But Col. McMaster has also pointed out that it’s “clear” we didn’t put enough troops on the Syrian border to stem the terrorist flow into Tal Afar. His regiment has been reporting on the lack of troops for some time. Nearly two years ago, for example, the New York Times wrote that,
After the battle here in September [2004] the military left behind fewer than 500 troops to patrol a region twice the size of Connecticut. With so few troops and the local police force in shambles, insurgents came back and turned Tal Afar, a dusty, agrarian city of about 200,000 people, into a way station for the trafficking of arms and insurgent fighters from nearby Syria — and a ghost town of terrorized residents afraid to open their stores, walk the streets or send their children to school. It is a cycle that has been repeated in rebellious cities throughout Iraq, and particularly those in the Sunni Arab regions west and north of Baghdad, where the insurgency’s roots run deepest. ”We have a finite number of troops,” said Maj. Chris Kennedy, executive officer of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, which arrived in Tal Afar several weeks ago. ”But if you pull out of an area and don’t leave security forces in it, all you’re going to do is leave the door open for them to come back. This is what our lack of combat power has done to us throughout the country. In the past, the problem has been we haven’t been able to leave sufficient forces in towns where we’ve cleared the insurgents out.”
The lack of troops aided al Qaeda efforts to infiltrate back into Tal Afar. And once back in, al Qaeda terrorized the local population, killed those who had collaborated with the Americans in 2004, and turned the city into an operational base to launch attacks around Iraq. While McMaster’s “clear and hold” strategy (in which, the colonel explains, the population is “secure[d] so that political development [and] economic development can proceed”) has been successful in Tal Afar, success elsewhere, which will require many well-trained troops, may well be enhanced if Secretary Rumsfeld followed the advice of Henry Kissinger. Kissinger, who supported Saddam’s removal from power and, unlike others, still does, recently explained why the Pentagon’s “linear” thinking on the training of Iraqi forces “runs the risk of confirming the adage that guerrillas win if they do not lose.” He argues that as Iraqi troops are stood up, they should be added to US forces, not a replacement for them. This policy, Kissinger believes, would “remedy the shortage of ground forces, which has slowed anti-guerrilla operations throughout the occupation.”
Whatever one’s view of the decision to undertake the Iraq war, the method by which it was entered, or the strategy by which it was conducted – and I supported the original decision – one must be clear about the consequences of failure. If, when we go, we leave nothing behind but a failed state and chaos, the consequences will be disastrous for the region and for America’s position in the world…. The views of critics and administration spokesmen converge on the proposition that as Iraqi units are trained, they should replace American forces – hence the controversy over which Iraqi units are in what state of readiness. But strategy based on substituting Iraqi for American troops may result in confirming an unsatisfactory stalemate. Even assuming that the training proceeds as scheduled and produces units the equivalent of the American forces being replaced – a highly dubious proposition – I would question the premise that American reductions should be in a linear relationship to Iraqi training. A design for simply maintaining the present unsatisfactory security situation. The better view is that the first fully trained Iraqi units should be seen as increments to coalition forces and not replacements, making possible accelerated offensive operations aimed at the guerrilla infrastructure. Such a strategy would help remedy the shortage of ground forces, which has slowed anti-guerrilla operations throughout the occupation. While seemingly more time-consuming, it would in fact present better opportunities for stabilizing the country and hence provide a more reliable exit route….
Sec. Rumsfeld is expected to make a recommendation on whether to keep or lower the current troop level in the next few weeks.
