Evil’s Autopsy

Leszek Kolakowski is probably best known outside his native Poland for his three-volume history of Marxism (Main Currents of Marxism), first published in 1978 in English and in a one-volume edition two years ago. He left Poland in 1968, following his expulsion from the Communist party and the banning of his publications. Subsequently, he taught at various distinguished American, British, and Canadian universities and was a senior research fellow at All Souls College, Oxford, between 1970 and his retirement in 1995.

This carefully edited volume offers an excellent and representative sampling of Kolakowski’s writings spanning his entire career. They address and illuminate virtually every major historical, philosophical, and political problem and polemic of the past century, as well as some of the endemic dilemmas of the human condition. It is dense with wisdom and insight, and although several of the essays touch on Communist systems–especially their theoretical inspiration and foundation–their demise (or transformation) does not diminish the relevance of these essays.

Kolakowski’s subjects include evil in history and human nature, the perils of the pursuit of utopia, the (still poorly understood) nature of totalitarianism, the differences and similarities between Nazism and communism, the relationship between Marxism and Communist (or state socialist) systems, genocide and its justifications, the problems of modernity and secularization, moral relativism and the religious roots of morality.

This volume will certainly help to settle the contentious issue of the relationship between Marxism and the political systems it had inspired and influenced, if not determined. Following the collapse of Soviet communism, an increasing number of Western intellectuals claimed that Marxism could not be held responsible for the failings of the Soviet Union (and similar systems) since the rulers of Communist states made no attempt to implement Marxism but merely used it as a legitimating device, a smokescreen. Far fewer argued that it was the very attempt to realize the unrealizable ideals of Marxism that finally led to the moral, material, and political crisis and collapse of these systems.

There was, indeed, a close connection between Marxist theories and ideals and the nature of “actually existing” Communist systems, even if Karl Marx could not have anticipated what part his ideas would play in the creation of political-social arrangements and policies which probably would not have pleased him. We may debate the precise nature of this connection, but its existence can hardly be disputed. Kolakowski rightly believes that the attempts to implement the basic values of Marxism generated repressive political organizations–or more generally, that Marxist theory implied consequences that were “incompatible with [Marx’s] ostensible value judgments.” That is to say, there were numerous, destructive unintended consequences of these attempts.

Thus, Marx’s anticipation of the benefits of the nationalization of the means of production found expression in the policies of all existing Communist systems (no gap here between theory and practice), and these blessings failed to materialize. Marx’s belief in the unification of human societies essential for “liberation” was another example of an ideological imperative with unfortunate consequences: As Kolakowski puts it, “There is no known technique apart from despotism whereby the unity of society can be achieved.”

Insofar as the residual appeals of socialism remain rooted in nostalgic evocations of community and solidarity–in contrast with the social isolation supposedly created by capitalism, but in fact resulting from the broader processes of modernization–Kolakowski’s observations go to the heart of the matter:

These writings also clarify the nature and origins of totalitarianism and the relationship between its major versions. Nazism was more “authentic” than the Communist varieties. As Kolakowski points out, “The gap between façade and reality was small–as a rule, the ideology made its true intentions brutally plain.” He also writes:

Throughout his career, Kolakowski has been preoccupied with timeless human dispositions, which find a variety of expressions, including the rise and fall of Communist systems and the utopian aspirations they used to embody. With Isaiah Berlin, he has appreciated the troublesome human proclivity for pursuing incompatible, mutually exclusive goals and values, such as freedom and equality, individualism and integration into a community, competitiveness and compassion, consumerism and the love of nature, rational, scientific problem-solving and the need for nonrational self- transcendence.

Adding to these paradoxes, “communism demanded both blind obedience and the recognition that it was a rational interpretation of the world.” There was, at the heart of all such longings, a hope that all conflicts between the personal and social, or the private and the public realm, could be eliminated–a hope bolstered by the craving for “totality” and “wholeness.”

Kolakowski is well aware that human nature presents insurmountable obstacles to the fulfilment of such utopian fantasies: “It is in the very constitution of humanity that our wants have no definite limits. . . . Without a consciousness of limits . . . any attempt to limit our wants will result in terrible frustration and aggression.”

As both a scholar of religion and a believer, Kolakowski is in a good position to identify the source of such longings in religious needs unmet by conventional religious institutions that have been undermined by modernity.

Kolakowski never ceased to be impressed by the attitudes of many Western, especially American, intellectuals who cannot relinquish the conviction that their society is far more contemptible than most others, and who remain persuaded that capitalism is the root of most evil in the world. It is these convictions which led to the durable double standards of such intellectuals who are “fervent moralists in some cases and Real-politikers . . . in others depending on political circumstances.” Another familiar double standard is found in the insistence that “anything that happens within the ‘capitalist system’ is by definition the product of capitalism; [but] anything bad that happens in the ‘socialist system’ is by the same definition the product of the same capitalism.”

Kolakowski is unique among contemporary social philosophers and intellectuals in recognizing and confronting the notion of evil: “[E]vil is a real characteristic of life and . . . we carry in us a kind of moral intuition that enables us to recognize it as such.” He also writes: “Evil . . . is not contingent, it is not the absence or deformation, or the subversion of virtue . . . but a stubborn and unredeemable fact.”

Neither reform, nor revolution, nor education, nor material progress will eradicate “the evil in us.” Such a tragic view of life is alien to Americans, products of a culture of high expectations, optimism, and good cheer, and inclined to believe that all good things are compatible and all problems have a solution. Kolakowski’s belief in natural law and “moral intuition” sets him apart from most modern, secular intellectuals, including those who may share his awareness of the problems created by secularization and modernization. They may agree with him that a pragmatic or purely functional morality is inadequate:

Paul Hollander is the author, most recently, of The End of Commitment: Intellectuals, Revolutionaries, and Political Morality in the Twentieth Century.