Today, the Republican nomination process is a muddle. The Washington Post recently christened Jeb Bush the frontrunner, and for good reason. He is pulling in the top Republican talent — the donors, consultants, and various policy advisors necessary to fund and run a top-notch campaign.
Yet, his polling numbers are anemic. The average from Real Clear Politics (RCP) shows Bush pulling in just 14 percent nationwide. In New Hampshire, RCP finds him with 16 percent, and 12 percent in Iowa. One might dismiss these figures, considering how early we are in the cycle. But Jeb (“John Ellis Bush”) is a Bush — and Bushes have been running for national office for nearly 40 years. Republican voters know who he is, and have a pretty good idea of what he stands for. Yet they are not jumping on board, at least not yet.
This is not the first time in history a candidate has been in this spot — winning the inside game, but underperforming with the public at large. Think back to Phil Gramm in 1996; he ran well with the donor class, but ultimately failed to gain any popular traction. How about Mario Cuomo in 1992? He was sought after by the donor class, but ultimately declined to run.
Yet Jeb Bush presents a unique case in that his name recognition (at least recognition of his last name) is universal. Gramm and even Cuomo were much less familiar, so their polling position early on was less relevant.
Perhaps the better historical parallel harkens back to a very old one — the GOP nomination of 1880. This is one of my all-time favorites contests, and I discuss it in my new book, A Republic No More: Big Government and the Rise of American Political Corruption. It serves as a lesson for Jeb’s presidential aspirations.
The 1880 campaign has been mostly forgotten, but the nomination that year was really a watershed in the young GOP’s history. Ulysses S. Grant had been out of the White House for four years by that point, and the ensuing time had been hard for the professional political class. Nowadays, when we think of the GOP “professional class” we imagine the mega-donors, strategists, consultants, and lobbyists — all of whom draw a living off Republican politics in some manner or another. Back then, the professional class hailed from the political machines in states like Pennsylvania and New York. These were the bosses, lieutenants, and various campaign workers who depended on federal patronage, mostly through government jobs like the post offices and customs houses.
Grant had been exceedingly generous to these spoilsmen, but at great cost to the party’s reputation. Corruption had become an issue by the end of his term, and in 1876 the party nominated a reformer, Rutherford Hayes. The spoilsmen — known then as the “Stalwarts” — hated Hayes, and wanted rid of him. They were not alone; Hayes had aggravated reformers, too, so he had utterly no hope for renomination in 1880. That year, the Stalwarts threw their weight behind Grant for an unprecedented third term, under the belief that he would be a more generous dispenser of federal largesse.
It nearly worked. On the first ballot, Grant collected a little more than 300 delegates, putting him well within striking distance of the 379 needed to win the nomination. His support was centered in states with strong GOP machines — Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania — as well as Southern states where Democrats had a stranglehold on electoral politics, and the handful of Republicans desperately needed federal patronage. But Grant’s support stalled beyond that.
For ballot after ballot, various anti-Grant candidates rose and fell, until they finally coalesced around an alternative, James Garfield of Ohio. Garfield’s hands were not entirely clean — he had been mentioned in the Crédit Mobilier scandal of 1872 — but he was not a Stalwart. Delegates started shifting to him on the 34th ballot, and he won a majority on the 36th ballot as the anti-Grant forces finally coalesced. Amazingly, Grant’s core supporters stuck with him until the very end. This was unusual, as typically there was a stampede to the winning candidate on the final ballots. Hence the phrase “ Immortal 306” — signifying the 306 delegates who hung with Grant until the bitter end.
There may be a similar process at play on the GOP side of the ledger in 2016. To be clear: the Bushes certainly are not spoilsmen. They play politics with sharp elbows, just like anybody else at that level, but the Bush ethos of civic duty places them far above the grubby pay-to-play politics of the Gilded Age. And yet there is today a class of professional politicians — a modern group of consultants, advisors, donors, lobbyists etc. — who prospered under 12 years of Bush presidencies. They are eager for a Bush restoration in 2016, just as the Stalwarts were clamoring for a return to Grantism in 1880.
Meanwhile, the broader GOP electorate seems wary, at best. At this point in the 2000 cycle, George W. Bush was polling upwards of 40 percent nationwide. By the end of 1999 it would rise to 60 percent. According to RCP, Jeb currently is clocking in under 15 percent — even though he is at least as well known now as his brother was in early 1999. There is clearly a hesitancy among the rest of the party — i.e. those who do not draw a living from politics — for a Bush restoration.
This points to Jeb’s big challenge. He might be able to attract his own version of the “Immortal 306,” corralling a sizeable portion of the GOP’s professional class, but as Grant’s experience in 1880 illustrates, that is not enough. One has to make a broader offer to the party. In 1880, Grant failed to do that. The logic of a Grant restoration made little sense that year — at least to those who did not draw a living from politics. Hence, he never made it past those core supporters. The country, and for that matter much of the Republican party, had moved on. So Grant lost.
Jeb certainly looks to be cornering the market on the modern variety of professional Republicans, but he too will have to do more. What is the case for a Bush restoration, beyond the fact that it would make the professional GOP comfortable once again? Why should average Republican primary voters — the insurance salesmen and truck drivers, not pollsters and policy advisors — choose Jeb over Scott Walker, Chris Christie, Ted Cruz, or the dozen other potential nominees? Jeb will have to make a very persuasive argument on this front. He will face tougher competition than his brother did in 2000. Indeed, 2016 could see the most competitive GOP primary since 1980.
As Grant’s experience in 1880 demonstrates, winning over the insiders and professionals is simply not enough. The Immortal 306 may stay with you the whole way, but they are never a majority of the party. Can Jeb expand beyond them? It remains to be seen.
Jay Cost is a staff writer at the Weekly Standard. His new book, A Republic No More: Big Government and the Rise of American Political Corruption, is now available.
