It’s interesting to note that my mentor, Edward Luttwak, was an advisor to US Aircraft in the design and development of the A-67, which as John Noonan reported here yesterday is a likely pick for the Air Force’s new COIN squadrons. Way back when, we did a study on close air support for the Air Force, and essentially concluded that fixed wing CAS was a waste of resources, because when you needed it badly, it was impossible to deliver (due to battlefield air defense systems), and when you could deliver it, you really didn’t need it. Luttwak greatly preferred rotary wing solutions, based on the Israeli experience in the Yom Kippur War, as well as developments in short-range air defense systems in the 1980s. Of course, that was in the context of the European Central Front, where NATO aircraft would have had to confront a very thick, layered, and overlapping Soviet air defense network. In COIN the situation is somewhat different, because air defenses tend to be simpler (mainly heavy machine guns and shoulder-fired missiles) and much thinner on the ground. That said, to be effective–that is, to deliver ordnance on target in a timely and surgical manner that minimizes collateral damage–a manned aircraft must either be equipped with sophisticated target acquisition sensors (FLIR, LLTV and the like), use precision munitions directed by troops on the ground or a dedicated target acquisition aircraft (either manned or unmanned), or rely on unguided weapons and fly very low and slow. Since the A-67 lacks sophisticated sensors and is unlikely to be equipped with precision munitions, the latter is likely to be its normal mode of attack. But, flying low and slow, the plane will be extremely vulnerable, regardless of its small size, agility, and robust construction. Assuming the plane is capable of attacking forces equipped with typical insurgent air defense weapons, it will still likely sustain varying degrees of damage that will require time to repair and will impact its availability rate. On wonders how long Iraqi air force pilots will continue to press their luck, once the insurgents figure out the particular weaknesses of the Dragon. That said, if it does manage to catch insurgents in the open, it should have a field day with them, given its typical load-out of GAU-2 7.62mm Minigun pods (each capable of spitting out 3,000 rounds per minute), 2.75-inch Hydra-70 rockets, and lightweight general purpose bombs. Its advertised endurance of eleven hours would allow it to provide extended coverage for Iraqi forces hunting down insurgents, but pilot endurance will be a real limiting factor (A-1 Skyraider pilots, who flew missions of similar duration in the Vietnam War, often employed inflatable rubber doughnuts to ease their aching posteriors). Also, the lack of any sort of hydraulic boost for the control system, while improving survivability against ground fire, will make the plane more work to fly, especially at higher speeds and payloads, which will also contribute to pilot fatigue. Finally, without an integral or pod-mounted FLIR or night vision system, the Dragon will be relatively ineffective in darkness or bad weather. At best, its pilots could try to fly the plane using helmet-mounted night vision goggles (in the same manner as many helicopter pilots), but this is an extremely difficult skill to master, and given the higher speeds at which the Dragon will operate, I predict a fairly high accident rate on night operations–until the Iraqis become proficient. That, I suspect, is the reason for the all-aircraft ballistic parachute recovery system–in the event of a non-recoverable spin or departure from controlled flight, the pilot can pull the ripcord, bringing the aircraft back to a level flight position from which he can either wait for it to return to earth, or (after releasing the chute), resume normal flight. In most inexperienced air forces, far more aircraft are lost to accidents than to malfunctions or hostile action. And that may be the main rationale for the A-67: a reasonable first step towards restoring the combat capability of the Iraqi Air Force. Cheap, simple to operate and repair, it’s a good match for the skill set of current Iraqi pilots and ground crews. In addition, its modest performance represents no threat to U.S. forces (which must still be a consideration given examples of treachery and hostile action on the part of a handful of insurgent infiltrators in the Iraqi Army). Over time, the Iraqi Air Force can introduce more capable combat aircraft, or even UAVs, to perform the COIN mission, allowing the A-67 to segue into the dual roles of advanced trainer and second line light attack aircraft.
