The Obama administration is, according to the Washington Post, still discussing the possibility of sending at least some (it is not clear how many) of the 98 Yemeni detainees held at Gitmo to Saudi Arabia. The administration has previously floated the idea of having the Yemenis reeducated in the Saudis’ rehabilitation program for jihadists. The only real question is: Why?
At least three problems come immediately to mind.
First, the Saudis have rejected previous overtures in this vein on multiple occasions. This likely indicates that the Saudis themselves don’t think this is such a good idea. And the administration will almost certainly have to spend some of its political capital to convince them otherwise. The United States regularly tries to get the Saudis to do more with respect to shutting down terrorism and extremism financing. Asking the Saudis to watch over citizens of another country, when their cooperation on so many other related matters is uneven, is a bit of a stretch.
Second, the Saudi rehabilitation program is clearly not as effective as was initially claimed. Earlier this year, the Saudis reported that 11 of the Kingdom’s 85 most wanted terrorists were former Gitmo detainees who were “rehabilitated” in the program. (One has since reentered Saudi custody.) One of these 11 is now a prominent leader of al Qaeda’s arm on the Arabian Peninsula. That same al Qaeda branch is the chief reason the Obama administration does not want to send the Yemenis back to their home country. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is particularly strong in Yemen. Besides the 11 former Gitmo detainees, dozens of other terrorists placed on Saudi Arabia’s most wanted list had also been “rehabilitated.”
Moreover, testimony from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) reveals that U.S. intelligence officials are increasingly wary of the program, or at least they should be. The Federation of American Scientists (fas.org) recently released a declassified version of the ODNI’s written responses to questions posed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence earlier this year. The responses, which were crafted for an annual threat hearing held on February 12, include a number of interesting tidbits about the Saudi rehabilitation program.
For example, the ODNI concedes: “One element lacking in the program is a method for measuring success.” That is, the ODNI can’t really gauge the program’s efficacy. This is likely because the Saudis are not usually forthcoming with sensitive information, especially as it relates to the Kingdom’s own citizens and their involvement in the terrorist network. For example, the Kingdom’s most wanted list was a huge embarrassment and a rarity in terms of Saudi disclosures.
Moreover, even the Saudis don’t think the worst of the worst can be rehabilitated through the program. According to the ODNI:
Thus, the program’s efficacy, to the extent that anyone can measure it, is enhanced by the fact that the Saudis exclude the worst segment of the terrorist and extremist population from the program.
Does the Obama administration think that the Yemenis held at Gitmo are “mostly minor offenders”? That is hard to believe. There are abundant examples of Yemeni detainees who should be considered major security risks.
Then there is the typical Saudi duplicity when it comes to extremists and terrorists. While continuing to make a substantial number of arrests, the ODNI notes:
What happens if a Yemeni detainee decides that he has been held too long and sues? Are the Saudis going to just let him go?
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Saudi program is this (emphasis added):
Got that? The Saudis are not all that troubled with the terrorists’ anti-Americanism, which is typical of the xenophobic Wahhabis. The program is principally designed to guide their violent ambitions away from their fellow Muslims — that is, those residing in the Kingdom. This is consistent with Saudi Arabia’s longstanding policy. The House of Saud has little trouble with directing the jihad elsewhere. The royals’ only real concern is protecting their own necks, which is part of the reason (and only part) why the Kingdom’s cooperation in what was previously called the “war on terror” has been so uneven.
Third, it is not clear that the “strengths” of the Saudi rehab program can be applied to the Yemeni detainees in the first place. Here is how the ODNI describes it:
The problem is that most of the Yemeni detainees do not have familial or “societal” roots inside the Kingdom. Back in May when the Obama administration was talking about this proposal, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said the Yemenis they would send to Saudi Arabia “would be those with strong Saudi family connections or strong connections to Saudi Arabia.” But it doesn’t appear that many of the Yemeni detainees have “strong” familial or other connections to Saudi Arabia. The Wall Street Journal noted earlier this year that “around 20 Yemenis” have “direct family connections to Saudi Arabia.” If accurate, that would leave 78 Yemenis with no direct ties to the Kingdom.
Is the Obama administration trying to send more than these 20 or so Yemeni detainees to Saudi Arabia? If so, then why? There is no evidence that the program is well-suited for Yemenis with no ties inside the Kingdom. Even with respect to the Yemenis with family ties inside the Kingdom, there is increasing evidence that the Saudi program is not really effective on hardened terrorists of any nationality, many of whom reside at Gitmo.
The Bush administration made its own mistakes in relying too heavily upon the Saudi rehabilitation program. The Obama administration would be wise not to repeat them, or make new mistakes of its own.
