Yesterday I posted on the subject of alleged cooperation between the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. In that post I made reference to skeptical remarks by two well respected experts, Paul Kerr and Jeffrey Lewis, that both seemed to step back from in subsequent posts. I also spoke with John Pike, who told me there was no way to confirm such reports, but that the North Korean, Iranian, and Pakistani nuclear programs were essentially “one program in three places.” Kerr feels I misrepresented his comments, and has attributed such misrepresentation to either dishonesty or stupidity on my part. I strongly deny that there was any intent to deceive (only time will tell if the other charge sticks), so let’s go through point by point. First Kerr says, “he claims (falsely) that additional evidence [of collaboration] has made the claim more plausible.” The additional evidence I was pointing to was this piece by Bill Gertz on collaboration between North Korea and Iran on ICBM technology. Kerr says the piece I “refer to is about missile, not nuclear, cooperation.” True enough, and I said as much, but any reasonable person could draw the conclusion that collaboration on technology for delivering a nuclear warhead makes collaboration on warhead design seem more plausible. If Kerr chooses not to make that leap, fine, but I’d have to disagree with him. Second, Kerr says the two haven’t changed their minds. I did mistakenly attribute a cross-post by Kerr that appeared on Lewis’s site to Lewis himself. So, my apologies to Dr. Lewis. But Kerr subsequently posted that his initial impression–that North Korean data would be of little use to Iran–was not correct, since information from the test of a weapon with a plutonium core (North Korea) would, in fact, be useful to a country working to design a weapon with a uranium core (Iran). I inferred that Kerr’s realization meant he was more inclined to believe that collaboration was possible, since there was much to be gained from the Iranian perspective. Kerr says, “that post only indicates that Iran could perhaps benefit more from North Korean test data than I had previously suspected. That doesn’t mean that North Korea is actually providing such data.” Again, Kerr chooses not to make this leap, I disagree–to me his statement implies that, in light of this new information, collaboration is more likely. Finally, Kerr says I inaccurately claimed that, “In Kerr’s opinion, the only way to significantly shorten that estimate [the IC’s 5-10 year estimate] was if the North Koreans sold weapons-grade fuel, presumably plutonium, to the Iranians.” Kerr had written that,
Because Couglin’s article was confined to collaboration on warhead design, I surmised that this only left the transfer of nuclear fuel as a collaborative measure which might speed up the Iranian program. I’m not sure what else goes into building a bomb other than designing the warhead and procuring the fuel–these seem to be the two significant obstacles. So if the estimate applies to producing HEU, it seems reasonable to conclude that, in Kerr’s opinion, only a transfer of fuel from North Korea to Iran would shorten the estimate. Again, I spoke to no one who thought Coughlin’s story was particularly credible. But the fact that Gertz later reported on ICBM collaboration between North Korea and Iran, and that Kerr later acknowledged that test data from North Korea would be valuable to Iran, led me to conclude that Kerr’s skepticism had softened and Couglin’s claims seemed more credible. If Kerr insists that none of this new information has led him to change his position, fine. But I think he’s sticking his head in the sand. We must assume the worst about these two regimes, and any evidence that confirms those assumptions ought to be treated as serious, rather than dismissed out of hand.
