As I explained in my piece yesterday, Peter Bergen, a CNN commentator and senior fellow at the New America Foundation, does not believe the intelligence Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) gave up on al Qaeda’s sleeper agents was all that important. The facts and evidence, as accumulated by American intelligence and law enforcement officials, show otherwise. Bergen’s reading of this evidence is simply mendacious. Bergen’s reading of the intelligence KSM gave up on al Qaeda’s anthrax program is also horribly skewed. Months prior to KSM’s arrest, an al Qaeda operative named Yazid Sufaat was arrested in Malaysia. Authorities did not know Sufaat’s role as al Qaeda’s chief anthrax scientist at the time. After he was captured on March 1, 2003, KSM gave up intelligence on Sufaat and two others involved in the anthrax program. When confronted with this intelligence, Sufaat then admitted his prominent role. This story is partially told in a recently declassified CIA analysis dated July 13, 2004 and titled “Khalid Sheikh Mohammed: Preeminent Source on Al Qaeda.” While the CIA found this intelligence important, Bergen thinks it was close to, if not entirely, worthless. Why? Bergen says al Qaeda’s anthrax program was harmless. In a piece for Foreign Policy, Bergen wrote: “In fact, al Qaeda’s anthrax program was a big dud that never produced anything remotely threatening, a point that the CIA report is silent on.” The CIA’s report is silent on this point because it is completely wrong. In fact, here is what Bergen wrote in his book Holy War, Inc. (emphasis added):
Indeed, al Qaeda’s biological weapons program was far more sophisticated than U.S. intelligence analysts had figured prior to the war in Afghanistan. This was especially true with respect to a pathogen the intelligence community calls “Agent X.” As a March 31, 2005 report by a presidential commission on America’s intelligence regarding weapons of mass destruction programs explained:
While the intelligence community tried to mask the identity of “Agent X” for security reasons, the Washington Post noted in 2006 that it is “a pathogen that terrorism experts say was almost certainly anthrax.” The description of “Agent X” offered by the presidential commission is consistent with other evidence that has been reported concerning al Qaeda’s anthrax program. So, post-war intelligence says al Qaeda’s anthrax program was “extensive, well-organized, and operated for two years before September 11.” Peter Bergen argues, on the other hand, that the anthrax program was just a “big dud.” Bergen does not offer any evidence to back up his claim. It is just something he says.Former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet offers more details on al Qaeda’s anthrax program in his book, At the Center of the Storm. Tenet says that Sufaat, apparently after confronted with the intelligence from KSM, described himself as the “CEO” of the anthrax program. Somewhat ominously, al Qaeda worked on developing anthrax in parallel with its planning of the September 11 attacks. The program was overseen by al Qaeda number two, Ayman al Zawahiri, and during the summer of 2001 Sufaat briefed Zawahiri and another top al Qaeda member on his progress, claiming that he had isolated strains of anthrax. (The narrative Tenet provides is consistent with what the commission had to say about “Agent X.”) With the onset of war, al Qaeda temporarily shuttered the program. Sufaat attempted to disappear in his native Malaysia. He had hoped to restart his work by “continuing the anthrax program in Indonesia.” But Sufaat was captured before he could reopen his shop. Two of his assistants from the anthrax program, however, remained free. Sufaat offered up some “fragmentary” information on them, according to the CIA’s report. “But it was ultimately the information provided by KSM that led to the capture of Yazid’s two principal assistants in the anthrax program.” Intelligence assessments are hardly sacrosanct. Bergen has every right to challenge them, including the CIA’s analyses of the intelligence KSM gave up under coercive questioning. But he should at least provide some evidence to back up his claims. Most people would probably not be comfortable assuming away the threat posed by al Qaeda’s pursuit of deadly biological agents, including anthrax. The CIA’s analysis notes: “Reporting from KSM has greatly advanced our understanding of al Qaeda’s anthrax program.” Peter Bergen offers no reasons to think otherwise.
