his rivals. Reports from Florida, whose November 18 straw poll is the next major event on the primary calendar, suggest he’s in trouble there. A slim victory or a defeat in the straw poll would increase doubt about Dole’s inevitable victory. And then, as the primaries approach, the issue of Dole’s advancing years will become real to voters in a way it isn’t when they’re answering poll questions on the phone. In late February, after Iowa and New Hampshire, someone will have emerged as the alternative to Dole; as long as it’s not Pat Buchanan, that candidate will have a good chance at taking the nomination.

Could he be Phil Gramm? If Republicans hadn’t won control of Congress, Gramm would probably have been the nominee. Republican primary voters would have wanted a tough, conservative president to battle a dangerous Democratic Congress. It is an irony of history that the 1994 GOP victory, achieved on a Gramm-like platform of fierce resistance to big-government liberalism, has hurt Gramm’s presidential hopes. In any case, having spent some $ 17 million this year, Gramm cannot find enough supporters to raise himself out of single digits in most states. In New Hampshire, more Republicans rate him unfavorably than favorably, and Buchanan’s populist appeal continues to prevent Gramm from consolidating the right. If Gramm could ever get Dole one- on-one, he might beat him — but it looks as if he might not get that chance.

Lamar Alexander might. First, Alexander has to do well in the Florida straw poll (either second or a close third, but clearly in the first tier). Second, God must answer his surely fervent prayers that both Powell and Gingrich stay out. Alexander might then be well-situated to pick up support from abandoned Powellistas and Gingrichites as a younger, more-or-less populist, acceptably conservative, and reasonably reassuring alternative to Dole.

Alexander is a good candidate, and will do well with voters — and there are many — like the Florida GOP activist who said, “I’ll decide based on what feelings I get when I meet the person. On issues, they’re all talking the same thing.” Alexander also has a superior campaign team, whose role in ushering the Wilson candidacy along to an early grave has been overlooked (except by Wilson, who urged his campaign contributors to support anyone but Alexander). And if Alexander emerges as a real possibility, I suspect polls will show him running well against Clinton, and with a better chance than Dole or Gramm of suppressing the yearning for a Perot (or even a Powell) independent candidacy. The Alexander victory would come about through a strong showing in New Hampshire, followed by a breakthrough in Georgia on March 5 and Florida on March 12, all of which propels him to victory over Dole in the Midwest and then California in the two weeks afterward. But again — all this assumes that Powell and Gingrich will have stayed out.

Gingrich? His negatives are awfully high — a stunning 70 percent of Americans now say they wouldn’t vote for him for president, second only to Buchanan at 71 percent. (Perot is close, with 68 percent; Dole and Clinton are in the mid-40s; for now, Powell is the least unacceptable, with 27 percent opposing his candidacy.) Even committed Republicans say they don’t want Newt to run.

Still, the Republican vote in congressional races surged from 28 million in 1990 to 36 million in 1994 — an increase comparable only to the partisan shift toward Democrats at the beginning of the New Deal. When a party has been transformed in this way, polls are unreliable. They didn’t capture McGovern’s strength in 1972 in a Democratic party taken over by the so-called New Politics, and they may not capture Gingrich’s potential strength today either in primaries or the general election. But a Gingrich candidacy would be a bold — and probably foolhardy — roll of the dice. He should be taken at his word that there’s only a 1-in-10 chance he’ll do it.

That leaves Powell. An independent candidacy is not out of the question — Powell would in fact have a shot at winning a plurality in a three-way race against Clinton and Dole (or Gramm, or Gingrich). The virtue of an independent run is that Powell can, like Perot, avoid the primary season altogether. But a Republican run appears more likely; after all, Powell has said it would be easier, and polls show that two-thirds of Republicans want him to run. So let us say that, after an uninspiring debate among the Republican candidates on November 17 and an inconclusive finish in the Florida straw poll the next day, Powell announces his candidacy on November 21. What then?

Conservatives will be key, in two respects. First, can Powell convince conservatives that he will be an ally of the Gingrich revolution? As Gingrich has said of Powell: “If he wanted to represent a more inclusive version of the revolution, advocating better ways to get to where we’re going, I think he’d be a very attractive and effective candidate.” Gingrich, of course, is the most important conservative Powell will have to convince. For if Gingrich were to say that he could work well with a President Powell, that would make it virtually impossible to raise the standard of the Gingrich revolution against him.

But even before Gingrich pronounces such a judgment, anti-Powell conservatives will have an agonizing decision. Do they rally behind Dole? Do they support Gramm? Or do they remain splintered? Buchanan recently called on conservatives to “unite now in opposition to a Powell candidacy.” Okay, but behind whom? Will Buchanan withdraw and support Dole or Gramm — either of whom might be able to stop Powell? Will Gramm withdraw for Dole? Unlikely. Fragmentation on the right will surely persist — and this will serve Powell well.

It’s hard to forecast the actual dynamics of a Powell candidacy. His support might weaken as he becomes “just another candidate.” But not necessarily; Powell might be a pretty good campaigner. After all, will he be out-debated by Dole? Out-charmed by Gramm? Don’t bet on it.

What we do know is that over the past several weeks, as Powell has test- marketed his moderate views, there has been no discernible decline in his Republican support. In one recent poll of New Hampshire Republicans, for example, Powell beats Dole 34 to 25 percent — and he beats Dole 29 to 23 percent among self-described conservative Republicans (who make up two-thirds of the New Hampshire party). And in a national poll conducted by the Tarrance Group for THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Powell beats Gramm 58 to 29 percent among conservative Republicans.

Will Powell become less acceptable to conservatives as the campaign wears on? Yes, if he allows himself to serve as the counter-revolutionary candidate of the Establishment. No, if he runs as the admitted Establishmentarian who nonetheless appreciates the need for bold reforms and seeks to broaden and legitimize the new reform coalition. (Powell would be helped a good deal in this respect if he were to embrace term limits.) Much also depends on the disposition of the GOP primary electorate. Will their confidence in the ideological leadership of Gingrich and company in Congress allow them the luxury of voting for “character” and “leadership” in the presidential race?

The test will, of course, come in New Hampshire. Powell would need to win there — and his chances are improved by the fact that independents can vote, and many often have voted, in the GOP primary. Then, New York. Right now, because of the machinations of Sen. Al D’Amato, it appears that Dole might be the only contender on the ballot in the state’s Republican primary. But Powell could force his way onto the ballot both by spending money and by daring the two senators to endure the obloquy of the press for denying New Yorkers an opportunity to vote for a native son.

A New York victory over Dole would send Powell south to Republican primary electorates that might be friendlier to Powell than one would think, in part because of his military background — and then probably on to a clinching victory in California on March 26. A Powell nomination would, it is true, produce a Buchananite third party. Even so, Powell would win easily in November.

One year before election day, the invisible primary that has been the 1996 presidential race thus far is almost over. The field has been narrowed. Now the rush to judgment begin.

By William Kristol