THE MOST CURIOUS thing about Europe’s newest democracies is their propensity to suffer serious reversal at their moment of greatest triumph. After gaining membership in the European Union and NATO, the Central European success stories of the 1990’s have hit a bad patch recently.
In Poland, a government with roots in the Solidarity movement of the 1980’s has alienated both Germany and Russia and divided its citizenry on the painful issue of how to deal with Poland’s communist past. In Slovakia, grumpy voters have decided to turn out their reformist prime minister in order to elect an opportunistic populist whose policy pronouncements have made the country an object of ridicule. And, in Romania, for reasons known only to Romanians, the Parliament has decided that formal entry into the European Union was the signal to launch the impeachment of the president.
Given their problematic history, the temporary resurgence of reactionary politics, populism, and political instability in these Central European democracies might have been expected. Like teenagers in their last summer before college, the collective misbehavior of Europe’s most recent democracies is disappointing and even annoying, but it is not serious. Further to the East, however, the political frailties and miscalculations that gave rise to these regressive trends within Europe may be fatal to the more delicate democracies that are not yet anchored in Europe’s institutions.
Ukraine is the case in point. There the democratic transformation which began with the Orange Revolution in 2004 has collapsed into bitterness, recrimination, and ongoing political crisis. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Ukraine’s entire political class has failed the Ukrainian people in the critical early years of their democracy. This failure has triggered the breakdown of the institutions, such as the Parliament and constitution, which are essential to the rule of law and accountable government. How did this happen, and who is to blame?
In 2006, in the first fair elections in Ukraine’s history, the voters split their support among the three major parties, giving the Party of Regions the largest share and control of the Government. The Regions party, whose power base lies in Eastern Ukraine and whose constituents are mostly Russian speaking, failed to reach a durable political understanding with the leaders of the Orange Revolution, who hail from the West of Ukraine. The Regions Party did not move quickly enough to dispel fears about its reputation for tolerating corruption and authoritarian measures while in previous Governments. Through a combination of the inaction by Regions and underlying cultural antagonisms between East and West, the two other parties became convinced that Regions intended to consolidate political power at the expense of the president and opposition.
In response, the Parliamentary opposition, led by the charismatic populist Yulia Timoshenko, made no secret that it regarded the results of the 2006 elections as illegitimate for the simple but unpersuasive reason that Yulia herself did not win. Publicly, the opposition called for new elections. Privately, they advocated “a second revolution” to complete the unfinished business of the Orange Revolution, which was to imprison the “bandits” of the Regions party. Hardly what the West expected from a democratic opposition party.
Finally, there is the party of President Victor Yushchenko, whose face, disfigured by poison, became the symbol of everything that was noble and heroic about the Orange Revolution. He was supposed to guide the birth of a modern Ukrainian nation as President Vaclav Havel did for the Czech Republic during the last decade. Sadly, this did not happen.
In the last month, President Yushchenko has dissolved the Parliament, removed unfriendly judges from the Constitutional Court, and attempted to dismiss the government. Today, President Yushchenko rules the country by presidential decree in a manner all too reminiscent of former Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma. As a consequence, the shaky institutional foundations of Ukrainian democracy have begun to give way. The prospect of elections later this summer seems unlikely to remedy the causes of the disease that is destabilizing the fragile Ukrainian nation. The only consolation is that this time Moscow cannot be held responsible for the political chaos in Kiev. Ukraine’s political elite have done this to themselves.
For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the flowering of democracy throughout Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, the failure of a European democracy is a real possibility. Official visits between Kiev and Washington have been cancelled. Negotiations between Ukraine and the European Union on visas and free trade are on hold. Even Ukraine’s entry into the World Trade Organization awaits the return of a functioning Parliament to Kiev. In short, an isolated Ukraine is now exposed to the potential restoration of Moscow’s influence and the adoption of its authoritarian political model.
The Ukrainian voters are appropriately disgusted by the blind ambition and recklessness of their leaders. Their websites are filled with dark talk of civil war. But in the capitals of Western Europe, the crisis is studiously ignored. In Washington, officials are dumbfounded but still adamant–the United States can do nothing. This is how democracies fail.
Bruce P. Jackson is the president of the Project on Transitional Democracies, a non-profit advocate for democratic change in the Balkans and former Soviet Union.
