Obama to Split the Afghan Baby

The New York Times reports that President Obama plans to amalgamate General McChrystal’s COIN strategy with General Biden’s (snark) counter-terrorism strategy, focusing on protecting cities instead of villages and towns.

President Obama’s advisers are focusing on a strategy for Afghanistan aimed at protecting about 10 top population centers, administration officials said Tuesday, describing an approach that would stop short of an all-out assault on the Taliban while still seeking to nurture long-term stability. Mr. Obama has yet to make a decision and has other options available to him, but as officials described it, the debate is no longer over whether to send more troops, but how many more will be needed. The question of how much of the country should fall under the direct protection of American and NATO forces will be central to deciding how many troops will be sent.

Obama’s advisors are slapping together two strategies — each of which simply cannot be prosecuted halfway — and haphazardly throwing them into the Hindu Kush. So instead of one proven, sound strategy, you now have two that are optimized for nothing. “Protecting cities” has a nice ring to it, but it completely ignores military reality. What about guarding lines of communication? Or supply routes? Who protects Afghanistan’s agrarian communities, which are the lifeblood of their economy? The Rhodesians pursued a failed strategy during their Bush War that was striking in its resemblance to Obama’s split-the-baby plan. Short on manpower, Rhodesians focused on holding their major cities and population centers. They slowly lost control of their rural countryside, couldn’t protect their commercial farms which — like Afghanistan — powered their economy, lost their highways, rail lines, communication nodes, and ultimately the war. In a different colonial conflict, however, our British allies were successful. During the Malayan Emergency, British forces drove a wedge between the local population and Maoist rebels, controlling vital arteries throughout the countryside, isolating towns and villages, and denying the enemy any potential safe haven. By the end of the war, the communist insurgents were confined to a small kill box — one the British ensured lived up to its name. The victory, however, didn’t come cheap. It took 12 years and nearly 100,000 Commonwealth forces to defeat the enemy. The obvious lesson here, proven by history, is that COIN isn’t something that can be done on a dime’s budget. It takes dedication, a kingly share of resources, and an equal amount of patience. However, defeating indigenous insurgents is possible with the right leadership, right strategy, and proper force structure. Naysayers should note that President Obama has all three available to him — so if we do allow Afghanistan to slip through our fingers, it will be because President Obama chose to lose.

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