The captain to whom Obama was referring presumably belongs to a battalion of the 10th Mountain Division, which is stationed at Ft. Drum, and as one of the Army’s few truly light infantry units, has been deployed more than almost any other formation outside of Special Operations Command. As Jake Tapper reported earlier, the captain was in fact a lieutenant at the time, so he obviously could have been a platoon leader. But his story isn’t quite Obama’s story. Obama gives the impression that these guys were about to go to Afghanistan, and then half of his platoon was detached and sent to Iraq instead. The actual story is more prosaic and typical of Army practice in most conflicts, including World War II. Over a period of some months, individuals in his platoon were transferred (not detached) to other units, probably based on immediate operational requirements; e.g., a unit about to deploy to Iraq was short of MOS-11B (Combat Infantryman), and the unit was fleshed out with drafts from other units. Happens all the time, has always happened. In World War II, it was not uncommon for units still in training, or newly arrived in a theater of operation, to be poached for troops to round out another unit about to go into battle. On going into battle shorthanded–it’s normal. If you aren’t shorthanded when you hit the ground, you will be shorthanded almost immediately thereafter, as your unit takes casualties or has to detach men for other duties. All rifle squads, platoons and companies in a combat zone are generally short anywhere from 15-25 percent of their TO&E (Table of Organization and Equipment) strength, and will remain so as long as combat intensity remains high and the unit stays in the line. On being pulled out for rest and recuperation, a unit will be fleshed out with replacements, who will receive some hasty orientation and training to augment the training they received beforehand. Then it’s back into the line, and the unit will be under strength again. That’s why a unit’s combat readiness is inversely proportional to its employment: units that never see combat always have their full complement of men and equipment, hence are (on paper) always more ready than units which have been in combat for any substantial period. Does this mean that the unit with the higher readiness is more “combat effective” than the other one? Not necessarily–a combat-proven unit at reduced strength may be much better than a rookie unit at full strength. There’s a tipping point, but defining it is a very complex subject. Regarding the HMMWVs, at the time there was a critical shortage throughout the Army in M1114 Up-Armored HMMWVs due to shortages of armor plate. This would have happened, no matter what the Bush administration had done, simply because there was no surplus capacity to produce armor in the industrial base (we have since been importing armor steel from a number of sources, including Russia and Ukraine). Only having two or three operational vehicles ought to be considered par for the course. So is complaining about it. Using other vehicles to make up the shortfall? Also par for the course. In World War II, our troops, the most lavishly equipped in history, often used captured German transport–along with captured German weapons (for instance, the 88mm Panzerschreck and the disposable Panzerfaust anti-tank rockets were considered much better than the 2.76-inch Bazooka, and were picked up wherever they could be found). On shortages of weapons and ammunition for training at Ft. Drum, again, this is typical of any army during a surge period. It has happened to our troops in every war. Our troops were, until well into 1942, forced to train with plywood mockups of tanks and dummy rifles. Heavy weapons such as the Mk.19 Automatic Grenade Launcher and the M2 Browning .50-cal machine gun are considered support weapons, and while it is nice to be able to train with them, I wouldn’t call the inability to do so a crippling disability for an infantry unit. After all, neither one is actually on the TO&E of a rifle platoon. Mounting a 12.7mm DShK in place of an M2 Browning? Not a particularly smart move, since the Browning has much better ballistics and is more reliable, but hey, with that big muzzle brake on the end, the Dushka really looks cool. Jake Tapper may think the captain “backs up Obama’s story.” Not really–if the “story” is the story as told by Obama. His version is misleading as a reporting of what the captain said. More fundamentally, it was intended as an indictment of our management of the war. But in this respect it’s silly. In fact, the “story” here merely shows the operation of “real war,” as opposed to “war on paper.” That a presidential candidate would make something of it either shows a cynical attempt to score political points, or an appalling ignorance of military realities.
